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ABSTRACT
Merger and Acquisition Activities in the Hospitality Industry
by
Hyun Kyung Chatfield
Dr. M ichael Dalbor, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f  Tourism and Convention Administration 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
This study provides a comprehensive study o f hospitality mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) for the period between 1985 and 2004. The cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) for hospitality target and acquiring firms around the announcement o f M&As are 
analyzed. The focus is on the returns o f target and acquiring firms, as well as returns by 
three different hospitality industry segments (hotel, restaurant and gaming), by nature o f 
acquisition, and by method o f  payment. In addition, it examines the influence o f REIT 
and public status on the CARs o f  M&A participants.
The overall findings are mixed. Some results are consistent w ith previous studies.
For instance, hospitality targets enjoy significantly positive returns. The target returns 
from both tender offers and mergers are significantly positive.
This study finds hospitality bidder returns are slightly positive and significant. This is 
consistent w ith the synergy motive for M&As. Also bidder returns to cash offers are 
higher than those o f stock offers supporting information asymmetry and signaling 
theories.
Ill
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Unlike previous studies, target returns to stock offers are higher than cash offers.
Most previous studies found target returns to cash offers are higher than stock offers.
This is an indication o f  possible characteristics unique to the hospitality industry.
Bidder returns from mergers are slightly positive; however, those o f  tender offers are 
not significantly different from zero which is contrary to previous studies showing bidder 
returns are generally higher in tender offers than mergers. Unlike previous studies, there 
is no association found between method o f  paym ent and nature o f acquisition. The 
results suggest bidder returns are more likely to be positive with mergers using cash 
offers. This indicates the market reacted positively and expected synergy from friendly 
mergers.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Background for the Study 
The definition o f  a merger is when two firms combine to form a single company. 
Successful mergers and acquisitions (M&A) play a significant role in the growth of 
business and allow firms to expand more quickly than they could naturally. Growth is 
generally considered to be critical to the health o f  a firm. In general, growing companies 
will attract more customers, higher quality employees and investors. Through mergers, 
firms can take advantage o f  economies o f scale, reduction in average costs, increased 
revenues, and create growth opportunities.
Merger participants include the bidding company, the target company, arbitrageurs, 
and shareholders, management and directors o f  both companies. A bidder is an 
entrepreneur who sees profitable opportunities and offers a m erger deal. A target is a 
firm a bidder seeks to acquire due to potential synergy or hidden profitable opportunities. 
Shareholders are the owners o f the firm, and large shareholders often have disparate 
influence over management decisions.
Turnover o f  the target firm ’s top management typically increases after a merger. 
Because o f potential job  loss and other inherent agency problem s, management may not 
always make the best decisions for shareholders. Unless there is compensation available
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for target’s top management, such as golden parachutes, target’s top management 
typically has a strong incentive to resist takeovers, especially from hostile bids. In a 
hostile bid, there m ay be other potential buyers. Sometimes target firms invite a friendly 
buyer, called a “w hite knight” that might have an interest in purchasing the target. 
Arbitrageurs are short-term investors investing in targets and are hoping to profit from 
the takeover situation.
M&A is one o f  m any potential investment projects that companies can pursue. 
Therefore, M&A decisions should be made based on shareholder wealth maximization. 
That means a firm should invest in projects that generate positive net present value.
There are many reasons for companies participating in M&As. Survey evidence shows 
that CFOs believe achieving operating synergies is the key motivation for M&A 
(Mukheijee, Kiymaz, & Baker, 2004).
Market Response
Even though rationale may vary from one merger or acquisition to another, merger 
success is commonly measured by  the short term and/or long term stock price responses. 
Studies not only show that returns from M&As vary over time, but also that the combined 
target and bidder response is uncertain. Studies show bidder returns have a slight 
tendency to decline for the period between the 1960s and 1990s. It appears that bidder 
returns were higher (more positive) in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) claim that average announcement returns to bidders were 
4.1% in the 1963 to 1968 period but -2.9%  in the 1981 to 1984 period. In addition.
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according to Moeller, Sclingemann, and Stulz (2003), bidders’ returns dramatically 
declined from 1997 to 2001.
On the other hand, targets earned significant gains from takeovers in the 1980’s 
(Weston, Siu, & Johnson, 2001). In recent years, the government has increased merger 
regulation along with the development o f  sophisticated defense tactics by target firms.
As a result, target firm s’ returns increased and the acquiring firm s’ returns decreased over 
this same time. Taken together. Fan and Goyal (2002) show the overall average o f  the 
combined returns to targets and bidders increased from 1962 to 1996. The combined 
wealth effect (from one day before the announcement to one day after) is 1.5% during 
1962 to 1970, and 2.4% for the period 1991 to 1996.
There are several factors with a potential to influence returns for both bidder and 
target companies. Some o f those factors include merger regulations, method or nature o f 
acquisition, method o f  payment, and extent o f management ownership.
Merger Regulation
Merger regulation can have a significant impact upon returns to bidders and target 
firms. Before the Williams Act, a hostile bidder was not obligated to reveal any 
information to target shareholders. The Williams Act, adopted in 1968, extended 
regulation to tender offers. It was intended to protect target shareholders from rapid and 
secret takeovers by (1) providing early warning and more inform ation during the takeover 
process so target shareholders and management can assess outstanding offers; (2) 
obligating a minimum period during which a tender offer m ust be left open (20 trading 
days), thus postponing the implementation o f the tender offer; and (3) giving power to
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targets to sue bidding firms. The Williams Act made the process o f  tendering an offer 
more expensive and lengthy for bidders.
It seems M &A regulation subjects merger participants to greater costs, especially for 
bidders. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) report that M &A legislation decreased bidder gains 
and increased target gains on tender offers. Likewise, Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, (1983) 
found that returns to bidding firms were significantly higher before the execution o f the 
Williams Act o f  1968. Bradley et al. (1988) report that the W illiams Act, as well as 
multiple bidder competition, has a negative effect on bidder returns and suggests that 
target returns increased at the cost o f  bidding firms. Schipper and Tom pson (1983) found 
four regulations promulgated between 1968 and 1970 are associated with wealth- 
reducing effects for bidding firms: (1) Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinions 16 
and 17, (2) the 1969 Tax Reform Act, (3) the Williams Amendments to the securities 
laws, and (4) its 1970 extension.
Method o f Acquisition: Tender Offer (Hostile) versus. Merger (Friendly)
Acquisitions can be divided into two types: tender offer or merger. “In a tender offer, 
the acquiring firm (the bidder) m akes an offer to the stockholders o f the firm it is seeking 
to control (the target) to submit or tender their shares in exchange for a specified price, 
expressed in cash or securities” (Copeland & Weston, 1983, p. 559). Tender offers are 
directed to the target firm shareholders, prearranged as take-it-or-leave-it offers, and 
often made with a hostile attitude. Mergers are typically negotiated between the top 
management o f  buyer and target firms, and usually involve friendly interaction (Bmner, 
2004). A hostile tender offer starts with an unsolicited offer by a bidder to obtain the
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bulk or all o f the target firm’s shares. Franks and M ayer (1996) and Schwert (2000) 
similarly define hostile takeovers as ones where an initial offer has been rejected by 
target management. The rejection may be due to several possibilities including a conflict 
over the price or the planned restructuring after the takeover. Due to rejection, the 
bidder then chooses a forced transaction.
Studies show tender offers generate greater value for bidders than mergers. Numerous 
studies report higher bidder returns in tender offers than in friendly negotiated deals. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarized 16 studies o f returns in contested and friendly 
transactions. According to the survey, several studies found significantly positive returns 
to bidders in hostile transactions (Asquith, Bruner, & M ullins, 1990; Gregory, 1997; 
Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Lang, Stultz, & W alkling, 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Ran & 
Vermaelen, 1998.). Jensen and Ruback (1983) claim, based on the analysis o f these 16 
studies, the weighted average o f  the return to bidders in successful tender offers was a 
positive 4.0% and in successful mergers was zero. On the other hand, the return to 
targets in successful tender offer was 29.9% and 7.72% in successful mergers.
Method o f  Payment
The method o f  payment can significantly influence the returns for M &A participants. 
Bidders have a choice between cash, stock, or a combination o f  both. The choice o f 
payment has an information effect to the m arket about b idder’s stock value and growth 
opportunities. Information asymmetry theory assumes management has better 
information about their firm. Therefore, w hen the market undervalues the company’s 
stock, management does not want to issue stock or use stock for acquisition, and is thus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
more likely to use cash for acquisition. On the other hand, w hen management believes 
their stock is overvalued in the market, they are m ore likely to use stock for acquisition. 
Market reactions to M & A  method o f payment is generally consistent with information 
asymmetry theory and many studies show that stock-for-stock transactions are more 
costly to bidders than cash transactions (see Asquith et al., 1990; Heron & Lie, 2002; 
Huang & W alkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Yook, 2003).
Studies find the higher the investment (growth) opportunities, the greater the 
likelihood o f  stock financing (Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 1996; M artin, 1996). Jung et al. claim 
that due to financial flexibility, managers with higher growth opportunities prefer to raise 
funds with equity than debt. M artin (1996) finds a strong relationship between bidders’ 
growth opportunities and stock financing and believes this is an underlying motive for the 
method o f payment in M&As. The more the bidders’ growth opportunities, the more 
likely stock financing will be used.
Management Equity Holding
Studies suggest that there is a relationship between the returns to the bidder’s 
shareholders and the equity interests held by the bidder’s managers and employees 
(Agrawal & M andelker, 1987; Healey, Palepu, & Ruback, 1997; You, Caves, Smith, & 
Henry, 1986). It seems like more value is produced when mangers have larger ownership 
interest. You et al. found that bidder returns were lower (i.e., more negative) when the 
bidding managers’ equity stake is lower. Similarly, Healey et al. (1997) reports that 
“While takeovers w ere usually break-even investments, the profitability o f individual 
transactions varied widely ... the transactions characteristics that were under
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management control substantially influenced the ultimate payoffs from takeovers” (p.
55).
Merger Waves
There are many possible motivations for mergers including synergy, tax 
considerations, purchase o f  assets below their replacement cost, diversification, and 
gaining control over another enterprise. Sorenson (2000) argues that mergers in the 
1990s occurred for different reasons than mergers in previous decades. Likewise, 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) describe the merger and acquisition (M&A) activity o f the 
1960s and 1970s as a time when strategies related to financial synergies and taxes led to 
conglomerate acquisitions; tax strategies were the primary m otivation behind the 1980’s 
M &A activity; and operating synergies led to the 1990’s M &A activity.
Economic gains can be derived from mergers through economies o f  scale and the 
exchange o f assets from less efficient to more efficient managers. However, one o f the 
reasons mergers are regulated by government is the possible reduction in competition.
Over the last century, empirical studies o f merger activity consistently show the 
following 1) M &A activity appears in waves and 2) within a wave, mergers strongly 
cluster by industry. Harford (2005) suggests that mergers m ight occur as a reaction to 
unexpected shocks to industry structure.
According to Harford (2005), a restaurant merger wave started in March o f  1985.
Due to saturation o f  the market and custom ers’ trends toward take-out food from 
restaurants and supermarkets, restaurants had to compete and m odify in order to survive 
these new trends. In addition, a lodging industry merger wave started in December 1996.
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Operators such as Starwood went on buying sprees, and other lodging operators also 
bought properties to gain sufficient bulk to compete in the corporate account business 
market.
During the last few years, numerous mergers and acquisitions occurred in the gaming 
industry. In June o f  2005, H arrah’s Entertainment obtained N evada regulators’ 
permission to complete its $9.4 billion merger with Caesars Entertainment, once the 
largest gaming company. After the merger, H arrah’s became the w orld’s largest gaming 
company including 56 casinos and almost 42,000 hotel rooms in 13 states and four other 
nations. In April 2005, MGM M irage bought out Mandalay Resort Group, previously the 
fourth largest casino company in Las Vegas, for $7.9 billion. A t the time it was the 
largest merger in history in this industry. (“Looking at life,” 2005). Currently in 2005, 
twenty-five percent o f  all commercial gaming revenues in the United States are generated 
in Las Vegas. These megamergers will change competition w ithin the industry.
Research into w hy mergers have occurred in the restaurant, lodging, and gaming 
industries has been limited. Recent studies about the rationale for m erger waves claims 
that there is a correlation between merger waves and high stock m arket valuations. 
Shleifer and V ishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan’s (2004) present models 
that demonstrate that merger waves result from managerial tim ing o f  stock market 
overvaluations o f their firms. Others, such as, Gort (1969) and M itchell and Mulherin 
(1996), claim that m erger waves result from an industry’s economic shocks, 
technological change, or a change in the regulatory environment. Harford (2005) agrees 
that economic, regulatory and technological shocks drive industry m erger waves.
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however, Harford argues adequate capital liquidity is required before the shock leads to a 
merger wave.
Although, studies o f  m erger waves reveal different characteristics, they also seem to 
share some com mon characteristics. M erger waves occurred in a period o f low or falling 
interest rates, a rising stock market, and an expanding economy. However, they are very 
much different in industry focus (e.g., oil, banking, utilities, internet, conglomerate, etc.), 
in type o f transaction (e.g., horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, strategic, or financial), and 
in the presence or absence o f  hostile bids. During the period o f  increasing real interest 
rates or increasing cost o f  capital, mergers and acquisitions seem to slow down (Bruner, 
2004).
According to Andrade, M itchell and Stafford (2001) the hotel industry was one o f  the 
top five industries in terms o f  average annual merger activity in the 1990s. Saturation in 
the hotel industry made new hotel development uneconomical in many areas (Kim,
2001). According to Cook Jr. (1997), hotel company valuations were fairly high and 
capital was generally available. As a result, mergers and acquisitions have been 
extensively used in the hotel industry as a means to achieve growth and this is anticipated 
to continue in the future.
Weston et al. (2001) claim that target shareholders typically gained substantially from 
takeovers in the 1980’s. Evidence from the 1980’s also shows that returns to target firms 
grew over the decade as government regulation improved and as targets developed better 
defensive strategies. The returns to bidding firms decreased over this same period. 
Overall, the total wealth increase from M &A activity in the 1980’s appears positive.
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Research Question
This study w ill investigate M &A activity in the hospitality industry (restaurant, hotel 
and casino industry) and the synergy effect (cumulative abnormal returns or gains) from 
merger activity for both target and acquiring companies. Do hospitality merger 
participants receive abnormal returns? If  there is a gain, then who m akes the gain and 
how much? W hat factors increase or decrease cumulative abnormal returns for both the 
target and acquiring company? What are the factors and how do they influence 
(positively or negatively) cumulative abnormal returns for both the target and the 
acquiring company? The hypotheses to be tested in this study evolve from the research 
questions based on previous studies.
Hypotheses 
Target Returns by Industry 
Hypothesis 1 : M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to target firms associated with 
M&A activity in the hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero.
Hl-T. in the gaming industry 
H I-2: in the restaurant industry 
H I -3; in the hotel industry 
H l-4: in the nonhospitality industry
H I-5: There is no difference in the mean CAR to target firms between the gaming, 
restaurant, hotel, and nonhospitality industry
10
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HI ; p (All targets CARs) < 0,
H I a: p (All targets CARs) > 0
H l-1 : p (target CAR for gaming industry) < 0
H la-1 : p (target CAR for gaming industry) > 0
H I-2: p (target CAR for restaurant industry) < 0
H la-2: p (target CAR for restaurant industry) > 0
H I-3: p (target CAR for hotel industry) < 0
H la-3: p (target CAR for hotel industry) > 0
H l-4: p (target CAR for nonhospitality industry) < 0
H la-4: p (target CAR for nonhospitality industry) > 0
H I-5: p (target CAR for gaming) = p (target CAR for restaurant) = p (target CAR for
hotel) = p (target CAR for nonhospiality)
H la-5: Means o f  target CARs for gaming, restaurant, hotel and nonhospiality are not 
equal to one another.
Bidder Returns by Industry 
Hypothesis 2: M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidders associated with M&A 
activity in the hospitality industry is equal to zero.
11
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H2-1 : in the gaming industry 
H2-2: in the restaurant industry 
H2-3: in the hotel industry
H2-4: There is no difference in the mean CAR to bidders between the gaming, 
restaurant and hotel industry
H2 : p (All bidder CARs) = 0 
H2a : p (All bidder CARs) f  0
H2-1 : p (bidder CAR for gaming industry) = 0 
H2a-1 : p (bidder CAR for gaming industry) f  0
H2-2: p (bidder CAR for restaurant industry) = 0 
H2a-2: p (bidder CAR for restaurant industry) f  0
H2-3: p (bidder CAR for hotel industry) = 0 
H2a-3 : p (bidder CAR for hotel industry) f  0
H2-4: p (bidder CAR for gaming) = p (bidder CAR for restaurant) = p (bidder CAR for 
hotel)
H2a-4: Means o f  bidder CARs for gaming, restaurant, and hotel are not equal to one 
another.
12
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Target Returns by Nature o f Acquisition 
Hypothesis 3: The mean CAR o f  target firms associated with M &A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H3 -1 : for tender offer 
H3-2: for m erger
H3-3: For target firms, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
H3-1 ; p (target CAR for tender offer) < 0 
H3a-1 : p (target CAR for tender offer) > 0
H3-2: p (target CAR for merger) < 0 
H3a-2; p (target CAR for merger) > 0
H3-3: p (target CAR for tender offer = p (target CAR for merger)
H3a-3: p (target CAR for tender offer f  p (target CAR for merger)
Target Returns by Method o f Payment 
Hypothesis 4: M ean CAR of target firms associated with M & A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H4-1 : for cash offer
H4-2: for stock offer
H4-3: for mix o f  cash and stock offer
13
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H4-4: For target firms, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and 
m ixed offer CARs
H4-1 : g (target CAR for cash offer) < 0 
H4a-1 : g (target CAR for cash offer) > 0
H4-2: g (target CAR for stock offer) < 0 
H4a-2: g (target CAR for stock offer) > 0
H4-3: g (target CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) < 0 
H4a-3 : g (target CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) > 0
H4-4: g (target CAR for cash) = g (target CAR for stock) = g (target CAR for 
mix o f  cash and stock offer)
H4a-4: Means o f  target CARs for cash, stock, and mixed offers are not equal to one 
another.
Bidder Returns by Nature o f  Acquisition 
Hypothesis 5 : M ean CAR o f bidders associated w ith M &A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H5 -1 : for tender offer 
H5-2: for merger
H5-3; For bidders, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
14
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H5-1 ; g (bidder CAR for tender offer) = 0
H5a-1 : g (bidder CAR for tender offer) A 0
H5-2: g (bidder CAR for merger) = 0 
H5a-2: g (bidder CAR for merger) A 0
H5-3: g (bidder CAR for tender offer = g (bidder CAR for merger)
H5a-3: g (bidder CAR for tender offer A g (bidder CAR for merger)
Bidder Returns by Method o f Payment 
Hypothesis 6: M ean CAR o f bidders associated with M &A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H 6-1 : for cash offer
H6-2: for stock offer
H6-3; for mix o f  cash and stock offer
H6-4: For bidders, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and 
mixed offer CARs
H6-1 : g (bidder CAR for cash offer) = 0 
H 6-la: g (bidder CAR for cash offer) A 0
15
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H6-2; g (bidder CAR for stock offer) = 0
H6-2a: g (bidder CAR for stock offer) A 0
H6-3 : g (bidder CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) = 0 
H6a-3; g (bidder CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) A 0
H6-4: g (bidder CAR for cash) = g (bidder CAR for stock) = g (bidder CAR for 
mix o f  cash and stock offer)
H6a-4: Means o f  bidder CARs for cash, stock, and mixed offers are not equal to one 
another.
Purpose o f  the Study 
The purpose o f  this study is to examine cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
surrounding m erger and acquisition activities by the nature o f  acquisition, method of 
payment, and type o f hospitality industry. The mean CAR represents the average total 
return o f the event (merger and acquisition in this study) for the particular time period 
across all firms. Do tender offers produce higher CARs to M &A participants than 
mergers? Does method o f paym ent affect CAR to participants? Specifically, this study 
will consider cumulative abnormal returns (gains) associated with M &A activity in the 
restaurant, hotel and gaming industries along with the differences among these three 
segments. This study will also investigate the specific factors that cause cumulative 
abnormal returns to merger participants in the hospitality industry to increase or decrease.
16
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Significance o f  the Study 
There are num erous merger and acquisition studies exam ining the overall market and 
also studies exam ining unique industries, such, as the banking and utility industries. As 
merger waves seem to be industry specific, M &A performance is not homogeneous 
across all industries. The hospitality industry has different characteristics than other 
industries. Due to different characteristics between the three industries (gaming, 
restaurant, and hotel), M&A activity and return behavior m ight be different between 
these three hospitality industry segments.
In general, the hospitality industry is a labor intensive industry. According to the 
Restaurant Organization (2005 Restaurant industry forecast, 2005), the restaurant 
industry in 2005 is the largest employer in the U.S. besides government. Restaurants 
currently employ approximately 12.2 million people. However, most restaurants are 
generally small businesses with 70% o f them having fewer than 20 employees, and more 
than 70% o f restaurants are single-unit (independent) operations.
In recent years, the restaurant industry has experienced rapid growth, and tremendous 
competition (Gu, 2002). Unfortunately, m any restaurant businesses failed due to this 
rapid expansion (Schwartz, 1999). The Dun and Bradstreet Business Failure Record 
(1993-1997) reported during the period 1992 to 1997, the restaurant industry had more 
business failures than any other single industry within the retail trade sector (Gu, 2002).
The lodging industry has significant investment in fixed assets, such as real estate. It 
also has intangible assets, such as experienced management and franchise affiliations 
(Kim, 2001). U pneja and Dalbor’s (2001a) study o f  long-term debt choice in the lodging 
industry found that unlike the restaurant industry (Upneja and Dalbor, 2001b), firm size
17
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was not a significant factor in the selection o f  long-term debt, and there is a significant 
positive relationship with growth opportunities and long-term debt in the hotel industry. 
The authors claim  the surprising result o f a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and long-term debt might be due to the tangible fixed asset nature o f the 
lodging industry, which may provide valuable collateral to the lenders.
The gaming industry is highly regulated and thus has significant entry barriers. 
Between 1993 and 1998, the gaming industry experienced significant revenue growth, 
heavy capital spending, declining profitability, and the increased use o f  debt financing 
(Rogers, 2005). Rogers (2005) claims casino gaming industry stock prices were very 
weak during 1994-1998. During this time, gaming industry stock price performance was 
ranked 120^ o f  122 industry categories in the Compustat Research Insight database (as 
cited in Rogers, 2005).
A merger wave swept through the hospitality industry during the last few decades. 
Despite this m erger wave in the hospitality industry, there are only limited studies o f 
M&A activity in the hospitality industry. This study will provide a thorough, 
comprehensive M & A study in the hospitality industry. It w ill investigate cumulative 
abnormal returns (gains) associated with M &A activity in the restaurant, hotel and 
gaming industries. I f  there are gains or losses, are the gains/losses from M &A activity 
different between each o f  these three segments o f  the hospitality industry? This study 
will also investigate w hat factors increase or decrease cumulative abnormal returns to 
target and acquiring firms.
18
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Limitations
This study is limited by secondary data. The merger announcement data are collected 
from Security D ata Corporations (SDC). Only stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX, and 
Nasdaq stock markets are included in the sample. Also, stock price information must be 
available in CRSP. REIT bidder and REIT target firms are very  few. Without the REIT 
bidder variable, however, the multiple regression models are not statistically significant.
Delimitations
This study is delimited by the sample selection. This study analyzes merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity in the hospitality industry between 1985 and 2004. Mergers 
and acquisitions data has been collected from Security D ata Corporations (SDC) with 
each acquirer’s ultim ate parent SIC from SDC used to classify firms. Stock price 
information has been collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
file. Only stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stock markets are included in 
the sample.
This study includes M&As acquired by hospitality firms under four different standard 
industry codes: restaurants (5812), motels and hotels (7011), and gaming and casinos 
(7993 and 7999).
Definition o f  Terms
1. Acquisition: To obtain or buy a controlling ownership in a firm.
2. Conglomerate: A  conglomerate merger is where both firms are in unrelated 
businesses.
19
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3. Cumulate abnormal return (CARL The CAR represents the average total return o f 
the event for the particular time period for all firms.
4. Event: Announcement o f  a merger and acquisition, tender offer, share repurchase, 
and so on.
5. Event studv: examines the changes in shareholder w ealth resulting from the 
announcement o f mergers and acquisitions.
6. Friendlv m erger: A friendly takeover has to be negotiated and accepted by 
shareholders and management.
7. Horizontal m erger: A  horizontal merger is where both firms are in the same line 
ofbusiness.
8. Hostile takeover: A bidder directly makes a tender offer to the shareholders o f the 
target company, w ithout informing the target management or after target 
management strongly resists a friendly takeover attempt. Each shareholder comes 
to a decision whether or not to tender his shares independently.
9. M erger: A merger is w hen two firms combine to form a single company. 
Normally friendly in nature, the top management o f  the target and bidder firms 
negotiate the deal.
10. Nonhospitality industry targets: Targets that are not in the hotel, restaurant, or 
gaming industry.
11. 0-ratio  (Tobin’s q-ratio): Market value o f  a firm divided by book value. It can 
be used to measure the stock performance o f a firm.
12. Residual: The abnormal return or excess returns which are calculated as the 
actual return for that day for a firm minus the predicted return. The abnormal
20
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return represents the unpredicted portion o f a firm ’s return caused by the event.
13. Residual analvsis: A study o f  the impact o f  an event by  assessing the 
unpredicted portion o f  a firm ’s return due to that event. This is accomplished by 
comparing a firm ’s actual return w ith the normal or predicted return that would 
have been generated without the event.
14. Tender offer: A type o f  takeover where a bidder uses a public offer or directly 
offers to purchase shares from target shareholders.
15. Vertical m erger: A m erger o f firms where one com pany is a supplier o f  the other 
company.
16. White knight: A friendly buyer who might have an interest in purchasing the 
target.
Organization o f  the Study
Chapter 1 includes introduction, background, problem statement, objectives and 
justification for the study. Chapter 2 provides a literature review o f M&A activity and 
previous research findings. Chapter 3 presents research methodology, and data 
descriptions. Chapter 4 presents results (findings / data analysis) o f  the study and 
discussion. Chapter 5 includes conclusions and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Introduction
Studies show that returns o f  merger participants fluctuate over time. In general, 
target returns are positive and higher than bidder returns. On the other hand, bidder 
returns shows m ixed results, some are positive and some are negative. There are several 
factors with a potential to influence returns for both bidder and target companies. Some 
of those factors include different industry type, nature o f acquisition, and method o f 
payment. This chapter presents the theoretical developments and empirical findings o f 
previous studies.
There are m any possible reasons for mergers including synergy, tax considerations, 
purchase o f assets below their replacement costs, diversification, and gaining control over 
other firms. M uch o f the literature classifies the motives for mergers into several 
categories. This study specifically discusses the synergy, agency, hubris, and 
redistribution motives. The synergy motive applies when economic gains result from 
combining the assets o f  two firms. The agency motive is when the acquiring firm ’s 
management gains and the acquiring firm’s shareholders lose. The hubris motive is when 
managers overvalue a takeover target and synergistic gains do not justify the bid price.
22
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The redistribution m otive is when shareholders gain at the expense o f other stakeholders 
such as bondholders, government, and employees.
Empirical Findings o f Target Returns 
M&A studies show target firms normally gain positive and higher returns than 
acquirers. Table 1 summarizes the literature showing returns to target firm shareholders. 
All 25 studies report positive target returns from 7.45% to 45.6%  for short term 
windows. Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) studied 399 large U.S. firms’ acquisitions 
from the 1970s to the 1980s. The authors found that following the merger 
announcement, target shareholders gain 28% on average. Schw ert’s (1996) empirical 
research shows abnormal returns to targets o f  successful offers averaging 35% to 40% 
from the mid 1970’s to the early 1990’s.
The empirical research o f You, Caves, Smith and Henry (1986) also support these 
conclusions. The results o f their frequency distribution analysis show the excess return to 
target companies for 133 mergers from 1975 to 1984 is about 20%. There was actually a 
wide range o f  returns for target firms. You et al. show that 82% o f target companies had 
positive excess returns and 20% had positive excess returns exceeding 40%.
23
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M cConnell (1986)
Jarrell & Poulsen 
(1989)
Lang, Stulz, & 
W alkling (1989)
+10.63%*
+31.77%*
149
+8.56%*
+28.99%*
+40.3%*
76
87
1929-1969 (-120,0) 71.6%
236 1963-1984 (-5,5)
1962-1980 (-1,0)
1968-1986 (-5,5)
95%
70%
526 1963-1986 (-20,10) N/A
N/A
Mergers; uses effective date as 
event date.
Tender offers only; subperiod 
data available for 7/63-6/68, 
7/68-12/80, 1/81-12/84; acquire 
returns have increased from 
+19% to +35% over time.
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3" Houston, James, & +15.58%* (1985-90) 27 1985-1996 (-4.1) N/A Deals in which both parties are
i Ryngaert (2001) +24.60%* (1991-96) 37 banks.
3
CD +20.80%* (all) 64
"n
c Beitel, Schiereck, +10.48%* 98 1985-2000 (-1,0) 53% Sample o f  European bank
3"
CD & W ahrenburg mergers.
"O
(2002)
o
Q.
C Kuipers, M iller, & +23.07%* 181 1982-1991 (-1,0) N/A U.S. targets o f  foreign
a
o
3
to-0 Patel (2003) acquirers.
■D
Renneboog & +9.01%* 136 1993-2000 (-1,0) N/A European transactions.
CD
Goergen (2003)
O.
$ Billett, King, & +22.15%* 265 1979-1997 (-1,0 N/A
3"
O
"O
M auer (2003) month)
N ote. Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date o f merger/bid. From A pplied  M ergers & A cquisitions, (p. 37-38), by 
Bruner, E. R, 2004, Hoboken, NJ: John W iley & Sons, Inc.
*p < .0 5 .
Table 2 shows the pattern o f  event returns for the 1980s. Targets earned significant 
gains from takeovers in the 1980’s (Weston, Siu, & Johnson, 2001). Since 1968, the 
government has increased merger regulation along with the development o f sophisticated 
defense tactics by target firms. As a result, target firm s’ returns increased and the 
acquiring firms’ returns decreased over this same time.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that “corporate takeovers generate positive 
gains” (p. 47). The authors find target firms in M&As typically receive positive returns 
and bidding firms returns are break even.
TaWe 2
Pattern o f Event Returns for the 1980s
Mergers Tender Offers
Targets Positive 20-25% Positive 30-40%
Buyers Positive 1-2% Negative 1-2%
Note. From Takeovers, restructuring, & corporate governance (3rd ed.), (p. 200), by 
Weston, J. F., Siu, J. A., & Johnson, B. A., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall.
Factors Affecting Returns o f  Target Firms 
Empirical studies show there are several factors affecting the returns o f target firms 
including potential synergy, competition (multiple bidder vs. single bidder), the 
regulatory environment at the tim e o f bid, management resistance, method o f payment, 
and an industry effect.
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Synergy
Berko vitch and Narayanan (1993) claim if  a takeover is motivated by synergy, the 
target can achieve some o f the synergy if  it resists the takeover or if  there are multiple 
bidders. In that case, it is assumed the higher the synergy, the higher the target gain if  
everything else is the same (see Berkovitch & Khannna, 1990; Berko vitch & Narayanan, 
1990; Fishman, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
Competition: Multiple Bidders versus Single Bidder 
If  competitive bidders exist in M&A activity, we should expect to see the offer price 
bid up due to competition, and thus, larger gains for the target and smaller gains for the 
bidder. Coment and Jarrell (cited in Bruner, 2004) and Bradley et al. (1988) show that 
multiple bidders in M &A activity are significantly associated with higher abnormal target 
returns. Empirical evidence suggests competition among bidders increases target returns 
but reduces bidder returns. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) find when multiple bidders 
contest, the b idders’ returns were lower, and target returns w ere much higher than for 
single-bidder offers. Bradley et al. (1988) find returns to bidder firms are significantly 
positive when there is no bidding competition, but bidder returns are not significantly 
different from zero when there is bidding competition. Bradley et al. (1988) claim that 
competition among bidding firms for the target may increase benefits to the target 
shareholders at the expense o f the bidder’s shareholders.
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Regulatory Environment at the Time o f  Bid 
Government regulation can and has encouraged more bidding competition in M&A 
activity. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) argue that the W illiams A ct o f  1968 and amendments 
to the act in 1970 require bidders to disclose more information, it sets a minimum tender 
offer period and includes antifraud provisions. The authors claim that this bidding 
information can be useful to competing bidders and thus cause higher returns to target 
and lower returns to bidders. They found returns to bidders declined following the 
implementation o f  the Williams Act and returns to targets increased, thus supporting their 
hypothesis.
Managerial Resistance and Method o f Payment 
Walkling and Long (1984) show that managerial resistance to takeovers is determined 
by their expected wealth changes from the takeover. Resistance by target management 
generally leads to higher legal costs and delay for the bidder. This m ay cause a higher 
offer to encourage target shareholders to sell. Huang and W alking (1987) considered the 
method o f payment, the form o f  the acquisition, and managerial resistance. Previous 
empirical studies show higher abnormal target returns for tender offers than for mergers. 
But these studies did not consider the method o f payment and managerial resistance. 
Huang and W alking (1987) show there was no statistical difference between target 
returns in tender offers than in mergers when method o f payment and managerial 
resistance w ere controlled. However, the degree o f managerial resistance was not 
significantly related to target returns. The method o f payment was found to have a 
significant impact on target returns. Cash offers had significantly higher abnormal target
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returns than stock offers after controlling for type o f acquisition and degree o f managerial 
resistance. W hen the paym ent method was a mix o f  cash and stock, the average 
abnormal target return was between the average for pure cash offers and pure stock 
offers.
Industry
Returns from M &As are not the same across all industries. Different industries have 
different characteristics and environments. M any M&A studies have been performed in 
the banking and utility industries due to their distinct regulations and industry 
characteristics. The hospitality industry has different characteristics from m any other 
industries, such as banking, utility, or manufacturing. However, there are limited studies 
in the hospitality industry. Kim (2001) studies the wealth effect o f  M&As in the lodging 
industry. Kim finds that targets o f  non-casino hotel shareholders earn 5.2% and targets o f 
casino hotel shareholders earn 16.1% in a three day window (-1 to 1).
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
Target Returns by Industry
Hypothesis 1 : M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to target firms associated with 
M&A activity in the hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero.
HI -1 : in the gam ing industry 
H I-2: in the restaurant industry 
H I-3; in the hotel industry 
H I-4: in the nonhospitality industry
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H l-5: There is no difference in the mean CAR to target firms between the gaming, 
restaurant, hotel, and nonhospitality industry
Empirical Findings o f  Bidder Returns 
M&A studies show mixed results for bidder returns. Bidder returns are generally 
lower than target returns and are close to zero. Some studies find positive returns and 
some studies find negative returns. Table 3 and 4 provide a summary o f  studies reporting 
negative returns to acquirers (bidders) and positive returns to acquirers, respectively.
Studies show bidder returns have a slight tendency to decline for the period between 
the 1960s and 1990s. It appears that bidder returns were higher (more positive) in the 
1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s and 1990s. The technology and banking industries 
were an exception where returns to bidders were higher in the 1990s.
Bradley et al. (1988) examined returns to bidders during the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 
1980’s. They argue that during the 1980’s the rapid development o f new financing 
techniques, new defensive strategies, and a more relaxed antitrust attitude towards 
horizontal mergers encouraged more competing bids than in the previous two decades. 
Their evidence supports this argument, as bidder returns were significantly lower in the 
1980’s than in the previous two decades. Bradley et al. (1988) claim that average 
announcement returns to bidders were 4.1% in the 1963 to 1968 period but -2 .9%  in 
the 1981 to 1984 period. In addition, according to Moeller, Sclingemann, and Stulz 
(2003), bidders’ returns dramatically declined from 1997 to 2001.
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Table 3
Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquires
Study Cumulative Sample
Abnormal Returns Size
Sample Event % Positive
Period W indow Return
______________ (Days)__________________
Notes
Langetieg (1978)
Dodd (1980)
Asquith, Bruner, 
& M ullins (1990)
Varaiya & Ferris 
(1987)
Morck, Shleifer, 
& Vishny (1990)
Franks, Harris, & 
Titman (1991)
-1.61%
-1.09%* successful 
-1.24%* unsuccessful
-0.85%*
-2.15%*
-3.9%*
-0.70%
-1.45%
149
60
66
343
96
96
326
1929-1969 (-120,0)
1970-1977 (-1,0)
1973-1983 (-1,0)
1974-1983 (-1,0)
1974-1983 (-20,80)
1975-1987 (-1,1)
399 1975-1984 (-5,5)
47.6%
N/A
41%
N/A
42%
41.4%
N/A
Mergers; uses effective date as 
event date.
Mergers only. Daily data.
Measured return by comparing 
change in bidder market value 
to market value o f target’s 
equity.
Mergers and tenders offers; 
segment data available on 
means o f payment and 
competition.
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Table 3 (continued).
Study Cumulative Sample Sample
Abnormal Returns Size Period
Servaes (1991) -1.07%*
Event
Window
(Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
384 1972-1987 (-1,close) N/A Mergers and tender offers; 
segment data by  payment 
method.
a.
3"
CD
CD■D
OO.
O
3
■D
O
W
Jennings & 
M azzeo (1991)
Banneijee & 
Owers (1992)
Byrd & Hickm an 
(1992)
Healy, Palepu, & 
Ruback (1992)
-0 .8% *
-3.3%*
-1.2% * *
-2 .2%
352 1979-1985 (-1,0)
57 1978-1987 (-1,0)
128 1980-1987 (-1,0)
50 1979-1984 (-5,5)
37%
21%
33%
N/A
White knight bids.
50 largest U.S. mergers during 
period.
■D
CD
O
3
Kaplan & 
W eisbach (1992)
Berkovitch & 
N arayanan (1993)
-1.49%*
-$10 MM
271 1971-1982 (-5,5)
330 1963-1988 (-5,5)
38%
49.4%
Mergers and tender offers.
Tender offers.
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Cumulative Sample
Abnormal Returns Size
Sirower (1994)
Eckbo & 
Thorbum  (2000)
M ulherin & 
Boone (2000)
M itchell & 
Stafford (2000)
W alker (2000)
-2.3%*
-0.30%
-0.37%
-0 .14% *t
-0.07%
-0.84%*$
0.77%
Sample Event
Period W indow
______________ (Days)
% Positive Notes 
Return
168 1979-1990 (-1,1)
390 1964-1983 (-40,0)
281 1990-1999 (-1,1)
366 1961-1993 (-1,0)
366
278
278
1980-1996 (-2,2)
35%
N/A
N/A
N/A
41.4%
46.4%
U.S. acquires o f Canadian 
targets.
Fama and French three-factor 
model, applied to monthly 
returns.
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DeLong (2001) - 1.68% * 280 (1988-1995) (-10,1)
Houston, James, -4.64%* (1985-1990) 27 (1985-1996) (-4,1)
& Ryngaert -2.61% (1991-1996) 37
(2001) -3.47%* all 64
33.6% Deals in which at least one
party is a bank.
N/A Deals in which both parties are
banks.
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Table 3 (continued).
Study Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns
Sample
Size
Sample
Period
Event
W indow
(Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
Ghosh (2002) -0.96% 1,190 (1985-1999) (-5,0) N/A
Kuipers, Miller, 
& Patel (2003)
-0.92%* 138 (1982-1991) (-1,0) N/A Foreign acquirers o f U.S. 
targets.
N ote. Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date o f  merger/bid.
fT op  return is based on an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio. Bottom return is based on a value-weighted benchmark portfolio. 
{Top return is a return adjusted for market average returns. Bottom return is adjusted for return on a matched firm.
From A pplied  M ergers & Acquisitions, (p. 39-40), by Bruner, E. R, 2004, Hoboken, NJ: John W iley & Sons, Inc.
*p < .05.
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Studies R eporting  P ositive  R eturns to A cquires
Study Cumulative Sample
A bnormal Returns Size
Sample Event
Period W indow
____________ (Days)
% Positive Notes 
Return
3
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CD
CD
T3
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CDQ.
W-J
Dodd & 
Ruback (1977)
Rum m er &
Hoffmeister
(1978)
Bradley (1980)
Jarrell & 
Bradley (1980)
+2.83%* successful 
+0.58%  unsuccessful
+5.20%* successful
+4.36%* successful 
-2.96% unsuccessful
+ 6 .66% *
124
48
1958-1978 (0,0)
17 1956-1970 (0,0)
88
46
1962-1977 (-20,+20)
88 1962-1977 (-40,+20)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Tender offers only. M onthly 
data.
Tender offers only. M onthly 
data.
Tender offers only. Daily data.
Tender offers only. Daily data.
■D
CD
Bradley, Desai, 
& Kim (1982)
+2.35%* successful 161 1962-1980 (-10,+10) N/A Tender offers only. Daily data.
C/)
o'3
Asquith (1983) +0.20% successful 
+0.50%  unsuccessful
196 1962-1976 (-1,0)
89
N/A Mergers only. Daily data.
Asquith, 
Bruner, & 
M ullins (1983)
+3.48%* successful 
+0.70%  unsuccessful
170 1963-1979 (-20,+ l)
41
N/A Mergers only. Daily data.
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Eckbo (1983)
Cumulative Sample
Abnormal Returns Size
Sample Event
Period Window
____________ (Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
+0.07% successful 102
+1.20%* unsuccessful 57
1963-1978 (-1,0) N/A Mergers only. Daily data.
3.
3"
CD
CD"O
OQ.C
a
o
3
■D
O
CDQ.
■D
CD
C /)
C /)
U)
00
M alatesta
(1983)
W ier(1983)
Dennis &
McConnell
(1986)
Jarrell, 
Brickley, & 
Netter (1987)
+0.90% successful 256 1969-1974 (0,0)
+3.99% unsuccessful
-0 .12% (-1,0) 
+3.24% (-6,+6)*
+1.14%*
16 1962-1979 (-10,
cancellation
date)
90 1962-1980 (-1,0)
440 1962-1985 (-10,5)
N/A
N/A
52%
N/A
Sicherman & +4.026%* related 49 1983-1985 (-10,+10) N/A
Pettway (1987) +0.047% unrelated 98
Mergers only. M onthly data.
Unsuccessful mergers only. 
Daily data.
Tender offers only; subperiod 
data available for 1962-69, 70- 
79, 80-85; acquirer returns have 
decreased from +4% to -1% .
Compared returns to buyers o f 
divested assets in related and 
unrelated industries.
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Cumulative Sample
Abnormal Returns Size
Sample Event
Period Window
____________ (Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
Bradley, Desai, 
& Kim  (1988)
Jarrell & 
Poulsen (1989)
Lang, Stulz, &
W alkling
(1989)
Loderer & 
M artin (1990)
Smith & Kim 
(1994)
+ 1%*
+0.92%*
0%
+1.72%* 1966-1968 
+0.57%* 1968-1980 
-0.07% 1981-1984
+0.50%
-0.23%
236 1963-1984 (-5,5)
461 1963-1986 (-5,5)
87 1968-1986 (-5,5)
970 1966-1984 (-5,0)
3401 
801
177 1980-1986 (-5,5)
(-1,0)
47%
N/A
N /A
N/A
49.2%
76.2%
Tender offers only; subperiod 
data available for 7/63-6/68, 
7/68-12/80, 1/81-12/84; 
acquirer returns have decreased 
from +4% to -3 %  over time.
Tender offers only.
Tender offers only.
M ergers and tenders offers; 
segment data available on size 
o f  acquisition.
Successful and unsuccessful 
tender offers.
Schwert (1996) +1.41% 666 1975-1991 (-42, 126) N/A Mergers, tenders offers; 
segment data available for 
various transaction attributes.
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Study Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns
Sample
Size
Sample
Period
Event
W indow
(Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
( O '
3" Maquieira, +6.14%* 55 1963-1996 (-60,60) 6L8% Study o f  returns in
i Megginson, & nonconglomerate deals conglomerate and
o Nail (1998) nonconglomerate stock-for-
"n
c
-4.79% conglomerate 47 3&2% stock deals.
3"
CD Lyroudi, 0% 50 1989-1991 (-5,5) N/A International acquisitions by
CD
■D Lazardis, & European and Japanese firms.
O
Q. Subeniotis
C
a
O
3
(1999)
O
■D Eckbo & +1.71%* 1,261 1964-1983 (-40,0) N/A Canadian acquirers o f  Canadian
O
3" Thorbum targets.
r-H
CD
O.
(2000)
$
3" Leeth & Borg +3.12%* 466 1919-1930 (-40,0) N/A
O
■D
(2000)
CD
1 . Kohers & 1.37%* cash deals 961 1987-1996 (0,1) N/A Sample o f  mergers among high-
W Kohers (2000) 1.09%* stock 673 tech firms.
3 1.26% whole sample 1,634
M ulherin +0.85%* 161 1962-1997 (-1,0) 49% Sample o f incomplete
(2000) acquisitions.
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Table 4 (continued).
Study Cumulative Sample
Abnormal Returns Size
Floreani & 
Rigamonti 
(2001)
Kohers & 
Kohers (2001)
Beitel et al. 
(2002)
Fuller, Netter, 
& Stegemoller 
(2002)
Billett, King, & 
M auer (2003)
Moeller, 
Schlingemann, 
& Stulz (2003)
Sample Event
Period W indow
____________ (Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
+2.63%*
+0.92%*
+0.06%
+1.77%* all 
+2.74%* K' time 
bidders
+0.15%
+1.13%* all
+1.496%* private 
-1.020%* public 
+2.003%* subsidiary
56 1996-2000 (-5,+5)
304 1984-1995 (-1,0)
98 1985-2000 (-1,0)
3,135 1990-2000 (-2,+2)
12,023 1980-2001 (0 ,36
months)
N/A
N/A
53%
N/A
831 1979-1997 (-1,0 month) N/A
N/A
Sample o f  European insurance 
company mergers.
Sample o f technology mergers.
Sample o f European bank 
mergers.
Tested the difference in bidders’ 
returns at acquiring private 
company, public company, or 
subsidiary o f  public company.
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Table 4 (continued).
Study Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns
Sample
Size
Sample
Period
Event
Window
(Days)
% Positive 
Return
Notes
Renneboog & 
Goergen (2003)
+0.70%* 142 1993-2000 C^,0) N/A European transactions.
N ote, Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date o f  merger/bid.
tT o p  return is based on an equal-weighted benchmark portfolio. Bottom return is based on a value-weighted benchmark portfolio. 
|T o p  return is a return adjusted for market average returns. Bottom return is adjusted for return on a matched firm.
From A p p lied  M ergers & A cquisitions, (p. 39-40), by  Bruner, E. R, 2004, Hoboken, NJ; John W iley & Sons, Inc.
*p < .05.
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Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) studied 399 large U.S. firm s’ acquisitions from the 
1970s to the 1980s. The authors found that following the m erger announcement, it seems 
like bidder returns are close to zero. The stock price o f  bidder companies decreased by 
one percent, but was not statistically significant. The empirical research o f  You et al. 
(1986) also support these conclusions. The results o f their frequency distribution analysis 
show excess returns to bidder firm stockholders from 1975 to 1984 was a negative one 
percent. The actual range o f  bidder returns was fairly wide. It shows that ahout 47% o f 
bidder firms had positive returns and 53% had negative returns. The positive returns for 
many bidder firms w ere modest with 25% o f bidder firms having positive returns of less 
than five percent. The negative returns for m any bidder firms were also modest with 
28% o f bidder firms having negative returns no worse than negative five percent. 
Schwert’s (1996) empirical research shows that bidders, on average, did not make gains 
from the mid 1970’s to the mid 1990’s. Using different samples, some other studies 
found small positive bidder returns.
Some large bidder companies appear to have performed very well in the 1990’s 
including some companies in the high tech sector. For example, Cisco Systems made 
several acquisitions and generated excellent returns over this period. Some internet 
companies also grew through acquisitions and also generated excellent returns.
But mergers were still high risk during this time period with many bidders failing to 
produce gains and often times producing losses. A slight majority o f  bidder firms over 
this time period experienced negative returns, but a significant proportion o f  bidder firms 
experienced positive returns. This positive experience for some bidders m ay provide
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motivation for firms to continue M &A activity even though average results m ay be 
negative.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that “corporate takeovers generate positive 
gains” (p. 47). The authors find target firms in M &As typically receive positive returns 
and bidding firms returns are break even.
However, Roll (1986) claims that “takeover gains may have been overestimated if  
they exist at all” (p. 198). Some researchers argue that the market can be overly 
concerned with the short term effect o f mergers w hen in fact these short term gains have 
come at the cost/expense o f  long term prospects.
W hy do bidders pay a high premium for target stocks? Potential synergy from the 
combined firms is one o f  the reasons. Empirical research indicates M &A activity does 
produce overall gains, on average, and the gains seem to be produced by synergy. There 
have been arguments that gains are produced by monopoly power, but the empirical 
studies do not support this. Mergers that fail to produce overall gains are thought to 
suffer due to agency problems and hubris.
Factors Affecting Returns to the Bidding Firms 
The Synergy M otive
The synergy motive implies that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) occur when 
combining two firms leads to shareholder gains for both firms. Synergy benefits are 
generally greater with vertical and horizontal mergers, but these are also m ost likely to be 
viewed as hindering competition by the government. Economic gains can be derived in 
mergers from economies o f scale and through the exchange o f  assets Irom less efficient
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to more efficient managers. There are several theories explaining the possible synergistic 
gains to M&As, which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
One source o f  synergistic gains is from improved efficiency. M anne (1965) wrote: 
“The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, 
the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who believe that they can manage the 
company more efficiently. And the potential return from the successful takeover and 
revitalization o f  a poorly run company can be enormous” ( p. 113). Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) claims friendly takeovers are more likely motivated by synergetic gains by 
combining two firm ’s assets and operations, whereas a hostile deal is more likely 
motivated by the need to discipline incumbent management. Trimbath (2002) states that 
“relatively inefficient firms have a higher probability o f being taken over” ( p. 71).
Bhide (as cited in Damodaran, 2004) claims that one-third o f  77 acquisitions from 1985 
to 1986 were prim arily motivated by operating synergy.
Differential efficiency theory argues that inefficient firms are taken over by efficient 
firms who proceed to eliminate the inefficiencies. Inefficient management theory argues 
that some firm s’ management are so poor that almost any management team could take 
over and improve firm performance. This could explain M &A between firms in different 
industries. Inefficient management theory can be viewed as a subset o f  differential 
efficiency theory.
Another source o f  synergistic gains is through economies o f  scale and scope, referred 
to as operating synergy theory. In many cases these economies may be due to 
complimentary capabilities between two firms. For example, one firm might be 
comparatively strong in research and development and the other firm might be
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comparatively strong in marketing. M erging the two firms results in improved research 
and development for one firm and improved marketing for the other with the end result 
being that the combined firm could be more efficient than the two firms operating 
individually.
In a similar manner, financial synergy theory argues that firm s’ cash flows and 
investment opportunities may compliment one another. For example, firms in declining 
industries often generate large cash flows given their lack o f  viable investments, whereas, 
firms in growth industries typically have more viable investment opportunities. The 
merged firm m ay lower the cost o f capital for the “growth” firm because o f the lower cost 
o f internal funds and also raise the return on funds and thus the value o f  the “declining” 
firm.
Diversification is another reason for synergy. Shareholders’ reasons for portfolio 
diversification and merger diversification are not the same. Shareholders can readily 
spread their investments and risk among industries, so there is no reason for firms to 
diversify to spread risk for shareholders. But firm employees or management are at 
greater risk if  their industry declines, as their particular skills may not be readily 
transferable to other industries. Firm diversification may improve job  security thus 
encouraging employees to improve their firm-specific skills making them more valuable 
to the firm.
There are arguments for and against takeovers for the purpose o f  diversification 
(Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). The pro arguments include a lowering o f  firm risk lowers 
the cost o f capital and thus increases firm value to investors. Also diversification 
improves a firm ’s flexibility, reducing the possibility o f  bankruptcy, reducing the agency
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costs o f external capital markets by replacing them to an extent through an internal 
allocation o f capital.
The arguments against diversification include an increased opportunity for managers 
to poorly allocate resources by subsidizing value destroying projects. Another similar 
argument is the reduction in information conveyed by the stock price o f  a diversified firm 
versus the inform ation imbedded in the stock prices o f  two independent firms.
Supporting arguments against diversifying mergers is a body o f  literature suggesting 
that corporate diversification does not create value. Empirical research by Morck, 
Shleifer, and V ishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), W alker 
(2000), and Lam ont and Polk (2002) indicates diversification related to M&As m ay be 
value reducing. Empirical research also indicates the typical diversified firm is valued at 
lower than a portfolio o f  comparable single-business line firms.
There are additional possible explanations for the observed discount for diversified 
firms. Managers m ay pursue diversification to reduce their human capital risk (Amihud 
& Lev, 1981), entrench themselves (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), or to create a larger firm 
as a means to greater pow er (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Others argue the 
diversification discount is nothing more than a measurement error (Whited, 2001).
Research shows that target firm s’ shares typically see a permanent increase in value 
after a tender offer whether or not it is successful (Damodaran, 2004). The information 
theory attempts to explain this by arguing that the tender offer sends a signal to the 
market that the target is undervalued. It is also possible that the tender offer motivates 
target firm executives to improve their management. Another argument is that the
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increased valuation is not permanent but indicates the strong possibility that another firm 
will make a bid for a synergistic combination.
As shown above, there are many theoretical explanations for synergistic M & A  gains. 
Several empirical studies support the significance o f synergy as a source o f M &A gains. 
Kim (2001) studied lodging and casino-hotel M&As between 1990 and 1999. He finds 
five day (2 days before and 2 days after the announcement) cum ulative abnormal returns 
for bidders o f  non-casino lodging were zero percent, whereas casino-hotels were 3.98%. 
Bradley, Desai, and K im  (1988) show that a successful tender offer increases the 
combined value o f  the merged firms by an average o f 7.4%. Empirical results by 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) indicate that synergy is the most important motive in 
takeovers with positive total gains. Kiymaz and M ukheqee (2000) empirically document 
the synergistic benefit from country diversification. Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000) show 
the synergy hypothesis is the prime explanation for foreign acquisitions o f  U.S. firms.
Redistribution M otive  
The redistribution motive states that the gain to stockholders o f M &A participants 
come at the expense o f  other stakeholders. Losing stakeholders include bondholders, the 
government, and the public at large.
One redistribution argument is that shareholders gain and the value o f  debt declines 
after M&A activity. But most studies do not find evidence that stockholders gain at the 
expense o f  bondholders in M &A activity (Asquith & Kim, 1982; Dennis & McConnell, 
1986; Kim & M cConnell, 1977).
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The impact o f taxes can affect the gains to M &A activity, but it generally does not 
play a prime role. Tax savings from M&A activity is a form o f redistribution from the 
government (and thus the public) to shareholders. Tax motivations for M&A activity 
include carryover o f  net operating losses and tax credits, stepped-up asset basis, and the 
substitution o f capital gains for ordinary gains. Aging firm oivners who worry about high 
inheritance taxes m ay also be motivated to sell their firms. Empirical research indicates 
the tax benefits from M &A activity can be large, but they generally are not the prime 
reason for M&A activity.
Competition, Regulation, and M anagem ent R esistance  
Factors leading to higher target returns include more competing bidders, management 
opposition to the bid and the regulatory environment at the time o f the bid. These factors 
also negatively impact bidding firm s’ return. Empirical evidence suggests competition 
among bidders increases target returns but reduces bidder returns. Bradley et al. (1988) 
find returns to bidder firms are significantly positive when there is no bidding 
competition, but bidder returns are not significantly different from zero when there is 
bidding competition. Bradley et al. claim that competition among bidding firms for the 
target may increase benefits to the target shareholders at the expense o f the bidder’s 
shareholders. In addition, returns for late-bidders’ (white knights) were negative 2.38% 
in their sample and they conclude, on average, white knights “pay too much” for the 
acquisitions (p. 30). They also find when multiple bidders contested, the bidders’ returns 
were lower, and target returns were much higher than for single-bidder offers. Their 
study finds that the Williams Act as well as multiple bidder competition has a negative
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effect on bidder returns and suggest that target returns increased at the cost o f  bidding 
firms.
In addition, there are several other factors causing lower returns to the bidder firms 
including relative size o f  the target to the acquiring firm, method o f  paym ent (cash versus 
stock-for-stock), agency motivation, and hubris.
The empirical evidence shows M&A activity produces mixed results for bidder firms. 
Average returns for bidding firms are generally not significantly different from zero, but 
in some studies are significantly negative (Bradley et al., 1988; Roll 1986).
Jarrell and Poulsen’s (1989) results indicate that target m anagem ent opposition to a 
bid and a strict regulatory environment have a negative impact on acquiring firm s’ 
returns. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Bradley et al. (1988) also show the regulatory 
environment impacts acquirer returns similar to Jarrell and Poulsen.
R ela tive Size o f  the Target to the B idder
Kahl and Rosen (as cited in Gorton, Kahl, & Rosen, 2002) found a negative 
relationship between the acquirer’s size and return. Also, Gorton et al. (2002) found for 
acquiring firms larger than their targets, the larger the acquirer relative to the target, the 
lower the acquirer’s return. But for acquiring firms smaller than their targets, the larger 
the acquirer relative to the target, the higher the acquirer’s return.
Asquith, Bruner, and M ullins (1983, 1990) have produced several studies showing 
mixed results regarding the impact o f bidder-target relative size upon bidder returns. 
Results using a sample o f mergers between 1963 and 1979 show the larger the bidder
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relative to the target, the higher the bidder return. Results using a sample between 1973 
and 1983 though show no significant relationship between relative size and bidder return.
Obviously, i f  a target firm is very small relative to the bidding firm, even a profitable 
acquisition may have little impact on the bidding firm ’s return. Asquith et al. (1983, 
1990) note this point and show that bidding firms’ returns increase as target size increases 
relative to the bidder’s size.
M ethod o f  Paym ent: Cash versus S tock-for-Stock  
Asquith et al. (1990) suggest that negative bidder returns are caused by stock 
financing o f acquisitions that releases adverse information about acquiring firms. Thus 
negative bidder returns are not evidence o f  a bad investment but evidence the acquiring 
firm is overvalued and the stock exchange signals this. W ith asymmetric information, the 
method o f paym ent m ay provide a signal to the market. The bidding firm ’s managers 
will prefer a cash offer if  they believe their firm is undervalued, and prefer a common 
stock exchange offer if  they believe their firm is overvalued (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & 
Rice, 1984). Thus, the market w ill interpret a cash offer positively and a common stock 
exchange offer negatively regarding the bidding firm ’s value.
Myers and M ajluf (1984) argue that different bidder returns in mergers and tender 
offers may be explained by the method o f financing the acquisition. Travlos (1987) 
shows that returns to bidding firms are typically negative for stock exchanges and 
bidding firms earn normal returns on cash bids. The abnormal returns between these two 
groups are significantly different and not affected by the type o f  takeover (merger versus 
tender offers) (Travlos). This finding is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. A
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takeover using com mon stock exchange signals negative information that the bidding 
firm is overvalued.
The results o f  the Travlos’ (1987) study provide an explanation for the results o f 
earlier studies on m ergers and tender offers. Since tender offers are usually cash offers 
and mergers are usually common stock exchange offers, the difference in earlier studies 
may be caused by the method o f  payment rather than type o f  M &A activity.
A gency M otive: M anagem ents ’ P riva te  In terest and  D efensive M erger
Some takeovers m ay be motivated by the self-interest o f management. Several 
reasons are offered to explain this including diversification o f  m anagem ent’s personal 
portfolio (Amihud & Lev, 1981), increasing firm size through free cash flow (Jensen, 
1986), and increasing the firm’s dependence on management through acquisition o f 
assets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).
Agency problems are caused by ineffective contracting. Examples o f typical agency 
conflicts include those between managers and stockholders or conflicts between creditors 
and stockholders. M anagerialism views takeovers as a cost resulting from agency 
problems. It argues that self-serving managers execute M &A activity to increase firm 
size and their own compensation regardless o f  the impact to shareholders.
The defensive m erger theory argues that some managers feel the need to protect their 
firm independence by  making defensive acquisitions. By increasing firm size through 
M&A, they make it more difficult to be acquired themselves by another firm. Defensive 
mergers are generally viewed as being value reducing for shareholders but benefiting
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managers by improving the probability o f  job retention. Gorton et al. (2002) argue that 
excessive M&A activity is caused by  the desire o f  managers to protect their jobs.
On the other hand, there are a number o f mechanisms that serve to mitigate agency 
problems. Instead o f  viewing takeovers as the cause o f agency problems, takeovers can 
also be viewed as relieving them. Agency problems may reduce firm value making the 
firm an excellent target for a takeover. Since many target managers lose their jobs after 
the merger, the possibility o f  being a takeover target may proceed to reduce agency 
problems and increase firm value.
Mergers can change control and ownership; as a result the target firm ’s top 
management often leaves after the merger. Dahya and Powell (1999) study 593 
successful takeovers in UK between 1985 and 1991. The authors find a significant 
increase in top management resignations from about 9.5% in the three years prior to 
takeover to 35% in the year following a takeover. The results are worse if  it is hostile 
takeover. The authors claim top management departures in hostile takeovers (59%) is 
significantly higher than friendly takeovers (31%) in the year after the takeover. Even in 
mergers o f equals, top management might end up having a new assignment. The threat 
o f takeover may also serve to motivate management to increase and maintain firm value, 
thereby reducing agency problems.
Takeovers m ay be motivated by the self-interest o f the bidding firm ’s management. 
Morck et al. (1990) show the returns to bidding firms are less when the firm diversifies, 
when they purchase a fast growing target, and when their managers underperform prior to 
the acquisition. These results suggest that managerial self-interest m ay motivate 
acquisitions that reduce bidding firm s’ values.
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Wiedenbaum and Vogt (1987) explain another possible management motivation for 
acquisitions. Managers may desire to increase firm size through acquisitions as a means 
to reduce shareholder monitoring. Shareholders have a more difficult time monitoring 
management with a larger and more complex firm.
Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) provide additional support that bad 
acquisitions are often caused by management self interest. They find empirical evidence 
that managers with larger ownership positions are less likely to be involved in bad 
acquisitions. Firth (1980) examines takeovers in the United Kingdom from 1969 to 1975. 
The results show that M&A activity lead to benefits for the target firm s’ shareholders and 
to the bidding firm s’ managers, but losses for the bidding firm s’ shareholders. This is 
consistent with takeovers motivated by management self interest rather than by 
maximization o f  shareholder wealth.
Gorton et al. (2002) argue that managers prefer their firms rem ain independent rather 
than be acquired by  other firms. I f  their firm is acquired the managers o f  the acquired 
firm may play a subordinate role in the new firm or lose their job. Expanding in size 
through acquisitions can reduce the probability o f  being acquired by another firm. Thus 
managers wishing to maintain firm control m ay engage in unprofitable defensive 
acquisitions to increase their firm size and minimize the probability o f  their firm being 
targeted. Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), and Ambrose and M egginson (1992) found 
the probability o f  being a target is decreasing in a firm’s size. These defensive mergers 
can be self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing. Gorton et al. (2002) argue the desire by 
managers to continue in their jobs can lead to excessive merger activity as a result o f 
these defensive mergers.
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H ubris
The hubris theory is a subset o f  agency theory. It argues that managers may be overly 
optimistic and thus overly aggressive in bidding for targets. The result is when acquiring 
firms pay too m uch for target firms. This is called the winner’s curse. The basic 
argument for the hubris motivation is that M &A activity is caused by  managers’ mistakes 
and that these M & A ’s lack synergy.
The hubris m otivation for M &A activity is caused by m anagers’ excessive self- 
confidence and arrogance. Managers o f bidding firms may overestimate the value o f  the 
target firms, or they m ay overestimate their ability to run the target firms and thus 
overpay for targets. M orck et al. (1990) and Roll (1986) both offer this as an explanation 
for the overpayment for targets in some acquisitions. The hubris hypothesis argues that 
there are no total gains from acquisition since the motivation is due to bidder 
managements over estimation o f  gains.
Bradley et al. (1988) find positive total gains in their sample o f  takeovers and 
conclude that takeovers increase value. However, in the 1980s, about 50% o f the 
acquiring firms suffer negative returns and overall average returns for acquiring firms 
were negative. I f  synergy was the motivation, the acquiring firms should experience 
gains from takeover. The authors argue that these negative returns for acquiring firms 
suggest the prim ary cause o f  the takeover m ay he agency or hubris. There are several 
other articles providing empirical evidence consistent with this argument. Malatesta 
(1983) finds that mergers increase value for target firms but decrease value for acquiring 
firms and claims these takeovers are agency motivated.
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Lewellen et al.(1985) find there is a positive relationship between acquirer returns 
and management ownership in the acquiring firm. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) 
argue there is a positive relation between acquirer returns and acquiring firm’s Tobin’s Q 
which can be considered a proxy for management quality. In other words, high quality 
management is more likely to gamer positive gains from takeovers.
Morck et al. (1990) claim acquirers show lower returns when the acquisition is 
motivated by growth or diversification. Another study finds bidding firm s’ management 
acquire more shares o f  their firm the more positive the stock price reaction to the 
takeover announcement. However, the author claims the evidence does not show 
managers intentionally overpay for target firms (Seyhun, 1990).
I f  a takeover is motivated by management’s self-interest, management may be able to 
increase their own wealth at shareholders’ cost. M anagement m ay engage in mergers that 
increase firm dependence on management skills even though this m ay reduce firm value. 
Consequently, i f  a takeover is motivated by agency, or m anagem ent’s self-interest, it is 
possible to have negative total gains and negative gains to bidder shareholders. If  target 
firms are aware o f  this motivation, they can gain bargaining power and try to extract 
some o f  managements’ rent. The higher the bidding firm managem ents’ utility, the more 
target shareholders can extract gains. Since management rent reduces shareholder value, 
total shareholder gains and management gains have a negative relationship. Even in the 
presence o f synergy between firms, competition, potential competition and hubris can 
result in bidders paying too much (Roll, 1986).
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
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Bidder Returns by Industry
Hypothesis 2: M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidders associated with M&A 
activity in the hospitality industry is equal to zero.
H2-1 : in the gam ing industry 
H2-2: in the restaurant industry 
H2-3 : in the hotel industry
H2-4: There is no difference in the mean CAR to bidders between the gaming, 
restaurant and hotel industry
Target Returns by Nature o f  Acquisition 
The form o f acquisition can be classified as merger or tender offer depending on the 
nature o f the offer. In general, a bidding firm offers to buy the target shares at a price 
higher than the target’s previous market value. The bidders have a choice between a 
(hostile) tender offer and a (friendly) merger. In a ‘hostile’ takeover a bidder directly 
makes a tender offer to the shareholders o f the target company, w ithout informing the 
target management or after target management strongly resists a friendly takeover 
attempt. Each shareholder comes to a decision whether or not to tender his shares 
independently. On the other hand, a ‘friendly’ takeover (merger) has to be negotiated and 
accepted by shareholders and management. The most typical friendly acquisition method 
is a merger. In some cases, a friendly takeover (friendly merger) could take the form o f a 
tender offer.
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Studies show tender offers create value to the target firms. According to Jensen and 
Ruback’s (1983) 16 M &A studies, the target average abnormal return in successful 
mergers was 20%, and in successful tender offers was 30% (see Table 5).
Table 5
A bnorm al Percentage S tock  P rice  Changes A ssocia ted  w ith Successfu l Corporate 
Takeovers
Takeover technique Target (%) Bidders (%)
Mergers 20 0
Tender offers 30 4
Note. From “The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence,” by Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983, Journa l o f  F inancia l Econom ics, 11(1-4), p. 7.
Target R eturns fo r  Successfu l Tender Offers 
Normally there is a high premium to target shareholders in tender offers. Table 6, 
panel A shows abnormal returns to targets and bidders o f  tender offers around a month or 
two o f  the event date. Targets o f  successful tender offers realize statistically significant 
abnormal returns ranging from 16.9% to 34.1%, and a weighted average abnormal return 
from the seven studies is 29.1%.
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P anel B. 1. M ergers: Tw o-day announcem ent effects
Dodd (1980) 1970-1977 (-1 ,0 ) -1.09 -1.24 +13.41 +12.73
(60,-2.98) (66,-2.63) (71,23.80) (80,19.08)
A squith (1983) 1962-1976 (-1 ,0 ) +0.20 +0.50 +6.20 +7.00
(196,0.78) (89,192) (211,23.07) (91,12.83)
C D
■ D
O
Q .
C
8
Q .
■D
CD
C /)W
o"3
O
8
ci'
3"
i
3
CD
3.
3"
CD
CD■D
O
Q .
C
a
O
3
"O
O
CD
Q .
■D
CD
C /)
C /)
Table 6 (continue).
O s
Bidding Firms Target Firms
Study Sample
Period
Event Period Successful
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Eckbo (1983) 1963-1978 ( - ! ,+ ! ) +0.07 +1.20 +6.24 +10.20
(102, -0.12) (57 ,2 .98) (57,9.97) (29,15.22)
W eighted average abnormal return -0.05 +0.15 +7.72 +9.76
(358, n.a.) (212, n.a) (339, n.a.) (200, n.a.)
P a n e l B. 2. M ergers: O ne-m onth announcem ent effects
Dodd (1980) 1970-1977 (-20, 0) +0.80 +3.13 +21.78 +22.45
(60, 0.67) (66, 2.05) (71, 11.93) (80, 10.38)
Asquith (1983) 1962-1976 (-19,+10) +0.20 +1.20 +13.30 +11.70
(196, 0.25) (87, 1.49) (211, 15.65) (91,6.71)
Eckbo 1983) 1963-1978 (-20, +10) +1.58 +4.85 +14.08 +25.03
(102, 1.48) (57, 3.43) (57, 6.97) (29,12.61)
Asquith, 1963-1979 (-20, 0) +3.48 +0.70 +20.5 +10.0
Bruner & (170, 5.30) (41,0.41) (35, 9.54) (19,3.45)
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Study Sample 
Period
Event Period
Bidding Firms Target Firms
Successful
(%)
Unsuccessful
(%)
Successful
(%)
Unsuccessful
(%)
M alatesta(1983) 1969-1974 Public +0.90 n.a. +16.8 n.a.
announcement (256,1.53) (83,17.57)
month
W eighted average abnormal return +1.37 +2.45 +15.90 +17.24
(784, n.a) (251, n.a) (457, n.a.) (219, n.a.)
P anel B.3. M ergers, Total abnorm al returns fro m  offer announcem ent through outcom e
Dodd 1980) 1970-1977 (-10,+10) -7.22 -5.50 +33.96 +3.68
(60, -2.60) (66, -2.05) (71, 7.66) (80, 0.96)
A squith 1962-1976 (-1, outcome -0.10 -5.90 +15.50 -7.50
(1983) date) (196, -0.05) (89, -3.15) (211,6.01) (91,-1.54)
W ier(1983) 1962-1979 (-10, ten days n.a. +3.99 n.a. -9.02
after cancellation (16, 0.89) (17, 1.82)
date)
W eighted average abnormal return -1.77 -4.82 +20.15 -2.88
(256, n.a.) (171, n.a.) (282, n.a.) (188, n.a.)
N ote. n.a. = not available. From “The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence,” by Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Journa l o f  
F inancia l Econom ics, 11 (1-4), p. 10-11.
Target R eturns f o r  Successfu l M ergers
Table 6, panel B .l shows target returns o f  two day merger announcement effect range 
from 6.2% to 13.4% and the weighted average abnormal return is 7.2%. Panel B.2 shows 
target retums o f  one month announcement effect range from 13.3% to 21.78%. The 
weighted average abnormal return is 15.9% around a one month period that is about 
twice the size o f  the two day effect, 7.2%. Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that much 
o f the abnormal return takes place before the public announcement.
Much empirical evidence shows the gains in tender offers (which have a tendency to 
be hostile) are higher than the gains in mergers (which have a tendency to be friendly). 
Existing research shows that tender offer deals tend to outperform mergers (e.g.,
Berko vitch & Khanna, 1991; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). Berko vitch and Khanna (1991) 
claim tender offers increase information disclosure and competition for target firms that 
lead to higher levels o f post-acquisition performance.
Some research claims that hostile tender offer targets are underperformers and their 
stock price is relatively low. Therefore, the higher retums from tender offers may be due 
to the bargain prices and/or the replacement o f inefficient management and modification 
o f  the firms’ strategies. However, Healey, Palepu, and Ruback (1997) found hostile 
transactions were related to insignificant progress in cash flow retum s due to possible 
higher acquisition premium payments.
M & A Regulations
The M&A process is closely regulated by securities laws and regulations. This 
regulation applies to issuance o f new shares by buyers, prevention on insider trading, and
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information disclosure to future investors. Securities regulations were created to protect 
investors and the market. Laws are promulgated by federal and state legislatures, 
whereas regulations are created hy the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or 
state regulatory agencies. In 1933 and 1934, the initial laws were adopted after the stock 
market crash and the Great Depression uncovered the abuses o f investors and markets 
(Bruner, 2004, chap. 27).
The Securities Act o f  1933 regulates the issuance o f  new securities. The issuer is 
required to register new securities with the SEC. Through registration the SEC can 
enforce standards o f  information disclosure.
The Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 regulates the public trading o f  securities and 
securities exchanges. It also requires the disclosure o f  information. All reporting 
companies, corporations with more than $10 million assets and more than 500 
shareholders, must register with the SEC and are required to present financial reports to 
the SEC and shareholders.
W illiams Am endm ent to the Securities Exchange A ct o f  1934  
Previous to the W illiams Amendment (also known as the W illiams Act), a hostile 
bidder was not obligated to reveal any information to target shareholders about a bid. 
However, due to the large number and abuse o f hostile tender offers in the 1960s, on July 
29, 1968, congress enacted the Williams Act. This consists o f Rules 13d and 14d o f  the 
Securities Exchange Act o f  1934 which establishes disclosure requirements for public 
tender offers. Upon filing with the SEC, the bidder must reveal detailed information 
about a tender offer including terms, cash source, plans for the company after takeover
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and so forth. M oreover, in 1970, the Williams amendment forced four crucial rules for 
which hostile tender offers must abide:
Early Warning
Buyer must notify the SEC by filing form 13(d) if  a buyer acquires 5% or more o f a 
target firm’s shares. This provides an early warning and m ore information to targets, 
shareholders, and competing bidders about a rising takeover challenge.
M inim um  P eriod  - Open fo r  20 D ays
The tender offer should be held open for 20 days (about 30 calendar days). This 
allows a delaying tender offer process, so the target can evaluate the offer, search for a 
“white knight” buyer or competing bidders may jo in  the takeover bid.
Equal Treatment
This prevents favoritism in the purchase o f  shares. All target shareholders are offered 
the same price. In addition, target shareholders have a right to withdraw shares that they 
may have tendered previously.
Cash Offers are A lso  Covered
The ’33 Act regulates securities issuances and thus applied to stock-for-stock offers. 
However, due to the increasing number o f  cash tender offers, the Williams Amendment 
covers cash tender offers under the antiffaud and registration requirements.
M & A R egulation E ffect on Target R eturns  
There is much research about the regulation effect on returns o f M &A participants. 
Bradley et al. (1988) study a sample o f 921 tender offers during the period from October 
1958 to December 1984. Their final sample included 236 tender offers for the period
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1963 to 1984. Their study shows that target returns increased significantly after 1968, the 
year o f  the Williams A ct amendment which requires a 20-day w aiting period. However, 
they find the combined tender offer returns o f  both target and bidding firms were 
consistent and positive over time (for all sub periods and the total period). Bradley et al. 
(1988) conclude “Thus, government regulations and other changes that have occurred in 
the tender offer environment have been a zero sum game: the increase in the gains to the 
target stockholders has come at the expense o f the stockholders o f  acquiring firms” (p.
31). They also find when multiple bidders contested, the bidders’ returns were lower, 
and target returns were much higher than for single-bidder offers. Their study finds that 
the Williams Act as well as multiple bidder competition has a negative effect on bidder 
returns and suggest that target returns increased at the cost o f  bidding firms. Consistent 
with this finding, W eston et al. (2001, chap. 8) suggest several possible explanations may 
be responsible for reducing bidder returns and placing targets in a better bargaining 
position. These include the W illiams Act (adopted in 1968), takeover defenses adopted 
by firms in the 1980s, state anti-takeover laws, and other judicial decisions protecting 
targets.
Smiley (as cited in Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and Jarrell and Bradley (1980) examined 
the effect o f changes in tender offer regulations on the abnormal return o f M&A 
participants. Smiley claims that due to the Williams Amendment, target abnormal returns 
were increased by 13%. Jarrell and Bradley claim the average target abnormal return 
increased after the Williams Amendment. Jarrell and Bradley find the target (47 
samples) average abnormal returns were 22% around the merger announcement (-40 day 
to +5 days) before the W illiams Amendment. On the other hand, the target average
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abnormal return (90 targets) regulated by  the W illiams Amendment is 40%, and 35% 
return (20 targets) regulated by both the W illiams Amendment and state tender offer 
laws. Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that it seems like regulation is costly to bidders 
and though it is not conclusive it seems target gains increase at the expense o f bidders’ 
shareholders.
Characteristics o f  Targets
Morck et al. (1988) study characteristics o f  ownership, asset, and performance o f 
friendly and hostile takeover targets to identify the source o f  takeover gains. Morck et al. 
(1988) conclude friendly takeovers are more likely motivated hy synergetic gains hy 
combining two firm ’s assets and operations whereas in hostile deal is more likely to be 
discipline the incumbent management. The authors find targets o f  friendly takeovers are 
more likely younger and faster growing, on the other hand, hostile takeovers targets are 
likely to be older and slow growing than friendly merger targets. Hostile targets tend to 
invest a smaller portion o f earnings than the average firm in the sample. The authors also 
find that hostile targets market values were about half o f replacement cost, for instance, 
average market value o f  hostile targets was only 52.4% o f  their replacement costs, while 
friendly targets’ was 79.6%.
M orck et al. (1988) argue that when bidder’s motivation is to gain through 
disciplining poor management performance, the acquisition is likely to be a hostile 
takeover. Morck et al. use Tobin’s q ratios to measure the performance o f the targets in 
1980. Their evidence shows the hostile targets had poor performance indicated by
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significantly lower Tobin’s q values than the friendly targets, and have a tendency to 
have lower Tobin’s q values within their industries.
Morck et al. (1988) also find the hostile target’ top managers hold significantly less 
stock o f their firms than friendly target managers, at 3.2% versus 14.5%. Also hostile 
targets managers w ere less likely to be a founder or members o f  a founding family, at 
10% versus 24.4% for friendly target managers. Friendly takeovers often times seem to 
coincide the intentional exit o f the founding family or a top manager w ith a very large 
stake in the firm.
Inefficiency H ypothesis
Explanations for motivations behind hostile takeovers are controversial. One o f  the 
arguments uses an inefficiency explanation. The argument is that hostile  takeovers arise 
to replace inefficient managers who do not maximize shareholder wealth. Some 
researchers view hostile takeover targets as underperformers that attract capital market 
control. Manne (1965) wrote: “The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be 
with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those who 
believe that they can manage the company more efficiently. And the potential return 
from the successful takeover and revitalization o f a poorly run com pany can he 
enormous” (p. 113). This logic underlies the inefficiency hypothesis, which assumes 
takeover by efficient management can produce benefits hy eliminating the inefficiency o f 
a target firm. Takeover defenses are obstacles that impede this reallocation process.
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H ostile  Targets are U nderperform ing F irm s  
Studies o f w hether hostile targets are underperforming firms are controversial. Some 
argue those targets are underperforming firms with evidence o f  high management 
turnover after hostile takeovers. Some argue it is simply a bargaining tactic o f the target 
to achieve a higher price and/or better terms.
There is evidence that hostile targets are generally underperforming firms. One study 
shows hostile targets have lower sales growth, return on equity, insider ownership, and 
price/eamings ratio. They also have low debt, unused debt capacity, and higher liquidity. 
(From a study by the Conference Board reported in “Merger, takeovers increasing 
pressure on outside board directors,” Securities Regulation and Law Reporter, August 16, 
1985, p. 1479. (as cited in Burner, 2004)). The low debt and unused debt capacity o f  the 
target is one o f  the attraction to bidders.
Palepu (1986), M orck et al. (1988) and Mitchel and Lehn (1990) find evidence that 
hostile targets are poor performers. Shivdasani (1993) argues that hostile targets are less 
efficient than non hostile targets. Schwert (2000) said that the performance differences 
are “consistent w ith the notion that targets o f hostile offers suffer disproportionately from 
entrenched m anagem ent.. .[and] inefficient use o f  corporate assets” ( p. 2616). He also 
claimed target shareholders might have a chance and more time to learn about the value 
o f their firm through resistance to a takeover.
Studies o f  the likelihood o f the takeover target whether hostile or fnendly find 
various factors consistent with poor performance o f targets. Hasbrouck (1985) showed 
that high market/book ratios and large firm size decrease the likelihood o f being a 
takeover target. Palepu (1986) claims the probability o f being a takeover target decreases
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with high sales growth, high leverage, and large size. Trimbath (2002) claims inefficient 
firms are more likely to be takeover targets.
Dahya and Powell (1998) studies successful friendly and hostile takeovers for the 
period 1989 to 1992 in UK. They claim hostile takeovers are often related to the 
disciplining o f a target firm ’s top management. Furthermore, prior to takeover, hostile 
targets have lower abnormal returns, poor profitability, lower managerial ownership and 
a high ownership stake held hy external block holders than friendly targets in the UK. 
Unlike other studies that found hostile takeover targets have unused debt capacity, Dahya 
and Powell (1998) found that takeover targets have higher debt than industry norm.
D ahya and Powell (1999) also study 593 successful UK takeovers from the period 
1985 to 1991. The authors claim that in the year after the takeover, 59% o f target’s top 
management left in hostile takeovers while 31% in friendly takeovers. This finding is 
consistent w ith other studies that show after a hostile takeover, management and hoard 
turnover go up, as does corporate restructuring for the target firm (Dahya & Powell,
1998; Shivdasani, 1993).
Interestingly, however, Dahya and Powell (1999) found conflicting results from their 
study in 1998. Unlike the 1998 study that argues hostile takeover targets are poor 
performers, Dahya and Powell (1999) results do not find evidence that takeovers targets, 
whether hostile or friendly, are poor performing firms. M oreover, accounting, cash flow 
and market-based performance measurements shows there is no differences between 
hostile and friendly targets. Therefore, they conclude high management turnover seems 
to have other reasons than poor performance.
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Franks and M ayer (1996) find little proof that hostile targets are poor performers 
prior to takeover indicating high board turnover was not due to management failure. The 
authors disagree w ith the hypothesis that hostile takeovers are a means o f  replacing poor 
management. Instead, management rejection o f  the bids seems to be disagreement over 
the offer price and restructuring o f  the target after the takeover. The possibility o f 
management replacement through a hostile takeover also provides a motivation for 
management to m aintain their stock price as high as possible.
Franks and M ayer (1996) find 90% o f target directors resign after successful hostile 
bids compared w ith 50% after accepted friendly merger bids. They compare merged 
target firms with firms that have not been involved in recent merger activity. They find 
insider director resignations are higher in both successful and unsuccessful hostile bids. 
For example, in a sample o f firms with the lowest stock performance in 1985, only 19% 
of the board resigned within a year o f  the bad performance, while 90% o f the board in 
successful hostile bids and 39% in unsuccessful bids resigned. Evidently, hostile 
takeovers are related to high board o f  director turnover. Consistent with this evidence, 
firms successfully defending a takeover attempt through greenmail experience higher 
management turnover than average (Klein & Rosenfeld, 1988). Evidence shows that 
even though hostile bids were not successful, the target still experiences high board 
turnovers. This is consistent w ith Hirshleifer and Thakor’s (1994) argument that hostile 
takeover attempts disclose information about the management quality to the market. 
Hostile takeovers can act as a corporate governance device to control agency problems 
due to management not acting in the best interest o f shareholders.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
B argain ing  Tactic
Schwert’s (2000) empirical tests show that m ost deals categorized as hostile by the 
press are really similar to nonhostile takeover attempts. The hostile versus nonhostile 
label is just a reflection o f choices made by the firms involved, both bidders and targets, 
in order to strategically maximize their potential gains from the deal. Schwert’s (2000) 
bargaining hypothesis suggests that target management resistance is for the purpose o f 
bargaining a better takeover deal. The entrenchment hypothesis suggests that target 
management resists in order to prevent a takeover. The author finds that hostile takeover 
negotiations are more likely to be associated w ith strategic bargaining. Franks and Mayer 
(1996) claim large gains are expected by target shareholders in hostile bids as a result o f a 
potentially high premium. The authors conclude the rejection o f  bids seems to be due to 
conflict o f restructuring and renegotiation over the condition o f the bids.
In addition, target shareholders benefit from hostile deals by generally receiving 
higher premiums than friendly deals. On average, targets usually receive a higher 
premium in hostile takeover bids partially due to resistance and the premium is even 
higher if  it is a cash deal. In many events, even though a target successfully defends 
against a hostile takeover, target shareholders and managers seem to realize their stock 
price was undervalued and the stock price o f  target firms finish norm ally higher than 
before the takeover attempt (Damodaran, 2004). It appears takeover attempts typically 
motivate reorganization and reveal the value o f  the target firm. Damodaran (2004) 
claims that even when takeovers fail, either from bidding firm withdrawal or target 
resistance, investors revalue the target firm. This assumes the bidding firm might have 
some valuable information about the target or an anticipation o f  an additional takeover
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offer. Bradley et al. (1988) study the effects o f unsuccessful takeovers o f target 
stockholders. They found, though statistically insignificant, upon the announcement of 
an unsuccessful takeover, the target return is negative. However, w ithin 60 days a 
considerable num ber o f  targets are acquired and generate large excess returns (50% to 
66%0-
Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that the target o f  unsuccessful tender offers make 
significantly positive returns even if  the takeover attempt failed. Moreover, if  the target 
o f an unsuccessful tender offer receives new offers within next two years, those targets 
realize even higher returns; however, if  there is no further offers they lose all 
announcement gains previously earned. Targets o f  unsuccessful mergers seem to lose all 
positive announcement gains upon the failure o f  the offer.
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
Target Returns by N ature o f  Acquisition
Hypothesis 3: The mean CAR o f target firms associated with M &A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H3-1 : for tender offer
H3-2: for m erger
H3-3; For target firms, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
Target Returns by M ethod o f Payment 
Em pirical Findings
Target firm returns are generally positive in M&As. Even then, the form o f payment 
affects target returns significantly. The form o f payment refers to cash versus stock
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offers. Target returns are substantially higher with cash payment. For stock for stock 
deals, target returns are significantly positive, however substantially lower than returns 
for the cash transactions (Bruner, 2004). Table 7 shows a summary o f  12 studies o f 
M&A cumulative abnormal returns by payment method.
Several studies found target shareholders make higher returns when the acquisition is 
financed by cash rather than stock (Asquith, et al., 1990; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1990; 
Franks, Harris, & M eyer, 1988; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, 
& Yang, 1983).
Draper and Paudyal (1999) find the method o f payment is an important determinant 
o f the gains to shareholders. Draper and Paudyal (1999) study returns o f  merger 
participants by mode o f  payment, such as, cash, the bidding firm ’s stock, or a 
combination o f both w ith an option given to the target shareholders. The authors find the 
target stock price in all three categories increases prior to the announcement. The returns 
o f the announcement day for all three categories were positive but w ith different 
magnitudes. Target returns were significantly lower for the stock offer (4.31% increase 
on the announcement day and 11.47% cumulative returns for 4 weeks before the 
announcement day to the announcement day) than the other two categories. The cash 
offer averaged an 8.75% return on the announcement day and more than 15% cumulative 
returns from 4 weeks before the announcement to the announcement day. Cash 
transactions are subject to immediate capital gains taxes while stock transactions are not. 
The authors claim the difference between the actual returns o f  cash versus stock 
transactions is not so great when these taxes are considered.
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Stock: N/A 
Cash: +24.58%
Stock & Cash: +37.57%**
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Stock: -2.40%**
Cash: +0.50%
Stock & Cash; -1.47%*
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Stock: +17.1%** 
Cash: +25.4%** 
Mix: +19.3%**
Stock: -1.9% 
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Mix: +0.3%
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Draper and Paudyal (1999) find if  the target was given the option to choose between a 
cash payment or a stock exchange, the target excess returns were the highest among all 
three groups (more than 10% on the announcement date and 18.5% cumulative returns 
for the 4 weeks before the announcement to the announcement date). The authors claim 
that the willingness o f  the bidder to give such an option provides evidence that the bidder 
has confidence in the synergistic value o f the acquisition and/or the bidder wants the 
target desperately. The authors find when the target has the option to choose the method 
o f payment; the target’s stock price increases the most, while the bidder’s stock price 
declines.
W hy Does Form o f Payment Affect Target Returns?
Inform ation Asym m etry  
The management o f  firms involved in M&A has their own information and estimation 
o f  their firm ’s value. Each also has their estimation ahout the synergistic value from the 
forthcoming m erger and acquisition. Draper and Paudyal (1999) claim the method o f 
payment conveys information o f  managements’ views and perceived synergy from a 
forthcoming acquisition. A stock offer may be an indication the bidding company 
believes its own stock is overpriced, or the bidding com pany is unsure about the potential 
takeover deal. On the other hand, a cash offer m ay be an indication the bidding firm 
values the synergies from the takeover and the bidding firm managers do not share 
private information. The cash offer price could be as low as the current price and the 
highest possible price depends on the bidder’s anticipated value o f  synergies from the
79
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acquisition. Consequently, the cash offer is expected to produee positive returns to the 
target firms.
Chang and M ais (2000) also find the higher the variance o f  a bidding firm’s stock 
return, the more likely a transaction is to he financed with stock. This may be an 
indication the management o f high risk firms hope to decrease their personal risk by 
“leverage-reducing transactions” (p. 139). For cash deals, target shareholders do not have 
to share the risk w ith bidding firm o f not achieving expected synergic gains from the 
M&A. Draper and Paudyal (1999) suggest that for target shareholders cash offers are 
less risky than stock offers. Therefore, cash offers are expected to generate higher target 
returns.
Com petition
Berkovitch and N arayanan’s (1990) model shows that when a takeover is financed 
with cash instead o f  equity, target earns higher returns. Also, the greater the competition, 
the higher target returns, and the amount o f cash offered as well as the ratio o f cash to 
stock goes up. For takeovers financed with a combination o f cash and equity, the higher 
the portion o f cash, the higher the abnormal returns to the target. The greater the 
competition, whether aetual or potential, the target will capture more o f  the synergistic 
value created by the M&A. The authors claim the greater the possible competition, the 
greater the amount o f  cash versus stock used to finance the M&A.
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Taxes
Tax treatment on cash and stock deals are considerably different for target firms. In 
cash deals for target shares, target shareholders w ill pay capital gain taxes immediately.
In a stock deal, target shareholders can defer tax paym ent until they sell the shares o f the 
new company. Therefore, target shareholders m ay require higher premiums (payment) 
on cash offers than stock offers to he compensated for the immediate capital gain taxes. 
Consistent with the different tax treatment argument, Hayn (1989) finds targets earn 
higher abnormal returns for taxable deals than tax-deferred deals.
M anagem ent Ownership o f  Target and  Job  Retention
Target managers w ith high ownership have substantial negotiating power in M&A 
transactions. Target managers can resist a potentially profitable acquisition when the 
gain from acquisition is not enough to cover their lost benefits. Managers are also able to 
use the power to negotiate more favorable conditions for themselves (Song & Walking, 
1993). Stulz (1988) argues that firms with high managerial ownership are less likely to 
be an acquisition target, since they are more costly to bidders. That is, once the firm 
becomes a target, high managerial ownership can produce high abnormal returns for the 
target. Stulz, W alking, and Song (1990) find in multiple-bid offers, target abnormal 
returns have a positive relationship with managerial ownership and a negative 
relationship w ith institutional ownership.
Ghosh and Ruland (1998) find that managerial ownership o f target firms is positively 
related with stock acquisition after controlling for other variables such as capital gains 
taxes, firm size, and friendly versus hostile nature o f  the acquisition. In addition, target
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managers have a h igher tendency for job retention when the target is acquired hy stock 
than cash. Their findings support the hypothesis that target managers with high 
ownership prefer to receive a stock exchange for their ownership in order to maintain 
control and voting influence after the acquisition. Also, target managers with high 
ownership and voting influence tend to keep their jobs after the acquisition. Therefore, 
target managers w ith high ownership will negotiate for a stock exchange over a cash 
acquisition. The authors claim target managerial ownership is a more significant factor 
than bidder m anagerial ownership for the method o f payment.
Characteristics o f  Cash Deals 
N ature  o f  Acquisition: Friendly versus H ostile  Tender Offers 
Zhang (2001) claims that tender offers are more likely to he hostile and are also more 
likely than mergers to be a cash offer (Gilson, 1989; Fishman, 1989). Stock payment is 
more likely to be used when a deal is friendly while cash paym ent is more likely used for 
hostile tender deals (Zhang, 2001).
Fishman (1989) claims a cash offer implies the target has a synergistic value and the 
cash offer helps to eliminate the competition. Fishman argues one o f  the reasons a tender 
offer is likely to be cash financed is regulatory explanation. A  cash offer is subject to 
fewer regulatory requirements than a stock offer. Also cash tender offers take less time 
to complete than stock financed transactions whether they are mergers or tender offers. 
Therefore, when there is actual or potential competition to acquire the target, bidders are 
more prone to use cash financed tender offer to block the rivals.
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Outside M onitoring  /  O w nership C oncentration  
Acquiring firm s’ managers have discretion to choose mode o f  payment. Chang and 
Mais (2000) study the motives o f  acquiring firm m anagers’ choice o f  financing. The 
authors find evidence that acquiring firm managers want to dim inish outside blockholder 
monitoring and decrease m anagers’ personal risk. Chang and M ais (2000) claim the 
acquirer’s choice o f  payment m ethod is highly related with the target firm ’s ownership 
composition. Chang and Mais (2000) and Yook, Gangopadhyay, and McCabe (1999) 
claim when the target and/or the buyer’s ownership is concentrated, the deal is likely to 
be a cash offer. By not offering stock, the acquirer potentially prevents new major 
shareholders who can possibly disagree with restructuring or firm policy. Chang and 
Mais (2000) claim managerial m otives also influence the choice o f fin a n c in g  in M&As. 
The authors claim that if  target firm ownership is concentrated, the bidder is more likely 
to finance with cash in order to prevent the creation o f  new outside blockholders. Thus 
the acquirer’s managers hope to minimize outside monitoring by spreading out 
ownership. As a result stock transactions are more likely when ownership is not 
concentrated (Chang & Mais, 2000; Yook et al., 1999).
M anagem ent Control 
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) claim if  the acquiring firm managers have a large 
ownership stake, the managers prefer a cash financed acquisition to maintain control o f 
the firm and not dilute their ownership. The method o f payment in M&As can be 
influenced by bidder and target management ownership. Yook, et al. (1999) finds 
evidence that bidding firms with low insider ownership are likely to offer stock and firms
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with high insider ownership are likely to offer cash. This is consistent with management 
control theory. M anagers with high ownership interest prefer not to offer stock in an 
effort to maintain control.
Cash A vailability
Bidding firms with adequate cash, sufficient cash flow, or high debt capacity are 
prone to use cash for their investment. Jensen (1986) claims that firms with excessive 
free cash flow are likely to engage in cash acquisitions. Zhang (2001), Heron and Lie 
(2002), and Chang and Mais (2000) measure bidders’ ability to pay cash with the 
bidders’ cash balance relative to target size. They find this measure to he significantly 
related with the m ethod o f payment (cash or stock). Consistent with other studies, Martin 
(1996) finds if  the acquiring firm has a high cash balance, the acquisition is more likely 
to he financed by  cash.
Characteristics o f Stock Deals 
H igh Stock M arket Values 
Some researchers claim the higher the acquirer’s stock performance, the more likely 
they will make a stock offer (Chang & Mais, 2000; Heron & Lie, 2002; Martin, 1996; 
Zhang, 2001). Typically the “Q” ratio (market value divided by book value) is used to 
measure stock performance (Bruner, 2004). They claim the higher the acquirers “Q” 
ratio, the more likely an offer will be with stock financing rather than cash or mixed 
payment.
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Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) find that the num ber o f stock mergers is 
associated with high stock market values. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that one o f 
the characteristics o f  m erger waves is high stock market values. It appears high stock 
values or possible overvalued stock prices promote M &A activity. Bidding firm 
managers may try to take advantage o f this opportunity o f  overvalued stock as a mean o f 
payment.
Investm ent O pportunity  
Carleton, Guilkey, Harris, and Stewart (1983) and M artin (1996) find evidence that 
payment method is significantly influenced hy buyer’s investment opportunities.
Martin’s (1996) study o f  underlying motives for the method o f payment in M&As finds 
that bidders’ growth opportunities and stock financing are strongly related. The more the 
bidders’ growth opportunities, the more likely stock financing will be used.
Size o f  Target
Some researchers find the relative size o f the target to the buyer is related to the form 
o f payment. The bigger the target relative to the buyer’s size, the deal is more likely to 
be a stock offer (Hansen, 1987; Zhang, 2001). This is evidence that the buyer’s ability to 
pay with cash is another important determinant o f  choice between cash or stock offer 
(Chang & Mais, 2000; Heron & Lie, 2002; Zhang, 2001). However, M artin (1996) finds 
no relationship between bidder’s firm size and method o f  payment. Yook, et al. (1999) 
find interesting evidence that bidders are likely to use cash acquisition when the target 
size is large compared to the bidder. The author claims the growth o f the junk bond
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market has enabled fairly small bidders to use junk bonds to acquire relatively larger 
targets.
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
Target Returns by M eth o d  o f  P aym ent
Hypothesis 4: M ean CAR o f target firms associated with M &A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H4-1 : for cash offer
H4-2: for stock offer
H4-3: for mix o f  cash and stock offer
H4-4: For target firms, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and 
mixed offer CARs
Bidder Returns by Nature o f  Acquisition 
Several studies show bidder returns are higher in tender offers than in friendly 
negotiated transactions (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). M any studies find positive significant 
bidder returns in hostile deals, (see Asquith et al., 1990; Gregory, 1997; Jarrell & 
Poulsen, 1989; Lang et al., 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Ran & Vermaelen, 1998). 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) survey returns in contested and friendly deals. Numerous 
studies show significant positive bidder returns in hostile deals. Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) concluded, based on an analysis o f 16 studies, that the bidder average abnormal 
return in successful mergers was zero, and in successful takeovers (tender offer) was 
+4.0% (see Table 5).
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Bidder Returns for Successful Tender Offers
Jensen and Ruback (1983) did a detailed analysis o f 16 M &A studies. Table 6, 
adopted from Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 11-13), summarizes thirteen studies o f 
successful takeover returns o f bidder and target firms. In Table 6 panel A, bidder 
abnormal returns o f  successful tender offers are summarized and show a significant 
positive return from 2.4% to 6.7%, with a weighted average return o f  3.8%. Although 
bidder returns for successful tender offers are considerably lower than those o f  targets, 
bidder returns for successful tender offers are positive and significant.
B idder Returns fo r  Successful M ergers  
The bidder returns in mergers is mixed as shown in panel B o f  table 6. On average, 
the two day (-1 to 0 day; the day before and the day o f the announcement) return o f 
bidders in successful mergers is zero and for one month around the event (-19 to 0, -20 to 
0, or -20 to +10 days; 19 to 20 days before and the day o f the announcement or ten days 
after the announcement) the return is 1.37%. Dodd (1980) finds a significant two-day 
announcement abnormal return o f  negative 1.09% for 60 successful m erger studies. 
Asquith (1983) and Eckho (1983) find slightly positive but not statistically significant 
abnormal returns indicating that merger bids are zero net present value investments. In 
panel B.2 o f  table 6 shows the one month announcement effect and all five studies show 
positive abnormal returns for bidders in successful mergers. However, only the Asquith 
et al.’ (1983) result, 3.48%, is statistically significant.
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M & A R egulation E ffect on B idder R eturns  
Some researchers argue the tender offer process has becom e more costly and time- 
consuming for bidders due to the adoption o f  the W illiams A ct in 1968. There is much 
research about the regulation effect on returns o f  M &A participants. Bradley et al.
(1988) study a sample o f  921 tender offers during the period from October 1958 to 
December 1984. Their final sample included 236 successful tender offers over the period 
1963 to 1984. Bradley et al. find bidder returns decreased from about 4% prior to the 
Williams Act (1963 to 1968) to 1.3% (insignificant) im mediately after the Williams Act 
(1968 to 1980), and a negative 3% in a still later period (1981 to 1984).
Jensen and Ruback (1983) report that security regulations seem to decrease bidder 
gains from takeovers. Smiley (as cited in Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and Jarrell and 
Bradley (1980) examined the effect o f  changes in tender offer regulations on the 
abnormal return o f  M & A participants. Jarrell and Bradley claim  the bidder abnormal 
return decreased after the Williams Amendment. The authors find the bidder average 
abnormal returns (-40 days to + 20 days) were 9% for 28 bidders prior to the Williams 
Amendment, 6% for 51 bidders regulated by the Williams Amendment, and 4% for nine 
bidders subject to both the Williams Amendment and state tender offer laws. Asquith et 
al. (1983) find similar evidence. They found 4.4% for bidder abnormal returns for 
mergers before October 1, 1969 and 1.7 % after October 1, 1969. Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) argue that it seems like regulation is costly to bidders and though it is not 
conclusive it seems target gains increase at the expense o f  bidders’ shareholders.
Schipper and Thompson (1983) claim increased legal restrictions on acquisitions had 
a significant impact on the market for mergers after 1969. Schipper and Tompson (1983)
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considered the effect o f  four regulatory changes that occurred from 1968 to 1970: 
Accounting Principle Board Opinions 16 and 17, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the 1968 
Williams Amendment, and its 1970 extension. Each o f these regulatory changes 
constrains bidders, therefore reducing bidders’ profitability. Schipper and Tompson 
(1983) found that the W illiams Amendment reduced acquirers’ equity values about 6%. 
Instead o f using before and after regulation comparison o f  bidder abnormal returns, the 
Schipper and Thom pson event-type tests are considered to be more accurate. They claim 
the regulatory changes are costly to bidding firms, and increased regulation reduces the 
wealth o f bidding firms.
Profile o f Hostile Tender Offers and Friendly Mergers 
Schnitzer (1996) studied the bidder’s choice between hostile or friendly takeover 
based on the uncertainty o f the target’s potential value, the target m anagem ents’ 
shareholding and transaction costs. Transaction cost is normally higher for hostile tender 
offers than friendly deals. These transaction costs include advertisements, mailings to 
shareholders on top o f  the high-cost services o f  lawyers and merchant banks. Franks and 
Harris (1989) showed in the United Kingdom, a big part o f  all merger and acquisition 
transaction costs are often due to hostile bids, which is only a small component o f the 
acquisition activity. In some cases, a bidder has to deal with costly takeover defenses, 
like poison pills. M oreover, normally there is a high premium to target shareholders in 
tender offers. Schnitzer (1996) argue the higher the transaction costs o f  hostile 
acquisitions relative to friendly ones, the more likely are friendly takeover attempts.
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H ostile  Takeover
Schnitzer (1996) argues if  the m anager o f the target company bears private 
information about the scope for efficiency gains, the bidder tends to go for a hostile 
acquisition despite the higher transaction costs relative to a friendly transaction.
There is a potential agency problem since the m anager’s interest may be different 
from shareholders’ interest. In a friendly offer, since a bidder negotiates the deal with the 
target management w ho has better and private insider information about the firm, there is 
information asymmetry. Therefore, i f  target management rejects a friendly offer, it might 
indicate the target is undervalued which possibly lead to a hostile takeover with a higher 
premium. Accordingly, when there is potential value increase and private information 
about the company, a takeover deal is more likely to be a hostile tender offer. Schnitzer 
(1996) claims that the greater the uncertainty the value o f  the acquisition, the more likely 
the bidder will choose a hostile takeover.
F riendly  Takeover
Friendly takeovers have weaknesses as well. There is an inherent agency problem 
caused by separation o f  ownership and management in a firm. M anagers’ interest may 
not align with the shareholders’ interest. If  the manager expects to lose his rents or perks, 
he may avoid a profitable merger. In a friendly takeover, the bidder has to persuade 
managers as well as shareholders to agree to the sale o f the company. To avoid the 
information asymmetry problem, in some cases a hostile takeover is used as an 
alternative since it does not need m anagers’ approval. Morck et al.’s (1988) finding 
supports this view. The authors argue if  the bidder plans to discipline the present
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management, it is likely to use a hostile tender offer. Nyborg (as cited in Schnitzer,
1996) finds the bidder’s need for the target management’s human capital in the 
reorganization is an important determinant o f the acquisition method used.
Generally, legal and governmental constraints takes longer for friendly bids than 
tender offers, therefore, friendly bids have disadvantages that allows more competitive 
bidders (Herzel and Shepro, as cited in Schnitzer, 1996). On the other hand, Berkovitch 
and Khanna (1991) point out a hostile tender offer must be made in public which brings 
more competition while a friendly deal can be negotiated secretly w ith a profitable target.
Investm ent O pportunities H ypothesis
Explanations for the motivations behind hostile takeovers are controversial. A more 
generous view about hostile takeovers is that the bidders are investors simply looking for 
profitable investment opportunities identified through research. The bidder may see 
strong growth opportunities, synergies, unknown or underemployed assets in a target.
This is the investment opportunities hypothesis. Some studies support this hypothesis 
claiming not to find evidence that targets are inefficient or essentially different from other 
firms (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Schwert, 2000). Franks and M ayer (1996) wrote, 
“there is little evidence o f  poor performance prior to bids” (p. 163). M cW illiams (1990) 
argues that returns from takeovers are better explained by utilization o f  synergies than 
does replacement o f  management or redirection o f inefficient firms. Some studies 
predicting the likelihood o f  takeover do not use performance measures such as 
market/book or price/eamings ratios as a measure o f  valuation (Ambrose & Megginson, 
1992; Shivdasani, 1993; Comment & Schwert, 1995).
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Whether the takeover targets are inefficient or not is controversial. However, it is 
assumed that these firms are not top performers and bidders find a profitable investment 
opportunity through takeover. A hostile takeover might be a bidder’s choice o f forceful 
entry when a friendly offer is rejected by the target.
Uncertain R esult
Table 8 shows the results o f 371 U.S. hostile takeover attempts from 1975 to 2000 
(Burner, 2004, chap. 32). SDC Platinum, the well-known M&A database, provides the 
following definitions (as cited in Burner, 2004, chap. 32): “Friendly (the board 
recommends the offer); Hostile (the board officially rejects the offer but the acquirer 
persists with the takeover); Neutral (the management o f the target has nothing to do with 
the transaction); Unsolicited (the offer is a surprise to the target’s board and has not yet 
given a recommendation).”
Burner (2004, chap. 32) claims that unsolicited bids are rare events and only 1.2% o f 
all finished deals in the United States between 1975 and 2000. According to Thomson 
Securities Data Corporation (as cited in Burner, 2004, chap. 32), o f  the unsolicited bids 
about 32% account for hostile bids. Among the hostile bids, 25% were successful, about 
30% were acquired by another (white knight), and about 45% remained independent.
The odds are not favorable for hostile bidders or for targets successfully resisting hostile 
bids. Obviously the hostile bid is rare and uncertain for all participants.
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Table 8
Summary o f  O utcom es o f  H ostile  Takeover A ttem pts: Breakdow n o f  D ea l A ttitude and  
Takeover R esults fro m  1975 to 2000
Bids for U.S. Targets by U.S. or 
Foreign Bidders
Total M&A done deals 93,312 100%
Total confirmed, unsolicited 1,151 1.2%
O f those that were unsolicited:
Friendly 111 9.7%
Neutral* 669 58TT4
Hostile 371 32.2%
Total 1,151 100.0%
O f those that were hostile:
Target sold to hostile bidder 91 24,5^6
(over competing bids) (28) (7.5%)
Target sold to another bidder 114 30.7%
Successful defense, target not sold 166 44.8%
Total 371 100^4
Note. From A pplied  M ergers & Acquisitions, (p. 806), by Bruner, E. R, 2004, Hoboken, 
NJ: John W iley & Sons, Inc.
*Neutral is defined as either (1) the bid is independent o f  the board o f  directors or (2) the 
board o f directors nether accepts the initial bid as friendly nor rejects the bid as hostile. 
Source o f  data: Thomson Securities Data Corporation (as cited in Burner, 2004, chap. 
32). The observations run from January 1, 1975, to N ovem ber 1, 2000.
Attractive Earnings
With the low success rate o f  hostile bids, why do bidders pursue hostile takeovers? 
Numerous studies find significantly greater positive abnormal returns for hostile takeover 
bidders than friendly transaction bidders. (Asquith et al., 1990; Gregory, 1997; Jarrell & 
Poulsen, 1989; Lang et al., 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Ran & Vermaelen, 1998).
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These positive returns m ay attract bidder firms to engage in hostile tender offers even 
with the low success rate.
Whether the m otivation for hostile takeover is inefficient management, investment 
opportunities, or bargaining tactic, bidders expect gains from the correction o f  inefficient 
management, growth opportunities and synergy through investment opportunities.
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
Bidder Returns by N a ture  o f  A cquisition
Hypothesis 5 : M ean CAR o f bidders associated with M &A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H5 -1 : for tender offer 
H5-2: for m erger
H5-3 : For bidders, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
Bidder Returns by  Method o f Payment 
E m pirica l F indings o f  B idder Returns by M ethod  o f  Paym ent 
Table 7 shows a summary o f  12 studies o f M &A cumulative abnormal returns by 
payment method. Studies find the form o f payment in M&As, as well as the financing 
decision by the bidding firm, affects the returns o f M&A participants. The form o f 
payment refers to cash versus stock. Several studies found the bidder shareholders make 
higher returns when the acquisition is financed by cash rather than stock (Asquith, et al., 
1990; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1990; Franks, Harris, & M eyer, 1988; Huang & 
Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983). It seems like stock for 
stock deals are costly to bidders. Numerous researchers found bidder returns were
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negative when the acquisition was paid by stock, and zero or a b it positive for cash 
transactions (Asquith, et ah, 1990; Heron & Lie, 2002; Huang & W alkling, 1987;
Travlos, 1987; Yook, 2003). The results are consistent w ith the information asymmetry 
and signaling theories that managers issue stock when they believe their firm value is 
high or overvalued, and try to avoid issuance o f  stock when they believe the firm is 
undervalued. Thus issuance o f stock signals information to the m arket and the stock 
price o f the company drops upon issuance. Stock for stock exchange for M&A 
transactions reacts the same way. That is, a stock exchange M &A transaction provides 
negative information that the bidding firm is overvalued. Tender offers tend to magnify 
the impact o f  cash versus stock outcomes. I f  tender offers are paid in cash, the bidder 
returns are higher and the returns from stock deals are lower (Bruner, 2004).
Chang (1998) finds the bidder earns positive abnormal returns for a stock offer 
takeover o f a privately owned target. This is the opposite from the negative abnormal 
returns generally experience in the stock offer takeover o f  publicly held targets. In 
contrast with publicly held firms, the bidder makes no abnormal returns for the cash offer 
when acquiring privately held firms. Chang claims the positive bidder returns from stock 
offers to privately owned targets are due to the monitoring effect by  the target 
shareholders that may reduce information asymmetries.
M ethod o f  Paym ent and  F inancing D ecision
The method o f payment and the financing decision are two different aspects o f a 
M&A. W hether to offer cash, stock or a combination o f both is the method o f payment. 
A cash offer however, can he financed by cash on hand, issuing new debt or issuing new
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equity o f the acquiring company. It depends on the availability o f  internal sources o f 
funds, and if  needed the bidding firm must raise external funds whether by debt or equity 
issuance. The pecking order theory claims that a firm prefers to use internal sources o f 
funds before turning to external funds. A stock offer can be financed by using a bidder’s 
own treasury stocks or issuing new equity. Table 9 illustrates the relationship between 
form o f payment and financing decision.
ThA/eP
Illustration o f  L inkage  between Form  o f  Paym ent and  F inancing:
Decision Tree and  O utcom es
Form o f payment decision Financing decision
1) Pay with cash a. Financed from cash on hand
b. Financed from new issue o f  debt
c. Financed from new issue o f  stock
2) Pay with stock d. Financed from shares in treasury
e. Financed from new issue o f  stock
Note. From A p p lied  m ergers and  acquisitions, (p. 575). by Bruner, R. F., 2004, Hoboken, 
IN; John W iley & Sons, Inc.
W hy Does Form o f Payment Affect Bidder Returns?
There are several arguments why the form o f payment affects returns o f M&A 
participants. The arguments included competition, information asymmetry, investment
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opportunities, risk sharing, management control, management ownership, agency costs 
and monitoring.
Com petition
Berkovitch and N arayanan’s (1990) model shows that when a takeover is financed 
with cash instead o f  equity, bidders earn higher returns. Also, the greater the 
competition, the amount o f cash offered as well as the ratio o f cash to stock goes up. For 
takeovers financed w ith a combination o f cash and equity, the higher the portion o f cash, 
the higher the abnormal returns to the bidder. The authors claim the greater the 
possibility o f  competition, the greater the amount o f cash versus stock used to finance the 
M&A.
Inform ation A sym m etry
For bidding firms, an M &A is generally a zero net present value investment and a 
stock transaction produces similar bidder results as the issuance o f  stock. As a result, a 
stock transaction decreases bidding firm returns.
Draper and Paudyal (1999) claim the method o f  payment conveys information o f 
managements’ views and perceived synergy from the forthcoming acquisition. A stock 
offer may be an indication the bidding company believes its own stock is overpriced, or 
the bidding company is unsure about the potential takeover deal. As a result, the bidding 
firm’s stock price decreases if  a stock offer is anticipated. On the other hand, a cash offer 
may be an indication the bidding firm values the synergies from the takeover and the 
bidding firm managers do not share private information. The cash offer price could be as
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low as the current price and the highest possible price depends on the bidder’s anticipated 
value o f synergies from the acquisition.
Information asymmetry explains that managers have better inside information than 
the public. Thus a firm’s market price m ay not fully reflect the firm ’s real value. Myers 
and M ajluf (1984) developed the pecking order theory o f financing. This argues that a 
firm will use inside funds before raising external funds. I f  the firm needs to raise external 
funds, it prefers to finance debt before equity. M yers and M ajluf also claim the firm will 
issue stocks (equity) when the managers believe its firm is overvalued. As a result, the 
issuance o f stock gives a negative signal to the m arket and the firm ’s stock price declines. 
Event studies find that negative returns follow announcements o f  a stock issuance 
(Asquith & Mullins, 1986; M asulis & Korwar, 1986). K arpoff and L ee’s (1991) study 
find that insiders who think their firm is overvalued are likely to issue stock instead o f 
debt. Smith (1986) reports, on average, stock prices drop ahout 3% at the announcement 
o f a seasoned new equity issuance. Similarly, if  bidding firm managers have unfavorable 
private information, they are more likely to use a stock offer in an acquisition. Empirical 
studies support this hypothesis showing that bidding firms’ returns are significantly 
negative in stock acquisitions, however zero or positive in cash acquisitions (Travlos, 
1987, Asquith, et al., 1990; see Table 8). Yook, et al. (1999) find insider selling in 
bidding firms to be significantly greater prior to stock offers than before cash offers. This 
implies that management knows the stock price will decrease so they sell shares before 
the stock acquisition is announced. The authors find that high net insider sales and stock 
acquisition has a positive relationship. The author also finds insider selling before the
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announcement and abnormal bidder returns around the offer have a significant negative 
relationship.
Investm ent Opportunities
Martin (1996) finds that method o f payment in M&A depends on both bidder’s and 
target’s investment opportunities. Studies find the higher the investment opportunities, 
the great the likelihood o f stock financing (Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 1996; Martin, 1996). 
Investment opportunities were measured as Tobin’s q-ratio, or historical sales growth. 
Carleton, et al.(1983) find a positive relationship between target market-to-book ratios 
and the likelihood o f  stock financing.
Jung et al. (1996) claim that firms with growth opportunities prefer to raise funds 
with equity than debt. Issuing equity will allow managers more discretion and financial 
flexibility. Unlike equity, debt financing requires management to pay a fixed amount. 
Debt financing monitors management to invest more carefully and not to invest in poor 
projects. For this reason, debt financing would maximize the value o f  the firms without 
good investment projects. On the other hand, firms with good investment projects will 
value discretion from equity financing. Jung et al. find that firms with good investment 
opportunities prefer to issue equity. The market reacts positively to equity issues by 
firms with good investment opportunities. M artin (1996) finds that investment 
opportunities o f  both bidders’ and targets’ are important factors o f  method o f payment.
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R isk  Sharing
One o f the essential elements o f  corporate acquisitions is how much target 
information exists. Hansen (1987) models how information asymmetry between the 
target and the bidding firm affect choice o f  payment in M&As. I f  the target has private 
information and is aware o f its value better than the bidder, the bidder would prefer to use 
a stock offer which has a “contingent-pricing effect” (Hansen, p. 76). So the target is 
forced to share the information and risk once the acquisition is complete. Hansen claims 
the larger the target size, the greater the information asymmetry. Thus, if  the target size 
increases, the bidder is more likely to use stock financing. On the other hand, i f  the 
bidder size increases, the bidder is less likely to use stock financing. Hansen also argues 
that the less confident the bidder about the targets’ investment opportunities, the more 
likely the bidder is to use stock financing.
Growth opportunities are difficult to measure. Hansen used a high q-ratio as a 
measure o f high growth opportunities. This also means that much o f  a firm’s value 
comes from potentially profitable investments that may never be achieved. Therefore, a 
target with a high q-ratio means the target is a risky investment. To reduce the risk, if  a 
target has high growth opportunities, a bidder is more likely to use stock financing. 
Moreover, if  the bidder has high investment opportunities, the bidder is more likely to use 
stock financing. Equity financing provides flexibility and discretion to managers in 
financing plans and firm policy (Martin, 1996). Also, if  the bidder has large investment 
opportunities, the target seems to be more willing to accept the bidders’ stock.
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M anagem ent C ontrol and  M anagem ent O w nership o f  B idder
Agency theory as contributed much to the understanding o f  managerial ownership 
and M&A activity. M anagerial ownership aligns managers’ interest with shareholders 
and gives incentives to managers to act as shareholders. It encourages reducing the 
possible abuse o f perquisites from managers, since managers share a higher portion of 
cost and ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). M &A can act as a discipline to poor 
management since the stock price o f  a firm is likely to suffer from poor management. If  
the stock price o f a potentially profitable firm is low, it is likely to become a takeover 
target.
Management control theory claims that managers are reluctant to give up control 
(Harris & Raviv, 1988; Jung, et al. 1996; Stulz, 1988). I f  the bidding firm managers have 
a high ownership interest, managers prefer not to use stock financing to avoid dilution of 
their control. Therefore, if  the bidding firm has high insider ownership, they are more 
likely to use a cash offer (Yook et al., 1999). Amihud, et al. (1990) find a significant 
relationship between greater insider ownership and cash financed acquisitions. The 
authors claim the corporate control issue influences the acquisition financing method.
Consistent with management control theory, Yook, et al. (1999) find evidence that 
bidders with high inside ownership are likely to use cash while bidders with low inside 
ownership are likely to use stock in M&As. However, the author reports that insider 
ownership levels are not related to cumulative abnormal returns. The author suggests that 
due to the management control hypothesis, the m arket expects high inside ownership 
bidding firms to use a cash offer to maintain control, not because the bidding firm is 
undervalued. Therefore, a cash offer by a high inside ownership firm is less favorable in
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the market. Since, bidding firms with high inside ownership prefer not to use a stock 
offer, if  stock financing is used in this case, the m arket reacts negatively. It is perceived 
as bad news to the m arket indicating the bidder’s stock is greatly overvalued. As a result, 
stock offers from the high inside ownership bidders are significantly further negative than 
stock offers from the low inside ownership bidders.
Martin (1996) claims that managerial ownership and likelihood o f  stock financing do 
not have a linear relationship. Halpem , Kieschnich, and Rotenberg (2005) claim if  
managerial ownership interest is at either a very low or a very high level, managers are 
less likely to be concerned about the diluting their control. On the other hand, if  
managerial ownership is at a mid-level, managers worry about maintaining their 
ownership control. It is over this middle range that increases in managerial ownership 
have a negative relationship with the probability o f  stock financing. Martin (1996) finds 
managers with low ownership (less than 5%) are not concerned about the dilution o f 
control. However, when management ownership is between 5% and 25%, the higher the 
management ownership, the less likely a bidding firm will use stock financing.
A gency Costs and  M onitoring
The financing decision can be influenced by agency costs and monitoring. I f  the firm 
should issue debt to finance a cash deal, management is obligated to pay the fixed 
expense required by the debt agreement. M anagem ent’s discretion is thus limited by this 
restriction o f  free cash flow. Creditors can play an important role in the monitoring o f 
management. Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) found that there is a positive
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relationship between bidders’ returns in tender offers and the proportion o f the 
acquisition financed by debt.
Jensen (1991) argues that some investors can play an im portant roll in monitoring the 
firm. Blockholders and institutional shareholders are good examples. They can influence 
firm policy and M&A negotiations. Since studies show that bidder returns from stock 
acquisitions are zero or negative, blockholders and institutional shareholders may not 
want a stock acquisition. Therefore, firms with more blockholders and institutional 
shareholders are less likely to use stock financing (Black, as cited in Martin, 1996). 
M artin’s (1996) finding supports this argument. M artin (1996) claims bidders with high 
institutional blockholdings are less likely to use stock financing. However, there was no 
relation between individual blockholders and m ode o f  payment.
Based on the previous studies, the following hypotheses are developed.
B idder R eturns by M ethod  o f  Paym ent
Hypothesis 6: M ean CAR o f bidders associated with M&A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H6-1 : for cash offer
H6-2: for stock offer
H6-3: for mix o f  cash and stock offer
H6-4: For bidders, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and mixed 
offer CARs
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Summary
This chapter presented a literature review o f M &A activities, returns to M&A 
participants and factors affecting these returns. Based on the empirical studies, testable 
hypotheses are developed. We can expect the target returns to be positive and higher 
than bidder returns. M &As are zero net present value investments for bidders, therefore, 
bidder returns are expected to be close to zero. Returns for the target and the bidder may 
vary between industries. We can also expect tender offers which tend to be hostile to 
produce positive and higher abnormal returns for both bidders and target firms than 
mergers which tend to be friendly. Cash offers w ill generate higher returns than stock 
offers. The factors affecting returns to M&A participants include the nature o f  the 
acquisition (hostile tender offer or friendly merger), the method o f payment (cash vs. 
stock exchange or m ixed o f both), and the industry. The next chapter will discuss 
testable hypotheses, data collection and methodology.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Collection 
This chapter presents hypotheses, data, and m ethodology for a study o f merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activities in the hospitality industry between 1985 and 2004. Firms in 
the hospitality industry during this 2 0  year period are identified according to the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations SIC (Standard Industry Code). Mergers and 
acquisitions data are collected from Security Data Corporations (SDC). Firms are 
classified according to the acquirer’s ultimate parent SIC from Secure Data Corporation. 
Stock price information was collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) file. Only stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stock markets are 
included in the sample. I f  the same bidder is involved in several M &As, each transaction 
is counted as a separate M&A.
All targets are acquired by hospitality bidders. Target’s status is divided into public, 
private, subsidiary and other. This study includes only public or private targets. All the 
other targets, such as joint ventures and subsidiaries, are excluded from this study along 
with the bidders that acquired these targets.
This study includes M&As transactions hy hospitality bidding firms under four 
different standard industry codes: restaurants, motels and hotels, gaming and casinos.
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To examine the hypotheses, the bidding firms are divided into three sub categories by 
SIC code: restaurants (5812), hotels (7011), and gaming (7993 and 7999). Targets are 
divided into four sub categories including the same three as for bidders and a fourth 
category, nonhospitality. This nonhospitality category includes all firms not in the hotel, 
restaurant, or gaming industries.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses as presented in Chapter 1 are summarized as follows:
Target Returns by Industry  
Hypothesis 1 : M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to target f irm s  associated with 
M&A activity in the hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero.
H 1  - 1  : in the gaming industry 
H I -2 : in the restaurant industry 
H I-3: in the hotel industry 
H I-4: in the nonhospitality industry
H I-5: There is no difference in the mean CAR to target firms between the gaming, 
restaurant, hotel, and nonhospitality industry
Bidder Returns by Industry  
Hypothesis 2: M ean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidders associated with M&A 
activity in the hospitality industry is equal to zero.
H2-T. in the gaming industry
106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
H2-2: in the restaurant industry 
H2-3: in the hotel industry
H2-4: There is no difference in the mean CAR to bidders between the gaming, 
restaurant and hotel industry
Target R eturns by N ature o f  Acquisition  
Hypothesis 3: The mean CAR o f  target firms associated with M &A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H3 -1 : for tender offer 
H3-2: for merger
H3-3: For target firms, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
Target R eturns by M ethod  o f  P aym ent 
Hypothesis 4: M ean CAR of target firms associated with M &A activity in the 
hospitality industry is less than or equal to zero,
H 4-1 : for cash offer
H4-2: for stock offer
H4-3 : for mix o f  cash and stock offer
H4-4: For target firms, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and 
mixed offer CARs
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Bidder Returns by N ature o f  Acquisition  
Hypothesis 5: M ean CAR o f bidders associated with M&A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H5-1 : for tender offer 
H5-2: for m erger
H5-3: For bidders, there is no difference between tender offer and merger CARs
B idder Returns by M ethod o f  P aym ent 
Hypothesis 6 : M ean CAR of bidders associated with M&A activity in the hospitality 
industry is equal to zero,
H 6 - 1 : for cash offer
H6-2: for stock offer
H6-3: for mix o f  cash and stock offer
H6-4: For bidders, there is no difference between cash offer, stock offer, and 
mixed offer CARs
Methodology
Standard event study methodology as described in Brown and W arner (1985) was 
performed to determine abnormal returns for the target and bidding firms. This 
methodology has been widely used in finance research and makes comparisons with other 
studies quite easy. Event study analysis is residual analysis and examines the changes in 
shareholder wealth resulting from the announcement o f mergers and acquisitions.
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Day zero is the date that the event (merger and acquisition) announcement is made for 
a particular firm. This announcement date is different for each firm. The event period is 
around the announcement date and is selected to obtain all stock price changes resulting 
from the event. A tw o-day event period window is frequently used in this type o f  study 
including the day before the announcement and the day o f the announcement (- 1 , 0 ).
This event window presumes that all information effects from the announcement are 
captured in this two-day period.
The market model is estimated by running an ordinary least squares regression over 
an estimation period from day -240 to day -61. This estimation period should be a clean 
period that can be before, after or both, but should not include the event period. The 
market model is:
^it ~ + ^i^mt +
where:
Rit = the return for firm i on day t,
ai = the mean return not explained by the market.
Pi = firm i ’s relationship with the market return (i.e., its risk factor),
Rmt = the return on the market on day t, where the return on the CRSP equal- 
weighted stock index is used as a proxy for the market return.
Sit = the error term or the regression residual.
The coefficients ai and Pi are the intercept and slope, respectively, for security i 
estimated by the ordinary squares (OLS) parameter.
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The predicted return is the expected return if  no event took place. The predicted 
return for firm “i” on day “t” in the event period is the return given by  the market model 
using the estimates o f  aj and Pi obtained from the estimation period. Thus, the predicted 
return using the market model is:
where now Rmt is the return on the market index for the actual day in  the event period.
Abnormal returns, AR, also referred to as excess returns or the residual, for each day 
in the event period (-1 ,0 ) is estimated for each firm. Abnormal returns (residual) are 
calculated as actual return for that day for the firm minus the predicted return estimated 
from the market model. The AR represents the unpredicted portion o f the return o f  firm 
value changes on that day caused by the event (merger and acquisition):
-  &
The average abnormal return ( A R  ) is the sum o f the abnormal returns o f all firms 
involved in mergers and acquisitions divided by Nt, the number o f  firms in the sample for 
the day t.
—  1
N t i=l
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The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as cum ulating the daily average 
abnormal returns (residual) over the entire event period. A two-day event period window 
is frequently used in this type o f  study including the day before the announcement and 
the day o f  the announcement (-1, 0). This event window presumes that all information 
effects resulting from the armouncement are included in the stock price changes during 
this two-day period. The CAR represents the average total return o f  the event for this 
particular time period across all firms. The CAR is computed as;
CAR = j^AR,
where ti is the first day ( - 1 ) in the event period and t2  is the last day (0 ) in the event 
period.
To test whether a share price effect is statistically significant, a t-statistic is computed. 
The null hypothesis for the t-test is that the average CAR in the event window equals 
zero. A one-sample t test examines if  the mean o f a single variable differs from an 
hypothesized value, zero in this study. That is, if  there is no abnormal return from the 
announcement o f  the mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the cumulative abnormal returns 
should be equal to zero. I f  there is a M &A effect, this should be captured in cumulative 
abnormal returns. The null hypotheses are either non directional two-tailed test or 
directional one-tailed test.
Testing bidder CARs
Ho: Pi = 0  (null hypothesis), non directional and two-tailed test,
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Ha: Pi ^  0  (alternative hypothesis)
Testing target CARs
Ho: Pi < 0  (null hypothesis) directional and one-tailed test,
Ha: Pi > 0  (alternative hypothesis)
As a default, SPSS calculates the probability (p-value) o f  a two-tailed test. A one­
tailed test p-value can be calculated by dividing a two tailed p-value by two.
An independent t-test compares the means o f two groups. The null hypothesis is the 
mean o f group 1  equals the mean o f  group 2 .
Ho: Pi = p 2 
Ha: Pi f  P2
An independent t-test is performed to test hypotheses H3-3 and H5-3. The null 
hypothesis o f H3-3 (H5-3) is that the means o f target (bidder) CARs for tender offers and 
mergers are the same. In other words, it tests if  there is any difference between the 
means o f tender offers and mergers for target (bidder) firms’ CARs.
To test for mean difference between three or more sub groups, an analysis o f  variance 
(ANOVA) is performed. The null hypothesis is all the group means are equal, that is, 
they come from the same population.
Ho: Pi = P2 ... = PA:
Ha: not all pi are equal
Where p, is the mean o f  group i. The F  statistic is constructed for testing the hypothesis.
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
F  =
variation among the sample means Between - groups sum o f squares / (k -1)
variation w ithin the sample W ithin - groups sum o f squares / (N - k)
Mean square between groups (MSg ) 
Mean square w ithin groups (M S^ )
If  the variation between groups is large, relative to the variation within each group, 
the F  statistic becomes large and the null hypothesis is rejected. I f  only two groups are 
used in an analysis o f  variance, the F  statistic is the same as the square o f  the t statistic 
from a two-sample t test.
I f  the overall F-statistic for ANOVA is significant, the null hypothesis is rejected.
This means there is a difference between the means o f  these groups. However the F  
statistic only provides inform ation that means are not equal. To further test which 
particular mean are different from one another, the post hoc pairwise multiple 
comparisons need to be performed. Different post hoc tests can be performed based upon 
the assumption o f  equal variance. There are post hoc tests available given the assumption 
o f equal variance and other post hoc tests if  the variances are not equal. Levene’s test 
examines the equal variance assumption. Levene’s test is reasonably robust to violations 
o f normality (SPSS 12, p. 58).
The chi-square is performed to examine the association between variables. Variables 
examined include nature o f acquisition, method o f payment, industry type, public/private 
status, REIT status, etc.
Multiple regression is used to identify the factors that led to an increase or decrease in 
cumulative abnormal returns to target and bidder firms. Two different sets o f  multiple
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regressions are used, one for target CARs as the dependent variable (Y) and the other for 
bidder CARs as the dependent variable (Y).
Multiple regression is performed to examine which variables best explain CARs for 
targets and bidders in hospitality M&As. The tests control for the targets’ public status as 
well as for the REIT status o f both bidder and target firms in our regression models. Two 
separate multiple regressions analyze the relationships between target CARs and eight 
independent (explanatory) variables, and between bidder CARs and seven independent 
variables (e.g., method o f  payment, nature o f  acquisition, bidders’ industry type, target 
public status and bidders’ REIT status). The target industry is divided into four 
categories: restaurant, gaming, hotel, and nonhospitality. The bidder industry is divided 
into three categories: restaurant, gaming and hotel. Thus the target CAR multiple 
regressions have eight independent dummy variables, and the bidder CAR multiple 
regressions have seven independent dummy variables. All o f the independent variables 
are dummy variables ( 1 , 0 ).
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model for target CARs is
TargetCARs = (3̂  + A, + ^ 2 ^ 2  + ......... +  ̂ + s
Target CARs: Dependent variable (Y)
Pq : constant
P\ : change in target CARs associated w ith unit change in A,
P2 : change in target CARs associated with unit change in A2
P% : change in target CARs associated with unit change in Ag
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Independent variables: (X, through Xg)
X\ : (mixed) mixture o f  cash and stock offers 1, otherwise 0
X 2 '. (cash) 1 0 0 % cash offers 1 , otherwise 0
( 1 0 0 % stock is reference category. 0 , 0 )
A3 : (bidREIT) REIT bidders 1, otherwise 0
A4 : (tarREIT) REIT targets 1, otherwise 0
Ag: (tender) tender offers 1, mergers 0
A^: (restaurant) target firms in restaurant industry, otherwise 0
Ay: (gaming) target firms in gaming industry, otherwise 0
Ag: (hotel) target firms in hotel industry, otherwise 0
(nonhospitaity target is reference category. 0 , 0 )
The OLS regression model for the bidder CARs is
BidderCARs = + P\X^ + P i ^ î   P k^k  ̂
Bidder CARs: Dependent variable 
Pq : constant
P\ : change in target CARs associated with unit change in X \
P2 : change in target CARs associated with unit change in A2
/ ? 7  : change in target CARs associated with unit change in Ay
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Independent variables: (Xi through X?)
Xi : (mixed) mixture o f  cash and stock offers 1 , otherwise 0
X 2 : (cash) 1 0 0 % cash offers 1 , otherwise 0
( 1 0 0 % stock is reference category. 0 , 0 )
A3 : (bidREIT) REIT bidders 1, otherwise 0
A4 : (tarpublic) public targets 1 , private targets 0
A): (tender) tender offers 1 , mergers 0
Ag: (restaurant) bidder firms in restaurant industry, otherwise 0
Ay: (gaming) bidder firms in gaming industry, otherwise 0
(hotel bidder is reference category. 0 , 0 )
Summary
This chapter discussed data collection procedures and the methodology used to test 
hypotheses. Standard event study methodology, t-test, ANOVA, chi-square and multiple 
regressions are perform ed to examine the hypotheses. The next chapter will discuss the 
results o f  the data analysis and findings.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Introduction
This chapter will report the results o f the data analysis and findings. The first o f  three 
sections presents a descriptive summary and chi-square results o f  the sample. The second 
section provides results o f  the t-test and analysis o f  variance (ANOVA) for the 
hypotheses. The last section discusses the multiple regression analysis that considered 
which factors affect cumulative abnormal returns for both the target and the bidder.
Descriptive Information
At first, 893 mergers and acquisitions by hospitality bidders are identified. Only 786 
bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated due to the restriction o f CAR 
calculation criteria and availability o f bidders’ stock price information. Out o f  the 786 
bidders, 141 are in gaming, 322 are in the restaurant industry, 297 are in the hotel 
industry and 26 are in other hospitality industry (cruise ship and amusement park). The 
other hospitality industry is excluded from the study due to the small sample size in this 
category.
All targets were acquired by hospitality bidders. Target’s status is divided into 
public, private, subsidiary and other. This study includes only public or private targets.
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All the other targets, such as joint ventures and subsidiaries, are excluded from this study 
along with the bidders that acquired these targets.
This study includes M &As transactions by hospitality bidding firms under four 
different standard industry codes: restaurants, motels and hotels, gaming and casinos.
To examine the hypotheses, the bidding firms are divided into three sub categories by 
SIC code: restaurants (5812), hotels (7011), and gaming (7993 and 7999). Targets are 
divided into four sub categories including the same three as for bidders and a fourth 
category, nonhospitality. This nonhospitality category includes all firms not in the hotel, 
restaurant, or gaming industries.
The final sample included 430 M &A cases. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
available for all 430 hospitality bidders, but are only available for 71 targets. The smaller 
number o f targets included in the study is due to the lack o f  stock price information. This 
lack o f stock price information was mainly caused by the private status o f most o f the 
targets. Table 10 shows hospitality M &As by year from 1985 to 2004. M&A activities 
were especially high from 1993 to 1999 with 26 or more acquisitions in the hospitality 
industry each year. For the last 20 years, from 1985 to 2004, the acquirer was in the 
gaming industry for 79 deals, 171 were in the restaurant industry, and 180 were in the 
hotel industry. Nine targets were in the gaming industry, 27 w ere in the restaurant 
industry, 23 were in the hotel industry, and 12 were in nonhospitality industries.
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Table 10
N um ber o f  H ospita lity  M & As fro m  1985 to 2004
Bidder’s Ultimate Parent SIC
Year
announced
Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total
1985 - 4 4 8
1986 - 3 2 5
1987 - 3 1 4
1988 1 3 4 8
1989 2 4 4 10
1990 1 4 2 7
1991 2 5 - 7
1992 - 10 1 11
1993 9 19 7 35
1994 10 13 9 32
1995 4 11 11 26
1996 4 16 41 61
1997 9 12 42 63
1998 3 15 22 40
1999 11 12 17 40
2000 5 6 4 15
2001 7 5 1 13
2002 2 10 3 15
2003 4 6 1 11
2004 5 10 4 19
Total 79 171 180 430
A ll 430 M&A cases were acquired by hospitality bidders. The bidders are divided 
into three sub categories - gaming, restaurant, and hotel industry. These are further 
examined by target’s public status, nature o f acquisition (tender offer vs. merger), method 
o f payment, and REIT status o f  both bidders and targets in each sub category. Chi-square 
tests are performed to examine existing association between these variables.
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Table 11
Descriptive In form ation  and  Chi-square test results fo r  430 b idd ing  firm s fro m  1985 to 
2004. B idders ’ Industry  Type vs. Targets ’ P ublic Status &
Bidders ’ Industry Type vs. N ature o f  A cquisition (Tender O ffer V5. M erger)
Bidder industry type
Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total
Target public status (N  == 430)
Private 64 139 148 351
Public 15 32 32 79
Total 79 171 180 430
Pearson chi-square= 0.076, df=2. p>0.963
Tender offer vs. m erger (A = 430)
Merger 77 165 171 413
Tender offer 2 6 9 17
Total 79 171 180 430
Pearson chi-square == 1.029, J / = 2 ,; ,  > .598
B idders ’ Industry  Type V5. Targets ’ P ublic S tatus  
Table 11 shows the number o f  cases by target’s public status and nature o f acquisition 
(tender offer vs. merger). The chi-square test is performed to examine if  there is an 
association between bidders’ industry type and targets’ public status. The chi-square 
results show that there is no association between the bidders’ industry type and the 
targets’ public status (Pearson chi-square = 0.076, d f = 2 , p >  .05). Since p-value for the 
chi-square is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the table variables are 
independent is not rejected.
120
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Among the 430 targets, 351 are private firms, and 79 are public firms. Private firms 
do not have stock price information, so only public target firm s’ CARs were calculated. 
Among 79 public targets, 71 target CARs are available in this study.
Bidders ’ Industry Type V5. N ature o f  A cquisition  (Tender O ffer  V5. M erger)
The association between bidders’ industry type and the nature o f  acquisition is tested 
(see Table 11). From 1985 to 2004, there were 413 mergers and 17 tender offers. Tender 
offers were a small portion o f the sample and mergers made up the majority o f the deals. 
The chi-square test results show that there is no association between bidders’ industry 
type and the nature o f  acquisition. The p-value for the chi-square is greater than 0.05, so 
the null hypothesis that the table variables are independent is not rejected (Pearson chi- 
square = 1.029, d f=  2, p > .05).
B idders ’ Industry Type vs. M ethod  o f  Paym ent 
This section tests the association between bidders’ industry type and method o f 
payment (see Table 12). A total o f 284 deals have method o f paym ent information. 
Among these, 158 deals were 100% cash offer, 59 deals were 100% stock offer and 67 
deals were a mix o f cash and stock. The highest num ber and proportion (71.4%) o f  cash 
offers was found among hotel industry bidders over the last 20 years.
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Bidders ’ Industry  V5. M eth o d  o f  P aym ent
Bidders’ Industry Type
Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total
Method o f Payment {N =  284)
Cash 25 48 85 158
Stock 8 38 13 59
Mixed 16 30 21 67
Total 49 116 119 284
% of within Bidders’ Industry Type
Cash 51.0% 41.1% 71.4% 55.6%
Stock 16.3% 32.8% 10.9% 20.8%
Mixed 32.7% 25.9% 17.6% 23.6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
% o f Total
Cash 8.8% 16.9% 29.9% 55.6%
Stock 2.8% 13.4% 4.6% 20.8%
Mixed 5.6% 10.6% 7.4% 23.6%
Total 17.3% 40.8% 41.9% 100%
Adjusted Residual
Cash -0.7 -4.0 4.5
Stock -0.8 4.1 -3.5
Mixed 1.6 0.7 -2.0
Pearson chi-square = 27.545, d f=  A ,p  = .000**
*p<.05. **p<.01.
The chi-square test shows that there is a significant association between the segment 
within the hospitality industry and method o f  payment. The p-value is less than 0.0005
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so the null hypothesis that the table variables are independent is rejected (Pearson chi- 
square = 27.545, d f=  4 , p <  .0005). The guideline for the chi-square assumption 
commonly used by most researchers are “no cell has an expected value less than 1.0 and 
not more than 20% of the cells have expected values less than 5” (SPSS Base 10.0 
Applications Guide, p. 67). The results show that no cell has an expected count less than 
5 and the minimum expected count is 10.18. Therefore, the test met this assumption and 
there is a significant association between type o f hospitality industry and method o f 
payment. However, the chi-square test provides little inform ation about how the 
variables are related or how strong are the relationships. To inspect the direction and 
strength o f the associations, the adjusted residuals can be examined. The adjusted 
residuals provide information about which cells depart m ost from the hypothesis o f 
independence. Residual values far below -2 or above +2 show cells that significantly 
depart from the model o f  independence. In the restaurant industry, the adjusted residuals 
o f -4.0 in cash and 4.5 in stock offer is an indication that restaurant bidders had fewer 
cash and more stock offers than expected under an assumption o f independence. In the 
hotel industry, the adjusted residuals o f 4.1 in cash and -3.5 in stock offer is an indication 
that hotel bidders had more cash and fewer stock offers than expected under an 
assumption o f  independence.
B idders ’ Industry Type V5. B idders ’ R E IT  Status  
Table 13 shows the number o f  cases by REIT status o f  both bidders and targets in 
each industry type sub category. The first section tests i f  there is an association between 
bidders’ industry type and bidders’ REIT status. There were 3 deals w ith REIT bidders
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in this study. Two deals were from the same hotel bidder, and 1 deal was from a gaming 
bidder. All other 427 bidders were non REIT. The hotel REIT bidder. Interstate Hotel & 
Resorts, Inc., made 2 acquisitions. The first was the acquisition o f  BridgeStreet 
Accommodations, announced in M arch 24, 2000. The payment was made with a mix o f 
cash and stock offer. The bidder return was -7.04% and the target return was 27.89%. In 
May 2, 2002, Interstate Hotel & Resorts announced the acquisition o f  Interstate Hotels 
Corporation. The paym ent was made w ith 100% stock offer and there was one other 
competing bidder for this merger. The bidder return was -20.79% and the target return 
was 52.23%. The gaming REIT bidder was Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. which 
announced the acquisition o f  Hollywood Park Reality Enterprise Inc. in May 3, 1991.
The bidder and target return were the same (4.69%). The method o f payment information 
was not available.
The chi-square test for the independence o f variables shows there is no association 
between bidders’ industry type and bidders’ REIT status (Pearson chi-square = 2.014, d f  
= 2 , p >  .05). The p-value for the chi-square is greater than 0.05, so the null hypothesis 
that the table variables are independent is not rejected.
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Table 13
Bidders ’ Industry Type vs. B idders ’ R E IT  Status, and  Targets ’ R E IT  Status
Bidder industry type
Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total
Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REIT) Bidder (A  = 430)
Non REIT Bidders 78 171 178 427
REIT Bidders 1 0 2 3
Total Bidders 79 171 180 430
Pearson chi-square == 2.014, df=- 2 , p >  .05
REIT (A =  71) Targets
Non REIT Targets 12 27 30 69
REIT Targets 1 0 1 2
Total Targets 13 27 31 71
Pearson chi-square == 1.930, r//=~-2,p> .05
B idders ’ Industry Type vs. Targets ’ R E IT  Status  
The association between bidders’ industry type and targets’ REIT status are tested 
(see Table 13). Among 71 target only 2 were REITs firms, one each in the gaming and 
hotel industry. The p-value for the chi-square is greater than 0.05, so the null hypothesis 
that the table variables are independent is not rejected (Pearson chi-square = 1.930, d f=  
2 , p >  .05). Therefore, there is no association between bidders’ industry type and targets’ 
REIT status.
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N ature o f  A cquisition vs. M ethod o f  P aym ent 
This section tests i f  there is an association between the nature o f  acquisition and the 
method o f payment (see Table 14). There were 284 deals w ith method o f payment 
information available. These deals included 158 cash offers, 59 stock offers and 67 
offers with a mix o f  cash and stock. The chi-square result is not statistically significant 
(Pearson chi-square = 2.59, d f=  2 , p >  .05). Therefore, the result does not support that 
there is an association between the nature o f  acquisition and method o f payment.
The literature review showed that tender offers tend to be hostile and mergers tend to 
be friendly deals. According to Security Data Corporations, between 1985 and 2004, 
there were a total o f  182 hostile deals across all industries. Among them, two deals were 
from hospitality industry bidders, Marriott Corporation’s acquisition o f Saga Corporation 
on May 7, 1986 (announcement date), and MGM Grand, Inc.’s acquisition o f Mirage 
Resorts, Inc. in 2000. The MGM Grand hostile deal data was not available, so it was not 
included in this study. Therefore, there was only one hostile deal, Marriott Corporation’s 
acquisition o f  Saga Corporation, was included in this study for hospitality M&As. The 
other 16 tender offers in this study, therefore, were considered to be friendly deals.
Marriott Corporation’s M&A was a hostile tender offer and a 100% cash offer. There 
was one other com peting bidder for this hostile tender offer. M arriott Corporation’s 
(hotel industry) bidder return was -2.0%, and Saga Corporation (restaurant industry) 
target return was 25.56%.
The findings do not support the claims o f previous studies that tender offers tend to 
be hostile cash offers and mergers tend to be friendly stock offers. The results o f this 
study suggest there is no association between nature o f  acquisition and method o f
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payment. In addition, M&As in the hospitality industry seemed to be quite friendly for 
the last 20 years.
Table 14
N ature o f  Acquisition  V5. M ethod  o f  Paym ent
M ethod o f Payment
Cash Stock Mixed Total
Nature o f Acquisition { N=  284) 
Merger 146 57 65 268
Tender Offer 12 2 2 16
Total 158 59 67 284
Pearson chi-square = 2.589, d f =  4 , p = 0.274
Targets ’ Public  Status vs. M ethod  o f  Paym ent 
This section tests the association between targets’ public status and method of 
payment (see Table 15). A total o f 284 bidder payment methods were available. The 
results o f  the chi-square are statistically significant (Pearson chi-square = 9.323, d f=  2 ,p  
< .05). Zero cells have an expected count less than 5 and the minimum expected count is 
14.75. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the table variables are independent is rejected. 
There is a significant association between targets’ public status and method o f payment. 
Even though chi-square does not indicate the direction or how strong the relation, the 
adjusted residuals provide some useful information. The adjusted residuals o f 2.6 in cash 
and -2.8 in stock indicate that private targets had more cash offers and fewer stock offers 
than expected under an assumption o f  independence. The adjusted residuals o f  -2.6 in
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cash and 2.8 in stock indicate that public targets had less cash offers and more stock 
offers than expected under an assumption o f independence.
Table 15
Targets ’ P ublic  Status vs. M ethod o f  Paym ent
M ethod o f Payment
Cash Stock M ixed Total
Target Public Status (A =  284)
Private 128 36 49 213
Public 30 23 18 71
Total 158 59 67 284
% o f Total
Private 45.1% 12.7% 17.3% 75%
Public 10.6% 8.1% 6.3% 25%
Total 55.6% 20.8% 23.6% 100%
Adjusted Residual
Private 2.6 -2.8 -0.4
Public -2.6 2.8 0.4
Pearson chi-square = 9.323, d f=  2 ,p = .009**
B idders ’ Industry Type vs. Targets ’ Industry  Type  
Table 16 shows the number o f  M &A cases by bidders’ industry type and targets’ 
industry type. The top half o f  the table describes the total 430 acquisitions according to 
three different bidder industries by four different target industries. M ost o f the 
acquisitions are within the same industry, except for gaming industry bidders. Although
128
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
gaming industry bidders acquired 22 gaming targets, they also acquired 1 restaurant, 27 
hotel and 29 non hospitality targets.
About 82% o f the 430 targets were private firms and their stock price information 
was not available. The bottom  half o f Table 4-7 includes the 71 targets with available 
CARs. The chi-square test is not performed for the data in this table because some o f  the 
cells have a “0” count.
Table 16
D escriptive inform ation: B idders ’ Industry Type V5. Targets ’ Industry  Type
Bidder industry type
Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total
Target industry type {N =  430)
Gaming 22 0 6 28
Restaurant 1 129 6 136
Hotel 27 0 131 158
Nonhospitality 29 42 37 108
Total 79 171 180 430
Target with CAR available: 
Target industry type {N =  71)
Gaming 6 0 3 9
Restaurant 0 26 1 27
Hotel 5 0 18 23
Nonhospitality 2 1 9 12
Total 13 27 31 71
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Testing Hypotheses: T-test and ANOVA Results 
Testing H ypotheses: H I  through H I -4, Testing Target CARs by Industry Type 
HI : p (All targets CARs) < 0 
H l-1 : p (target CAR for gaming industry) < 0 
H I -2: p (target CAR for restaurant industry) < 0 
H I-3: p (target CAR for hotel industry) < 0 
H I -4: p (target CAR for nonhospitality industry) < 0
H I-5: p (target CAR for gaming) = p (target CAR for restaurant) = p (target CAR for 
hotel) = p (target CAR for nonhospiality)
The returns o f target firms, overall and by industry, are the subject o f hypotheses HI 
through H I-5. Table 17 summarizes target returns for a two day window, from one day 
before the announcement to the announcement date (-1, 0), along w ith t-test and ANOVA 
results. The descriptive results showed discrepancies between the mean and median 
values which indicate a departure from normality. There are different ways to approach 
this situation. First, perform a t- test. W hen a sample size is large, the t distribution 
looks similar to the z distribution. However, when the sample size is small, the t 
distribution can be used. Second, an alternative could be the use o f a nonparametric test 
which is distribution-free. However, a nonparametric test is not as powerful as the t-test 
when the sample is from a normally distributed population. To test hypotheses H I 
through H I-4, a one sample t-test is employed to examine i f  the mean o f the target CARs 
is significantly greater than zero. To test hypothesis H l-5 , analysis o f variance
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(ANOVA) is performed to examine whether there is a difference in the mean o f the target 
CARs between the gaming, restaurant, hotel and nonhospitality industries.
Table 11
Targets ’ Cum ulative A bnorm al R eturns by Industry
Sub Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Total targets 71 11.76 6.33 6.081 16.30 0.000
Gaming 9 11.91 6.27 2.621 13.63 0.031
Restaurant 27 14.41 13.69 4.214 17.77 0.000
Hotel 23 9.34 5.56 2.949 15.20 0.007
NonHospitality 12 10.34 2.31 2.014 17.80 0.069
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni 
correction & 
1-tailed)
Minimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
98.75% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
Total targets 0.000** -10.22 56.91 7.91 15.62
Gaming 0.062 0.20 42.19 -2.66 26.47
Restaurant 0.000** -10.22 53.51 5.24 23.59
Hotel 0.014** -9.58 52.23 0.72 17.96
NonHospitality 0.138 -2.47 56.91 -4.96 25.65
ANOVA test result; F(3, 67) = 0.426, p  = .735
* p <  .05, * * p <  .01.
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A total o f 71 target CARs were available for this study. All the targets in this study 
were acquired by  hospitality industry firms. The target CARs ranged from -10.22% to 
56.91%. The lowest target return o f -10.22% was in the restaurant industry and the 
highest of 56.91% was in the nonhospitality industry.
Hypothesis H I tests whether the mean o f  the target CARs is statistically greater than 
zero. The mean CAR for all targets (N =  71) is 11.76% and is significantly greater than 
zero at the 1% level, t(70) = 6.081, SD  = 16.3%, p  < .0005. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis o f  H I is rejected.
Targets were divided into four categories; 9 in gaming, 27 in restaurant, 23 in hotel, 
12 in the other industry (NonHospitality). By running four t-tests simultaneously, a 
multiple testing problem is created. The t- test assumes only one test is being performed, 
whereas four t-tests need .to be executed, one for each subpopulation. With an increasing 
number o f tests, the probability o f  finding a significant difference by  chance alone 
increases dramatically. This multiple testing problem can be solved by  making 
adjustment with a Bonferroni correction. This is accomplished by multiplying the 
number o f tests by the probability (p-value) o f  each test. For example, if  the computed 
probabilities for four tests are 0.0031, 0.000, 0.007 and 0.069, then the Bonferroni 
correction multiplies the probabilities by four. The adjusted probabilities would be 
0.124, 0.000, 0.028 and 0.276, and the test would no longer be reported as significant 
at the 5% level. The alternative hypothesis is that target return is greater than zero which 
is a one-tailed test. Since SPSS reports a two-tail test, the p-value is divided by two to 
calculate the probahility value for a one tail test (SPSS Base 10.0, chap. 8).
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The mean CAR o f  gaming targets is 11.91%, N = 9 ,  t(S) = 2.621, SD  = 13.63%, 
p  = .062, and is not significant at the 5% level, but it is significant at the 10% level. The 
hypothesis H l-1  is rejected at the 10% level. The sample size o f gam ing targets is small 
{N=  9), and an additional nonparametric test is performed. Nonparametric tests are 
distribution-free. The rank test or one sample sign test is an alternative for the one 
sample t-test and can be applied when distributional assumptions are questionable. The 
results o f  the non parametric test is significant at the 1% level {p = 0.002).
Restaurant (A =  27) and hotel {N -  23) targets earned significantly positive CARs. 
Restaurant targets earned an average o f  14.41% returns, t{26) = 4.214, SD  = 17.77%, 
p  < .005, and hotel targets earned 9.34% returns, t{22) = 2.949, SD  = 15.20%, < .05. 
The H I-2 and H I -3 null hypotheses that the mean is less than or equal to zero are 
rejected. Therefore, the mean target returns o f restaurant and hotel industries are 
significantly greater than zero.
The mean CAR o f nonhospitality targets is 10.34%, N  = 12, /(11) = 2.014, SD  = 
1 7 . 8 % , >  .05, but it is not significantly different from zero. The null hypotheses o f  H l- 
4 that the mean is less than or equal to zero is not rejected. The average CAR o f 
nonhospitality industries is not significantly greater than zero.
Analysis o f  variance (ANOVA) is used to test hypothesis H l-5  to examine if  any 
differences exist between the target CAR means (average CAR) from the gaming, 
restaurant, hotel, and nonhospitality industries (see Table 17). The assumptions for 
ANOVA are that: (1) the populations are normally distributed in each group, (2) the 
variances o f the group populations are equal, and (3) the observations are independent.
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The Levene homogeneity o f  variance test is conducted to test for equal variance among 
the groups.
The ANOVA results show there is no difference o f  means among the four groups,
F(3, 67) = 0.426, p >  .05. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the CARs o f target firms from the gaming, restaurant, hotel, and nonhospitality industries 
is not rejected.
In sub categories, although the means are not statistically different from each other, 
target returns o f  the restaurant (p = 14.41%) and gaming industries (p = 11.91%) are the 
highest among the four groups. Hotel industry targets earned 9.34% and nonhospitality 
targets earned 10.34%. However, nonhospitality and gaming target CARs are not 
significantly different than zero.
Testing H ypotheses: H 3-1 through H3-3, Testing Target CARs by N ature o f  Acquisition  
H3-1 : p (target CAR for tender offer) < 0 
H3-2: p (target CAR for merger) < 0
H3-3: p (target CAR for tender offer = p (target CAR for merger)
Target returns by nature o f  acquisition are the subject o f  hypotheses H3-1 through 
H3-3. Table 18 summarizes the results o f  t-tests. To test Hypotheses H3-1 and H3-2, a 
one sample t-test is used to test if  the mean o f the target CAR is less than or equal to zero. 
An independent two sample test is performed to examine the mean differences for 
hypothesis H3-3.
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By running two t-tests simultaneously, the multiple testing problem  remains a 
consideration. To solve the multiple testing problem, adjusted p-values are calculated by 
multiplying each p-value by two (Bonferroni correction). The resulting p-value is 
divided by two to calculate the p-value for a one-tailed test.
TbWe 7g
Targets ’ Cum ulative A bnorm al Returns by Nature o f  A cquisition
Sub Group A  Mean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Tender offer 13 10.76 4.42 2.688 14.44 0.020
Merger 58 11.99 6.48 5.435 16.80 0.000
Total targets 71
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni 
correetion & 1 
tailed)
Minimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
97.5% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference 
(%)
Tender offer 0.020* -2.41 45.88 0.51 21.01
Merger 0.000** -10.22 56.91 6.91 17.07
Independent sample t-test result: f(69) = 0.244, /? = .808
* p <  .05, * * p <  .01.
The results show both mergers and tender offers produced significantly positive target 
CARs. For merger cases, the average (mean) target CAR is 11.99% and os significant at 
0.01 level, A  = 58, t(57) = 5.435, SD = 16.80%,/? < .005. For tender offers, the average
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target CAR is 10.76% and is signifieant at 0.05 level, N =  13, t(12) = 2.688, SD  = 
14.44%,/? < .05. The null hypotheses o f  H3-1 and H3-2 are rejected. The average 
returns o f mergers and tender offers for target CAR are positive and significantly 
different from zero. The sample size o f tender offer targets is small (A = 13) and an 
additional nonparametric test is performed. The nonparametric test (one sample sign test) 
showed the results are not significant (p = 0.134).
The hypothesis H3-3 compares equal means between tender offer and merger returns 
o f target firms. The independent sample t-test results showed that Levene’s test for 
equality o f variances is not significant ( F  = 0.498,/? > .05), indicating that the hypothesis 
o f equal variances is not rejected. Therefore, pooled-variance {Equal variances assumed) 
t-test results are reported. The results show that there is no difference between the mean 
o f target CARs for mergers and tender offers, /(69) = 0.244, p > .05. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis o f  H3-3 that equal means o f  target CAR for mergers and tender offers is not 
rejected.
Testing H ypotheses: H 4-1 through H4-3, Testing Target CARs by M ethod o f  Paym ent 
H4-1 : p (target CAR for cash offer) < 0
H4-2: p (target CAR for stock offer) < 0
H4-3 : p (target CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) < 0
H4-4: p (target CAR for cash) = p (target CAR for stock) = p (target CAR for
mix o f  cash and stock offer)
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Target returns by method o f payment are the subject o f  hypotheses H4-1 through 
H4-4. Table 19 summarizes the results o f  t-tests and ANOVA. The one sample t-test is 
performed to check H4-1 through H4-3 to examine if  the means for these three groups are 
less than or equal to zero. To test H4-4, an ANOVA is performed on the group mean 
differences.
Since three t-tests are performed simultaneously, the p-values are adjusted with the 
Bonferroni correction. This correction multiplies each p-value by the number o f t-test 
being performed (3 tests). Since this is a one-tailed test, the resulting p-value is then 
divided by two. The results show the target CAR for all three sub groups are 
significantly positive. The mean o f the target CAR for cash offers (N = 24) is 8.60% and 
is significantly greater than zero, t(23) = 3.043, SD  = 13.84%,/? < .01. The mean o f the 
target CAR for stock offers (N  -  23) is 17.48% and is significantly greater than zero, 
t(22) = 4.009, SD  = 20.92%, /? < .01. The mean o f  the target CAR for cash and stock 
mixed offers (N = 17) is 12.94% and is significant greater than zero, t { \ 6 ) = 4.285, SD = 
12.45%,/? < .01). Therefore hypotheses H4-1 through H4-3 are all rejected.
The ANOVA test results show that there is no difference between the means o f the 
target CARs for these three sub groups, F{2, 61) = 1.712,/? > .05. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis o f  H4-4, that the means o f target CARs for all three groups (cash, stock, and 
mixed offers) are equal, carmot be rejected. Despite the lack o f  statistical significance, 
the results produced some interesting outcomes. The mean o f target CARs for stock 
offers is higher than that for cash offers or mixed offers. This is contrary to most findings 
in the literature.
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Targets ' Cum ulative A bnorm al Returns by M ethod  o f  P aym ent
Sub Group N  Mean 
(%)
M edian
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Cash 24 8.60 4.99 3.043 13.84 0.006
Stock 23 17.48 14.82 4.009 20.92 0.001
Mixed 17 12.94 14.82 4.285 12.45 0.001
Total targets 64
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni 
correction & 
1-tailed)
M inimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
98.33% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
Cash 0.009** -9.58 45.88 1.30 15.89
Stock 0.002** -10.22 56.91 6.19 28.78
Mixed 0.002** -4.55 39.74 4.87 21.01
ANOVA test result: F(2, 61) = 1.712, p  = .189
* p <  .05, **p <  .01.
Testing Target CARs by Targets ’ R E IT  Status  
Additional t-tests are performed to examine if  the REIT status o f target firms impacts 
target returns (see Table 20). There were only 2 targets w ith REIT status and 69 non- 
REIT targets. The results show that the mean o f  non-REIT target CARs is 12.05% and is 
statistically significant, t(68) = 6.084, SD  = 16.45%,/» < .005. However, the mean o f
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REIT target CARs (2.03%) is not significantly different from zero, f ( l)  = 0.765, SD  = 
3.16% , p  > .05. After the Bonferroni correction, the resulting p-value o f  the REIT target 
became greater than one. It is denoted as N/A in table 20. An independent sample t-test 
is used to examine the equality o f means between REIT targets and non-REIT targets. 
The results show there is no difference between the means o f  these two groups. The 
difference between the means o f  target CARs for non-REIT targets and REIT targets is 
not statically significant, t{69) = 0.855, p  > .05.
Table 20
Targets ’ C um ulative A bnorm al Returns by Targets ’ R E IT  Status
Sub Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
NonRElT target 69 12.05 6.62 6.084 16.45 0.000
REIT target 2 2 0 3 2.03 0.765 3.76 0.584
Total targets 71
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni
correction)
Minimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
97.5% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
NonRElT target 0.000** -10.22 56.91 7.51 16.59
REIT target N /A *(l) -0.62 4.69 -65.56 6^63
Independent sample t- test result: f(69) = 0.855, p  = .396
Note. *(1) resulting p-value is greater than 1. 
* p <  .05, * * /)<  .01.
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Testing H ypotheses: H 2 through H2-4, Testing B idder CARs by Industry Type 
H2 : p (All bidder CARs) = 0 
H2-1 : |i (bidder CAR for gaming industry) = 0 
H2-2: p (bidder CAR for restaurant industry) = 0 
H2-3: g (bidder CAR for hotel industry) = 0
H2-4: p (bidder CAR for gaming) = p (bidder CAR for restaurant) = p. (bidder CAR for 
hotel)
The returns o f  bidding firms, overall and by industry, are the subject o f hypotheses 
H2 through H2-4. Table 21 summarizes bidder returns for a two day window, one day 
before the announcement to the announcement date (-1, 0), along w ith t-test and ANOVA 
results. To test Hypotheses H2 through H2-3, a one sample t-test is performed to 
examine if  the mean o f bidder CARs is significantly different from zero. To test 
Hypothesis H2-4, analysis o f  variance (ANOVA) is performed to examine whether there 
is a difference in the m ean o f  bidder CARs between the gaming, restaurant and hotel 
industries.
Performing a confidence interval test in the presence o f  the multiple testing problem, 
an adjustment is required. In order to report a confidence interval appropriate for all 
three tests at an overall 95% level, a 98.33% confidence interval is used. The calculation 
is made by dividing the alpha level by the number o f comparisons made (for a 95% or 
0.95 confidence interval, alpha is 0.05). To obtain an overall significance level o f 95% 
for the three confidence intervals, divide 0.05 by three. The resulting 0.0167, implies that 
a 98.33% (1 -  0.0167) interval be used (SPSS Base 10.0, chap. 8).
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Table 21
Bidders ’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry
Sub Group N  Mean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Total bidders 430 1.48 &50 3 ^38 8.41 0.000
Gaming 79 3.18 fr93 2.772 10.19 0.007
Restaurant 171 1.19 0.11 1.572 &88 0.118
Hotel 180 1.00 0.56 2.452 5.50 0.015
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni
correction)
Minimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
98.33% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
Total bidders 0.000** -32.29 87.75 &68 1 11
Gaming 0.021* -12.66 55.91 O J# 5.97
Restaurant 0.354 -32.29 87.75 -0.63 3.01
Hotel 0.045* -20.79 25.61 0.02 2.00
ANOVA test result: F{2, 427) = 2.008, p  = .135
* p <  .05, ** < .01.
Hypothesis H I tests whether overall bidder CARs are statistically different from zero. 
A total o f 430 bidder CAR are available for this study. All the bidders in this study were 
hospitality industry bidders. The bidder CARs range from -32.29% to 87.75%. Both the 
lowest bidder returns o f -32.29% and the highest o f 87.75% are in the restaurant industry. 
The average CAR for all bidders (N = 430) is 1.48%, t(429) = 3.638, SD  = 8.41%, p  <
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.005. Also, a 95% confidence interval does not include zero, so the null hypothesis o f 
mean equal to zero is rejected. Therefore, the overall bidder CAR is significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level, and the hypothesis H I is rejected.
To test Hypotheses H2-1 through H2-3, one sample t-tests are performed to examine if 
the mean o f each o f  these three groups is different from zero. To fix the multiple testing 
problem, the Bonferroni correction is used to correct the p-value (p-value o f  each group 
times three). Also, the adjusted confidence level (98.33% confidence level as explained 
previously) is used to report an appropriate confidence interval for all three tests.
The gaming industry has the highest returns (p = 3.18%) among the three sub groups 
followed by restaurant (p = 1.19%) and hotel (p = 1.00%), however, the mean differences 
between the three sub categories are not statistically different. The medians o f these 
three groups had different ranks than the means because the distributions are skewed due 
to outliers. There were two extreme outliers; Host America Corporation (restaurant 
industry) acquired Globalnet Energy Investors Ine (restaurant industry, and private target) 
in 2003. The acquisition was 100% stock offer and the bidder return was 87.75%. 
Littlefield Corporation (gaming industry) acquired Bingo B am  (gaming industry, and 
private target) in 2004. The payment method information was not available and the 
bidder return was 55.91%. Additional tests were performed to examine if  the results are 
different with and without the outliers.
The gaming (77= 21, p = 3.18%) and hotel (A =  180, p = 1.00%) industry bidders 
earned returns significantly different from zero. Gaming industry bidders earned an 
average o f 3.18%, t(78) = 2.772, SD  = 10.19% ,p < .05, and hotel industry bidders earned 
an average o f  1.00%, /(179) = 2.452, SD  = 5.50% ,p  < .05. The confidence interval does
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not include zero for both industries, so the null hypothesis o f  mean equal to zero is 
rejected. The average bidder returns o f  gaming and hotel industries are significantly 
different from zero and the hypotheses o f H2-1 and H2-3 are rejected.
The mean CAR o f restaurants (N =  171, p = 1.19%) is not significantly different from 
zero, /(170) =  1.572, SD  = 9.88%,p >  .05. Also, the confidence interval includes zero. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis o f  H2-2, that the average CAR o f  restaurants is equal to 
zero, is not be rejected.
To investigate w hether the mean o f bidder CARs are different in the sub sample 
categories, an ANOVA is performed. The results show that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the mean o f these three sub groups, F (2, 427) = 2.008, p  > 
.05. Thus, the H2-4 null hypothesis that there is no difference in the mean bidder CARs 
between the gaming, restaurant and hotel industries is not rejected.
Bidders Return w ithout the Two Outliers
Additional tests are performed without the two outliers (see Table 22). The t-tests 
and ANOVA results are similar to before. This only affects the gaming industry, 
restaurant industry, and the total bidders since there are no outliers in the hotel industry. 
The gaming industry, V  = 78, p = 2.5%, t(77) = 2.667, SD  = 8.28%,p  < 0.05, and 
restaurant industry returns, A =  170, p = 0.68%, t(169) = 1.208, SD  = 7.31%, p < .05, are 
still significantly different from zero. The total bidder (V =  428) CAR is 1.15% and still 
significantly different from zero, t(427) = 3.476, SD  = 6 .83% ,p  < .005. The means for 
gaming, restaurant and total bidders are slightly lower than before. Also, ANOVA test 
results are still not significant indicating there is no difference in the mean bidder CARs 
between the gaming, restaurant and hotel industries, F{2, 425) = 1.984,p > .05.
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Table 22
Bidders ’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry (without 2 outlier, N=428)
Sub Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Total bidders 428 1.15 0.48 3.476 &83 0.001
Gaming 78 2.50 0.93 2.667 &28 0.009
Restaurant 170 0.68 -0.12 1.208 7.31 0.229
Hotel 180 1.00 0.56 2.452 5.50 0.015
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni
correction)
M inimum
(%)
M aximum
(%)
98.33% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference 
(%)
Total bidders 0.003** -32.29 3543 0.50 1.80
Gaming 0.027* -12.66 3543 0.21 4 ^ 0
Restaurant 0.687 -32.29 32.15 -0.68 2.03
Hotel 0.045* -20.79 25.61 &02 2.00
ANOVA test result: F{3, 425) == 1.984, p  = .135
* p <  .05, * * p <  .01.
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Testing Hypotheses: H5-1 through H5-3, Testing Bidder CARs by Nature o f Acquisition
H5-1 : p (bidder CAR for tender offer) = 0
H5-2: p (bidder CAR for merger) = 0
H5-3: p (bidder CAR for tender offer = p (bidder CAR for merger)
Bidder returns by nature o f  acquisition are the subject o f  hypotheses H5-1 through 
H5-3. Table 23 summarizes the results o f the t-tests. To test hypotheses H5-1 and H5-2, 
one sample t-tests are used to examine if  the mean o f  bidder CARs is significantly 
different from zero. An independent two sample test is performed to test the mean 
difference between these two CARs.
The Bonferroni correction is applied to solve the multiple testing problem. That is, 
each p-value o f  the t-test is multiplied by two. Also, a 97.5% confidence interval is 
computed in order to obtain a 95% confidence level for these two tests.
The results show the mean bidder return from mergers { N =  413) is 1.54% and 
significantly different from zero, t(412) = 3.659, SD  = 8.54% ,p  < .005. The confidence 
interval does not include zero. Therefore, the H5-1 null hypothesis, that the mean of 
bidder CARs from mergers is equal to zero, is rejected. The mean bidder return from 
tender offers { N =  17), however, is not significantly different from zero, p = -0.03%, t(16) 
= -0.034, SD = 3.98% ,p  > .05. Also, the confidence interval included zero. Therefore, 
the H5-2 null hypothesis, that the mean o f bidder CARs from tender offers is equal to 
zero, is not rejected.
For hypothesis H5-3, an independent sample t-test result shows that there is no 
difference between the mean bidder CAR for mergers and the mean bidder CAR for
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tender offers. Levene’s test for equality o f  variances was not significant (F  = 1.751, p  > 
.05). Thus w ith this indication o f  equal variances, the pooled-variance t-test results are 
considered, t(428) = 0.754, p  > .05. The H5-3 null hypothesis that means o f bidder CAR 
for mergers and tender offers are equal is not rejected. The bidder means for mergers and 
tender offers are not significantly different from each other.
Bidders ’ Cum ulative A bnorm a l Returns by N ature o f  A cquisition
Suh Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Tender offer 17 -0.03 -0.21 -0.034 2 9 8 0.973
Merger 413 1.54 0.60 3.659 8.54 0.000
Total bidders 430
Suh Group Sig.
(Bonferroni
eorrection)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
97.5% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference 
(%)
Tender offer N /A *(l) -7.81 9.03 -2.42 235
Merger 0.000** -32.30 87.75 2 5 9 248
Independent Sample t-test result: f(428) = 0.754, p  = .451
Note. *(1) resulting p-value is greater than 1. 
* p  < .05, * * p  < .01.
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Bidders Return without the Two Outliers
Additional tests are performed after deleting two outliers (see Table 28). The two 
outliers are both merger deals. The new results show a slight decrease in the mean o f 
bidder CARs from mergers (A =  411, p = 1.20%), however it is still significantly 
different from zero, t(410) = 3.504, SD  = 6.92%, p  < .005. Also, the difference between 
the means o f bidder CARs from mergers and tender offers is not statistically different, 
t(426) = 0.727,p  > .05. The results are somewhat different than previous findings. 
Previous studies found the bidder returns from tender offers were higher than mergers. 
Unlike previous studies, the results show positive bidder returns from mergers and zero 
returns from tender offers.
Testing H ypotheses: H6-1 through H6-3, Testing B idder CARs by M ethod  o f  Paym ent 
H6-1 : p (bidder CAR for cash offer) = 0 
H6-2: p (bidder CAR for stock offer) = 0 
H6-3 : p (bidder CAR for mix o f  cash and stock offer) = 0 
H6-4: p (bidder CAR for cash) = p (bidder CAR for stock) = p (bidder CAR for 
mix o f  cash and stock offer)
Testing the bidder returns by method o f  payment is the subject o f  hypotheses H6-1 
through H6-4. Table 24 summarizes the results o f t-tests and ANOVA. The one sample 
t-tests are performed to examine if  the mean o f  each o f the three groups is different from 
zero (H6-1 through H6-3). To test H6-4, an ANOVA is performed to examine the group 
mean differences.
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Table 24
Bidders ’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Method o f Payment
Suh Group N  M ean 
(%)
M edian
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Cash 158 1.60 0.95 3.560 5.66 0.000
Stock 59 2 ^ ^ 0.43 1.632 14.09 0.108
Mixed 67 0.79 0 3 9 0368 8 4 3 0.445
Total bidders 284
Sub Group Sig.
(Bonferroni
correction)
M inimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
98.33% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
Cash 0.000** -12.12 35.43 0.51 2.69
Stock 0.324 -20.79 87.75 -1.50 7 3 2
Mixed N /A *(l) -32.29 16.76 -1.70 3 3 2
ANOVA test result: F(2, 281) = 1.030, p  = 358
Note. *(1) resulting p-value is greater than 1.
* p  < .05, ** p <  .01.
Since three t-tests are performed simultaneously, the p-values are adjusted with the 
Bonferroni correction hy multiplying each p-value by three. A 98.33% confidence 
interval is computed to obtain a 95% confidence interval. The results show the bidder 
CAR for cash offers (77= 158) is 1.60% and significantly different from zero, t(157) = 
3.560, SD = 5 .66% ,p  < .005. The confidence interval does not include zero. Therefore,
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the H6-1 null hypothesis is rejected. The bidder returns for stock offers, N =  59, p = 
2.99%, t(58) = 1.632, SD  = 14.09%, p  > .05, and mixed offers, N =  67, p = 0.79%, t{6 6 ) 
= 0.768, SD  = 8.43% ,p  > .05, are not significantly different from zero. Also, in both 
cases the confidence interval included zero. Therefore, the H6-2 and H6-3 null 
hypotheses are not rejected.
The ANOVA test results show that there is no difference in the means o f the bidder 
CARs between cash, stock, and mixed offers, F(2, 281) = 1 .030,p > .05. Therefore, the 
H6-4 null hypothesis, that the means o f  bidder CARs for all three groups (cash, stock and 
mixed offer) are equal, is not rejected.
Bidders Return by M ethod  o f  Paym ent w ithout the Outlier
The results show that mean and median have different ranks within the category o f 
stock and cash offers. Though not statistically significant, the mean o f  bidder return for 
stock offers is higher than that for cash offers. But the median o f the bidder returns for 
cash offers is higher than that for stock offers. This ranking difference might be due to 
outliers. Additional tests are performed without the outliers. There is one outlier with 
method o f paym ent information available. This outlier is a stock offer, and thus the 
results only affect the stock offer outcome. The bidder CAR for stock offer (V =  58) is 
noticeably decreased (p = 1.53%) when the outlier is not included. However, it is still 
not statistically different from zero, t(57) = 1.359, SD  = 8.59%, p  > .05 (see Table 28). 
The ANOVA test results still show no difference in the mean o f  bidder returns between 
the cash, stock and mixed offers, F(2, 280) = 0.326,p  > .05. The results are consistent 
with previous studies. Bidder returns to cash offers are higher than those o f stock offers. 
Thus the results support information asymmetry and signaling theories.
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Testing B idder CARs by B idders ’ R E IT  Status 
Additional t-tests are performed to examine if  the REIT status o f  bidder firms impacts 
bidder returns (see Table 25). Three bidders are REITs and 427 bidders are not REITs. 
The results show that the mean o f non-REIT bidder CARs is 1.54% and is significantly 
different from zero, t(426) = 3.807, SD  = 8.36%, p  < .005. The mean o f REIT bidder 
CARs is -7.71%, but is not statistically different from zero, t{2) = -1.048, SD  = 12.75%, p  
> .05. The m eans o f  bidder CARs for non-REIT and REIT bidders are not significantly 
different from one another at the 5% level, but significantly different from each other at 
the 10% level, t(428) = 1.904,p  = 0.058.
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Table 25
Bidders ’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Bidders ’ REIT Status
Sub Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
t statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
NonRElT
bidder
427 1.54 0.51 3.807 8 3 6 0.000
REIT bidder 3 -7.71 -7.04 -1.048 12.75 0.405
Total bidders 430
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni
correction)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
97.5% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference 
(%)
NonRElT
bidder
0.000** -32.29 87.75 0 3 3 2.45
REIT bidder 0.810 -20.79 4.69 -53.40 37.98
Independent Sample f-test result: 7(428) = 1.904, p  =  .058
* p <  .05, * * p  < .01.
Testing B idder CARs by Targets ’ P ublic  Status  
The bidder CARs are examined by the targets’ public status (see Table 26). There are 
351 private targets and 79 public targets. The mean o f bidder returns from private targets 
is 1.66% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, t(350) = 3.664, SD -  
8.49%, p  < .005. The mean o f  bidder returns (p = 0.65%) from public targets is not 
significantly different from zero, t(78) = 0.721, SD  = 8.04%, p  > .05. The means o f
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bidder CARs for private and public targets are not significantly different from one 
another, t(428) = 0.963,p  > .05.
Table 26
Bidders ’ C um ulative A bnorm al R eturns by Targets ’ P ub lic  Sta tus
Sub Group N  M ean 
(%)
Median
(%)
7 statistic SD
(%)
P
(2-tailed)
Private target 351 1.66 0.65 3.664 8 4 9 0.000
Public target 79 0.65 0.10 0.721 8.04 0.473
Total targets 430
Sub Group P
(Bonferroni
correction)
Minimum
(%)
Maximum
(%)
97.5% Confidence 
Interval o f Difference
(%)
Private target 0.000** -32.29 87.75 0.64 2 3 9
Public target 0.946 -20.79 32.15 -1.42 2 7 2
Independent Sample 7-test result: 7(428) = 0.963, p  = .336
* p <  .05, * * p  < .01.
Table 27 and 28 summarize t-test and ANOVA results for hypotheses tests for target 
and bidder returns, respectively. Table 29 shows the summary o f  additional t-tests for 
target returns by  target REIT status, bidder returns by bidder REIT status, and bidder 
returns by targets’ public status.
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To We 27
Sum m ary o f  t-test a n d  AN O VA R esults f o r  H ypotheses fo r  Target Returns
Hypotheses Targets N M ean (%) 7 statistic P
HI Total targets 71
(70)
11.76
(11.12)
6.081
(6.010)
0.000**
(0.000**)
H l-1 Gaming 9 11.91 2.621 0.062
H l-2 Restaurant 27 14.41 4.214 0.000**
H l-3 Hotel 23 9 3 4 2.949 0.014**
H I-4 NonHospitality 12
(11)
10.34
(6.11)
2.014
(1.919)
0.138
01168)
H l-5 p-value o f  F  statistics fX 3,67) = 
F ( 3 ,66) =
0 4 2 6
(0395)
0.735
(0.448)
H3-1 Tender offer 13 10.76 2.688 0.020*
H3-2 M erger 58
(57)
11.99
(11.20)
5.435
(5.342)
0.000**
(0.000**)
H3-3 p-value o f  t statistics 7(69) =
7(68) =
0.244
(0.092)
0308
(0.927)
H4-1 Cash offer 24 8 3 0 3.043 0.009**
H4-2 Stock offer 23
(22)
17.48
(15.69)
4.009
(3.771)
0.002**
(0.002)**
H4-3 M ixed offer 17 12.94 4285 0.002**
H4-4 p-value o f  F  statistics F (2 ,6 1 ) =
F(2, 60) =
1.712
(1.186)
0.189
(0.313)
Note. The results without the outliers are in parentheses. 
* p <  .05, **p < .01.
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Summary o f t-test and ANOVA results for Hypotheses for Bidder Returns
Hypotheses Bidders N M ean (%) 7 statistic P
H2 Total bidders 430 1.48 3.638 0.000**
(428) (1.15) (3.476) (0.003**)
H2-1 Gaming 79 3.18 2 7 7 2 0.021*
(78) (2.50) C2667) (0.027*)
H2-2 Restaurant 171 1.19 1.572 0.354
(170) (0.68) (1.208) (0.687)
H2-3 Hotel 180 1.00 24 5 2 0.045*
H2-4 p-value o f F  statistics F(2, 427) = 2.008 0.135
F(2, 425) = (1.984) (0.139)
H5-1 Tender offer 17 -0.03 -0.034 N /A *(l)
H5-2 Merger 413 1.54 3.659 0.000**
(411) (1.20) (3.504) (0.002)
H5-3 p-value o f t statistics 7(428) = 0.754 0.451
7(426) = (0.727) (0.468)
H6-1 Cash offer 158 1.60 3.560 0.000**
H6-2 Stock offer 59 2 9 9 1.632 0.324
(58) (1.53) (1.359) (0.540)
H6-3 M ixed offer 67 0.79 0.767 N /A *(l)
H6-4 p-value o f  F  statistics F(2, 281) = 1.030 0358
F ( 2 ,2 80 )= (0.326) (0.722)
Note. *(1) resulting p-value is greater than 1. The results w ithout the outliers are in 
parentheses.
* p  < .05, * * p  < .01.
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Table 29
Summ ary o f  A dd itiona l t-tests f o r  Target Returns by Target R E IT  Status, B idder R eturns  
by Bidder R E IT  Status, a n d  B idder Returns by Targets ’ P ublic  Status
N Mean (%) 7 statistic P
Target NonRElT 69 12.05 6.084 0.000**
CARs by target
target REIT
status REIT target 2 2 3 3 0.765 N /A *(l)
p-value o f  t statistics 7(69) = 0.855 0.396
Bidder N onRElT 427 1.54 3.807 0.000**
CARs by bidder
bidder
REIT status REIT bidder 3 -7.71 -1.048 0.810
p-value o f  t statistics 7(428) = 1.904 0.058
Bidder Private target 351 1.66 3.664 0.000**
CARs by
targets’ Public target 79 0.65 0.721 0.946
public
status p-value o f  t statistics 7(428) = 0363 0 3 3 6
Note. *(1) resulting p-value is greater than 1. 
* p  < .05, * * p  < .01.
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M ultiple Regression for Target CARs 
Multiple regression is used to examine variables explaining the target CARs. Table 
30 shows results o f  multiple regressions for target CARs. The OLS regression model for 
the target CARs is:
TargetCARs = y0Q +  + P k ^ k  ^
Dependent variable: target cumulative returns 
Target CARs: Dependent variable (Y)
Pq : constant
: change in target CARs associated with unit change in X\
P2 : change in target CARs associated w ith unit change in X 2
P^ : change in target CARs associated w ith unit change in Ag
Independent variables: (X, through Xg)
X \ : (mixed) mixture o f  cash and stock offers 1, otherwise 0
X 2 '. (cash) 100% cash offers 1, otherwise 0
(100% stock is reference category. 0, 0)
Xy. (bidREIT) REIT bidders 1, otherwise 0
X 4 : (tarREIT) REIT targets 1, otherwise 0
Xs'. (tender) tender offers 1, mergers 0
Xy. (restaurant) target firms in restaurant industry, otherwise 0
A?: (gaming) target firms in gaming industry, otherwise 0
Xy. (hotel) target firms in hotel industry, otherwise 0
(nonhospitaity target is reference category. 0, 0)
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Table 30
M ultip le R egressions E xpla in ing  the Target Cum ulative Returns f o r  70 com pleted takeovers (1985-2004)
LA
■ - J
Regression 
Model no.
No.
of
IVs
intercept mixed cash bidREIT tarREIT tender restaurant gaming hotel F
statistic
(p-value)
Adjusted
N
(R")
N
(1) 4 0.142**
(0.000)
-0.030
(0.538)
-0.065
(0.179)
0.273*
(0.016)
0.022
(0.676)
2.186
(0.082)
0.071
(0.131)
63
(2) 5 0.143**
(0.000)
-0.031
(0.539)
-0.060
(0.223)
0.273*
(0.017)
-0.089
(0.575)
0.018
(0.735)
1.792
(0.129)
0.060
(0.136)
63
(3) 8 0.053
(0.367)
-0.009
(0.865)
-0.030
(0.553)
0.327**
(0.005)
-0.029
(0.856)
-0.010
(0.856)
0.126*
(0.041)
0.090
(0.221)
0.050
(0.408)
1.793
(0.099)
0.093
(0.210)
63
(4) 7 0.051
(0.372)
-0.009
(0.863)
-0.031
(0.530)
0.328**
(0.005)
-0.009
(0.868)
0.129*
(0.032)
0.092
(0.197)
0.052
(0.370)
2.080
(0.061)
0.109
(0.209)
63
(5) 6 0.052
(0.358)
-0.009
(0.860)
-0.034
(0.457)
0.328**
(0.004)
0.126*
(0.028)
0.092
(0.195)
0.051
(0.372)
2.465*
(0.035)
0.124 
( 0.209)
63
(6) 4 0.042
(0.364)
0.209*
(0.025)
0.102
(0.065)
0.054
(0.430)
0.042
(0.448)
2.040
(0.099)
0.057
(0.112)
70
(7) 5 0.056
(0.237)
0.264**
(0.008)
-0.196
(0.106)
-0.010 0.091
(0.104)
0.057
(0.402)
2.078
(0.619)
1.829
(0.108)
0.067
(0.148)
70
(8) 3 0.106**
(0.000)
0.426*
(0.013)
-0.209
(0.079)
0.001
(0.979)
2.430
(0.073)
0.059
(0.099)
70
Note. The p-values are in parentheses. 
*p>0.05, **p>0.01
One target outlier with a CAR o f 56.91% is removed from the analysis. A total o f 70 
completed takeover target CARs are available for analysis. Sixty-three o f  these 
observations have complete data for payment information. The dependent variable is the 
target CAR, and all o f  the independent variables are dumm y variables. The explanatory 
variables are types o f  industry, method o f payment, and nature o f acquisition. We also 
control for REIT status o f  bidders. Eight regressions are estimated using different 
combinations o f  the eight independent variables listed above. Out o f  these eight 
regressions estimated, six regressions are significant at the 10% level. Regression (5) is 
the model with the best fit and is significant at the 5% level (F  = 2.465, p  < .05) with 6  
independent dum m y variables: mixed, cash, bidREIT, restaurant, gaming and hotel.
The guideline for the minimum observations per independent variable is a ratio o f 5 
to 1 (Hair, 1998, chap. 4). The ratio o f observations per independent variable in this 
study is about 10 to 1. Though 15 to 20 observations per independent variable are 
desirable, a 10 to 1 ratio still meets the minimum requirements. An adequate number o f 
observations per independent variable are necessary to assure the sample is not over fitted 
and still validate the results to make sure the findings can be generalized to the entire 
population.
The sample is tested for the multiple regression assumption before and after the 
model has been estimated. Linearity is assessed through an analysis o f  residuals and 
partial regression plots. The scatter plot o f  the residual versus the predicted dependent 
values does not exhibit any nonlinear pattern to the residuals, thus ensuring that the 
overall equation is linear. The partial regression plots show the relationship o f each 
single independent variable to the dependent variable, and indicates no nonlinear pattern.
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thus meeting the assumption o f  linearity for each independent variable. Constant variance 
analysis (test for homoscedasticity) is accomplished through examination o f the residuals, 
which show no pattern o f  violation. Independence o f the residuals is assumed in this 
study since the data are not time series. The histogram and norm al probability plots show 
no or little violation o f  normality.
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to examine multicollinearity o f the model. 
Larger VIF values are a sign o f  a high degree o f  multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. The recommended cutoff point for VIF value to indicate no multicollinearity is 
less than 10 or less than 5 to be more conservative. All independent variables in the 
regression (5) have a VIF range between 1.1 and 2.1 indicating there is no 
multicollinearity problem.
The explanatory power o f  the regression (5) is 20.9% (iP  = 0.209, adjusted = 
0.124). Twenty one percent o f  total variation o f  target CARs are explained by these 6  
independent variables. Adjusted R^ is 12.4%. Adjusted R^ takes into account the sample 
size and number o f  explanatory variables included in the regression equation. This is 
helpful when comparing equations with different sample sizes or different numbers o f 
explanatory variables (Hair, 1998, chap. 4). The results o f  regression (5) indicate that 2 
variables significantly influence the target CARs. They are restaurant target and bidders’ 
REIT status. The regression model is:
TargetCARs = 0.051 + 0.32SbidREIT  + 0 .\26restauran t
The coefficient o f the restaurant dummy variable is 0.126 and significantly positive. 
This suggests the target returns are on average 12.6% higher with a restaurant industry
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target {p < .05) than a nonhospitality target in our sample. The coefficient o f  REIT 
bidder dummy variable is 0.328 and significantly positive. This suggests the target 
returns are on average 32.8% higher when a bidder has REIT status {p < .005) than a 
bidder without REIT status. The results show that target returns increase when the 
bidders are REIT firms. This m ight indicate REIT bidders overpay their targets, and the 
reasons should be further investigated. The coefficients o f  method o f payment are not 
significant in this model.
M ultiple Regression for Bidder CARs 
Table 31 shows the results o f  multiple regressions for 283 completed takeover bidder 
CARs. Two bidders with CARs higher than 55% are excluded from the analysis on the 
basis o f  being outliers. OLS regression model for the bidder CARs is:
BidderCARs = + + P 2X 2 + P->, î + .........+ P k^k  ^
Bidder CARs: Dependent variable 
ŷ o : constant
P\ : change in target CARs associated with unit change in X\
P2 : change in target CARs associated with unit change in X 2
Pi : change in target CARs associated w ith unit change in A?
Independent variables: (X, through X?)
A] : (mixed) mixture o f  cash and stock offers 1 , otherwise 0
Xy. (cash) 1 0 0 % cash offers 1 , otherwise 0
( 1 0 0 % stock is reference category. 0 , 0 )
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A3: (bidREIT) REIT bidders 1, otherwise 0
A4 : (tarpublic) public targets 1 , private targets 0
A5 : (tender) tender offers 1 , mergers 0
Xy. (restaurant) bidder firms in restaurant industry, otherwise 0 
A?: (gaming) bidder firms in gaming industry, otherwise 0
(hotel bidder is reference category. 0 , 0 )
The dependent variable is the CAR o f bidding firms and all o f  the independent 
variables are dumm y variables. The explanatory variables are types o f  industry, method 
o f payment, and nature o f acquisition. We also control for REIT status o f bidders, and 
public status o f  targets. All four regression models estimated are significant at the 10% 
level. Regression model (1) is the best model and is significant at the 5% level. It 
includes 283 observations and 5 independent dummy variables (F=2.361, p  < .05). The 
sample size per independent variable is adequate to run the test to obtain the power and 
make sure the findings can be generalized to the entire population. The independent 
variables included in the regression (1) are mixed offer, cash offer, REIT bidder, 
restaurant bidder, and gaming bidder. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to 
examine the multicollinearity o f  the model. All independent variables in the regression 
(1) have a VIF range between 1.0 and 1.8 indicating there is no multicollinearity 
problem.
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Table 31
M ultip le  Regressions E xpla in ing  the B idder Cum ulative R eturns f o r  283 com pleted takeovers (1985-2004)
Regression 
Model no.
No. of 
IVs
intercept mixed cash bidREIT tarpublic tender restaurant gaming F  statistic 
(p-value)
Adjusted
R-
( ^
N
(1) 5 0.018 -0.009 -0.003 -0.152** -0.002 0.012 2.361* 0.024 283
(0.127) (0.453) (0.793) (0.003) (0.813) (0.301) (0.040) (0 .041)
(2) 6 0.018 -0.010 -0.002 -0.153** -0.011 -0.002 0.012 2.028 0.021 283
(0.119) (0.452) (0.825) (0.003) (0.534) (0.810) (0.310) (0.062) (0.042)
(3) 6 0.019 -0.010 -0.003 -0.151** -0.002 -0.002 0.012 1.967 0.020 283
(0.133) (0.444) (0.769) (0.003) (0.842) (0.805) (0 .302) (0.070) (0 .041)
(4) 7 0.018 -0.009 -0.002 -0.153** 0.002 -0.011 -0.002 0.012 1.732 0.018 283
(0.144) (0.456) (0.832) (0.003) (0 .988) (0 .589) (0.811) (0.311) (0.102) (0.042)
CD
Q .
Note. The p-values are in parentheses. 
*p>0.05, **p>0.01
"O
CD
C /)
C /)
The explanatory power o f  the regression (1) is 4.1% (R^ = 0.041, adjusted R^ =
0.024). Four point one percent o f  the total variations o f bidder CARs are explained by 
these 5 independent variables. The explanatory power o f the regressions for bidder 
CARs is pretty low (adjusted R^ ranges from 0.018 to 0.024), even though cross-sectional 
regressions o f bidder abnormal returns is generally low (Chang, 1998). Only the REIT 
bidder independent variable is significant and the remainder o f  the independent variables 
are not significant. The estimated regression model is:
BidderCARs = 0.018 -  O A Slb idR E IT
The results indicate that bidder CARs decrease 15.2% when the bidder is a REIT.
This might indicate REIT bidders overpay when they acquire targets. This is consistent 
w ith the regression results for target CARs. The target CARs increase when the bidder is 
a REIT. This m ight be an indication o f agency or hubris motivation. Also it might be 
evidence that REITs have unique motives to engage in M &As such as special tax 
considerations or regulations. This needs further investigation to explain why REIT 
bidder returns are lower than nonREIT bidder returns, and the consequent higher returns 
to their targets. This finding m ight only apply to this sample since it includes only a 
small number o f  REIT bidders compared to nonREIT bidders. Thus it might be 
inappropriate to generalize this finding.
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Summary
This chapter reports the results o f  the data analysis and hypotheses tests. The chapter 
is divided into three sections. The first section is a descriptive analysis and chi-square 
tests are performed to check the overall data and association between variables. In the 
second section, hypotheses are tested by t-tests and ANOVA tests to examine if  the 
hospitality M &A participants realize significant cumulative abnormal returns and if  the 
mean o f returns are different among groups. In the third section, multiple regressions are 
performed to examine the variables explaining cumulative abnormal returns for both 
targets and bidders.
The overall results are mixed. Some results are consistent with previous studies, and 
some are different. Chapter five will present an interpretation o f  the findings as well as 
recommendations for future study.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM MENDATIONS
Introduction
This study examines the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for hospitality target 
and acquiring firms around the announcement o f  mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The 
focus is on the returns o f  overall target and acquiring firms, as well as returns by three 
different hospitality industry segments, by nature o f acquisition, and by method of 
payment. Findings and conclusions o f the study are discussed in this chapter. It also 
addresses contributions o f the study and recommendations for future research.
Summary o f Findings, and Conclusions 
D escriptive Inform ation  
This study includes a total o f  430 hospitality bidder and 71 target CARs. Among 430 
bidders, 79 are in gaming, 171 are in restaurant and 180 are in the hotel industry. Targets 
are divided according to their public status; 351 private targets and 79 public targets. 
Private targets do not have stock price information and among 79 public targets, 71 target 
CARs are available. These 71 targets consist o f  9 gaming, 27 restaurant, 23 hotel, and 12 
not in the hospitality industry. There are very few tender offers over the last 20 years. In 
the sample o f  430 bidders, only 17 are tender offers, and 413 are mergers. There are only
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2 hostile takeovers in the hospitality industry for the last 20 years, and this study includes 
1 o f these. Based upon the evidence in this study, the hospitality M &As market appears 
to be quite friendly during this time period and this is supported by Halibozek and 
Kovacich (2005). They believe low interest rates and recent economic growth make for a 
friendly M&A environment.
There are 284 cases have payment information available out o f the 430 bidders. This 
includes 158 cash offers, 59 stock offers and 67 are a m ixture o f  both cash and stock 
offers. More than h a lf o f  the M&As deals are cash offers.
Chi-square Test Results
The chi-square test shows that there is a significant association between bidders’ 
industry segment and the method o f payment. The adjusted residuals in the restaurant 
industry indicate that restaurant bidders have fewer cash offers and more stock offers 
than expected under an assumption o f independence. On the other hand, the hotel 
industry bidders have more cash offers and fewer stock offers than expected under an 
assumption o f  independence. Also, significant association is found between target’s 
public status and method o f payment. The results show private targets have more cash 
offers and fewer stock offers and public targets have less cash offers and more stock 
offers than would be expected under an assumption o f independence between target’s 
public status and method o f payment. It might indicate private targets prefer cash offers 
to stock offers, or bidders prefer to offer cash to private targets in order not to create new 
block holders. However this topic needs further investigation. Descriptive analysis
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shows very few bidders or targets are REITs. Among 430 bidders, only 3 bidders are 
REITs and 2 o f  71 targets are REITs.
Target Firm  Returns  
Consistent w ith m any studies (Breadley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Franks, Harris & 
Timan, 1999; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Lang, Stulz & W alking, 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 
1997; Sullivan, 1989) the results show that overall target returns (g = 11.76%) are 
significantly positive. Restaurant (p = 14.41%) and hotel target (p = 9.34%) returns are 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Gaming target returns are positive (p = 11.91%) 
but not statistically significant at the 5% level but significant at the 10% level. 
Nonhospitality target returns (10.34%) are not significantly different from zero.
ANOVA test result shows the mean o f target CARs between the different industry 
segments are not significantly different from each other. Despite the lack o f statistical 
difference between means, the results show the mean o f target returns for the gaming 
industry are higher (p = l 1.91%) than the hotel industry (p = 9.34%) which is consistent 
with K im ’s (2001) finding that 2 day (-1, 0) target returns for casino hotels (p = 16.1%) 
were higher than those o f non-casino hotels (p = 5.2%).
Target returns are analyzed by  the nature o f  the acquisitions; tender offers versus 
mergers. The mean o f  the target CARs for both tender offers and mergers are 
significantly positive. Interestingly, the results show the returns o f  target tender offers 
are slightly lower (p = 10.76%) than those o f mergers (p = 11.99%) but the difference is 
not statistically significant. This is not the same as most previous studies which show the 
returns o f target tender offers are higher than those o f mergers.
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Target returns are examined by method o f payment w hich includes cash, stock, or a 
mixture o f both cash and stock offers. Target returns are significantly positive in all three 
sub groups. The ANOVA test result shows the mean difference between these three sub 
groups is not statistically significant. Despite the lack o f statistical significance, the 
results are interesting. The mean o f  target CARs for stock offers is higher (p = 17.48% 
and 15.69% without the outlier) than that for cash offers (p  = 9.61%) or mixed offers (p 
= 12.94%). This is contrary to findings in most previous studies that cash offers generate 
higher returns than stock offers to targets. This may be due to an industry effect upon the 
choice o f  cash versus stock offers. However, due to the small sample size the finding 
might apply this sample only and cannot be generalized to the entire population. Franks, 
Harris and M ayer (1988) claim the larger gains found for target shareholders in cash 
acquisitions than in equity acquisitions may be partially due to target shareholders 
obligation for capital gains taxes with cash offers but not w ith equity offers. On the other 
hand, Rappaport and Sirower (2001) argue that the actual impact o f  tax considerations on 
merger values is not as great as others have argued.
B idding Firm  Returns  
Bidding firm CARs are positive and significant (p = 1.48%) indicating there may be 
synergistic gain. Returns by industry show both gaming industry bidders (p = 3.18% and 
2.5% without an outlier) and hotel industry bidders (p= l% ) earn significantly positive 
returns. Restaurant industry bidder returns (p = 1.19%) are not statistically significant. 
Kim (2001) finds that 2-day returns o f non-casino bidders are not significant (p =
1.22%), however those o f  casino hotels are significantly positive (p = 3.63%). Consistent
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with K im ’s study, the gaming industry bidders earn higher returns than hotel industry 
bidders; however the mean difference is not statistically significant.
There are high entry barriers to the gaming industry such as acquiring gaming 
licenses, familiarity o f  gaming regulations, and experience. Thus it can be difficult for a 
non-gaming bidder to acquire gaming industry targets. Therefore, there might be less 
competition in gaming industry M &As than other industries. This could contribute to 
higher returns for gaming bidders.
Bidder returns by nature o f  acquisition shows the bidder returns from tender offers 
are not significantly different from zero (p = -0.03), but the returns from mergers (1.54%) 
are positive and significant at the 1% level. This is the opposite o f  many studies’
(Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998) findings that bidder returns from 
tender offers are higher than those o f mergers, though a t-test shows the mean difference 
between these two groups are not statistically significant. This study includes a small 
number o f tender offers in the sample and tender offers are not necessarily hostile deals.
In fact, there is only one hostile tender offer included in this study. This might indicate 
that the market has changed to value friendly mergers more than previously or it might 
indicate that the hospitality industry is different than other industries.
Bidder returns are also examined by method o f  payment; cash, stock, and a mixture o f 
both cash and stock offers. Only the bidder returns from cash offers are significantly 
positive (p = 1.58%), and stock offers (p = 2.99% and 1.5% without an outlier) and 
mixed offers (p = 0.77%) are not statistically significant. This is consistent with previous 
studies (Asquith, et al., 1990; Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1990; Franks, Harris, & Meyer, 
1988; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983) showing
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that bidder returns from cash offers are generally higher than stock offers due to 
information asymm etry and signaling effects. The method o f  paym ent in M&As 
provides signals about the bidder’s expectation regarding risk and synergy from the 
acquisition as well as information about the bidders’ stock price. The findings support 
information asym m etry and signaling theory. Bidders tend to use stock offers if  their 
stock is overvalued and use cash offers if  their stock is undervalued. In addition, if  the 
bidder is confident about the potential synergy from the acquisition, the bidder would pay 
cash so it does not share the expected synergy with target shareholders (Rappaport & 
Sirower, 2001). However, i f  the bidder believes there is a high risk o f  not achieving the 
potential synergy, the bidder might offer stock to dilute the ownership and the risk. 
Therefore, when the stock offer is announced, it sends negative signals to the market that 
the bidder’s stock is overvalued or that its management does not have confidence in the 
acquisition. On the other hand, a cash offer is generally believed to indicate one o f 
several possibilities. It could indicate the bidder’s stock is undervalued. The bidder may 
be confident about the potential synergy from the merger. The bidder might be desperate 
to obtain additional market share. Or it may be an attempt by a bidder to make a strong 
offer so as not to lose the target to someone else.
The Results o f  M ultiple Regressions  
The result o f the multiple regression for target CARs suggests that target returns 
increase if  the target firm is in the restaurant industry versus those in the nonhospitality 
industry. Also target returns increase when a bidder is a REIT. This might indicate REIT 
bidders overpay their targets. The method o f paym ent is not significant in this model.
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Interestingly, the results from the multiple regression for bidder  CARs show that 
bidder returns decrease when the bidder is a REIT. This is consistent with the finding 
from the regression for target CARs showing that REIT bidders might overpay. W hen a 
bidder is a REIT, the target CARs increase, and the REIT bidder CARs decrease. It 
could be due to agency problems, hubris, unique regulations or special tax considerations. 
This may be an interesting topic for further research. This finding may apply only to this 
sample since there are only a small number o f  REIT bidders compared to nonREIT 
bidders. Thus it m ight be inappropriate to generalize this finding. Pem steiner’s (2000) 
study finds the b idder’s REIT status is not statistically significant in explaining premiums 
paid in hotel M&As. The method o f payment and bidders’ industry types in the 
regression are not significant for the bidder returns.
The results o f  this study are consistent with Jensen and R uback’s (1983) conclusion 
that target firm shareholders gain and bidding firm shareholders do not lose. This finding 
also supports the claims that target firms capture synergy from M&As. Sullivan (1989) 
finds that target firm shareholders receive 97% o f the total gain.
Contributions o f  the Study 
This study provides a comprehensive study o f  hospitality M&As for the last 20 years. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for both target and bidding firms are examined for 
influence by industry type within the hospitality segment, by nature o f  acquisition and by 
method o f payment. In addition, the influence o f  both target and bidder REIT status and 
the public versus private status o f  targets are considered. The study finds that hospitality 
targets enjoy significantly positive returns which are consistent with most o f the
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literature. Over the entire 20 year sample period, tender offers make up only a small 
portion o f the sample and it seems like the M&As environment was friendly over this 
sample period. In fact, there are only 2 hostile takeovers for the last 20 years and this 
study includes one o f  these. The target returns from both tender offers and mergers are 
significantly positive and the mean difference between these two is statistically 
insignificant. Interestingly, our results showing the impact o f  method o f  payment on 
target returns are the opposite o f  many previous studies. Generally, previous studies 
show target returns to cash offers are higher than stock offers. Some researchers argue 
this can be explained to an extent by the tax treatment. The results show that target 
returns for stock offers are higher than those o f cash offers even though the difference is 
statistically insignificant. There could be characteristics peculiar to the hospitality 
industry that contributes this result. There are only 2 REIT targets. The returns o f  these 
2 REIT targets are slightly positive but not significant and the returns o f  nonREIT targets 
are significantly positive.
Hospitality bidders as an overall group earn slightly positive returns in this study. 
Gaming and hotel industry bidders earn slight positive returns. However, restaurant 
industry bidders’ returns are not significantly different than zero. Bidder returns from 
tender offers are not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, bidder returns from 
mergers are slightly positive and significant which is the opposite o f  m ost previous 
studies. Generally, previous studies find that bidder returns are higher in tender offers 
than mergers. Tender offers are a very small portion o f this study. Previous studies 
claim that tender offers tend to be hostile cash offers and m ergers tend to be friendly 
stock offers. On the contrary, this study found no association between the nature o f
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acquisition and the method o f payment. This might contribute to the different results 
found in this study, including higher target return to cash offers than stock offers, and 
higher bidder returns from mergers than tender offers. The market may value friendly 
mergers more highly than hostile tender offers. Or there m ay be a unique industry effect 
in the hospitality industry.
Cash offer bidders earn slightly positive but significant returns. Bidder returns from 
stock offers are positive but insignificant. The findings support information asymmetry 
and signaling theories. For the last 20 years, cash deals have made up 55.6% o f M&As in 
the hospitality industry. The results suggest that bidder returns are more likely to be 
positive with mergers using cash offers.
There are only 3 REIT bidders. The returns o f  these 3 REIT bidders are negative but 
not statistically significant and the returns o f  nonREIT bidders are positive and 
significant. Again, this might be an indication o f  agency problems, hubris, unique 
regulations or tax consideration to REITs, and needs further investigation. Bidder returns 
are positive and significant when the target is private; however, they are not significantly 
different from zero w hen the target is public. Table 32 summarizes the results o f 
hypotheses tests for both target and bidder returns.
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Table 32
Summary o f Hypotheses Tests fo r  both Target and Bidder Returns
Hypotheses Targets Null
Hypothesis
Rejected
(Y/N)
Hypotheses Bidders Null
Hypothesis
Rejected
(Y/N)
H I Total targets Y H2 Total bidders Y
H l-1 Gaming Y*(i) H2-1 Gaming Y
H l-2 Restaurant Y H2-2 Restaurant N
H l-3 Hotel Y H2-3 Hotel Y
H l-4 NonHospitality N ---
H l-5 M ean
difference
N H2-4 M ean
difference
N
H3-1 Tender offer Y H5-1 Tender offer N
H3-2 M erger Y H5-2 M erger Y
H3-3 M ean
difference
N H5-3 M ean
difference
N
H4-1 Cash offer Y H6-1 Cash offer Y
H4-2 Stock offer Y H6-2 Stock offer N
H4-3 M ixed offer Y H6-3 M ixed offer N
H4-4 M ean
difference
N H6-4 M ean
difference
N
Note. Significant at the 10% level, p  = .062
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Recommendations for Future Study 
There are some limitations to this comprehensive study regarding mergers and 
acquisitions in the hospitality industry. The proportion o f REIT bidders compared to 
nonREIT bidders in the multiple regression analyses is very small. W ithout the REIT 
bidder variable, however, the equations are not statistically significant. Also, the 
coefficient o f  determination (R^) for the multiple regressions in this study is small and the 
model could m ost likely be improved by including more relevant variables, such as, 
financial information, ownership structures, subsidiary targets, size o f  both firms, 
multiple bidders, cross board acquisition, and so on. Also, although this study includes 
all the available M &As and the sample size meets the minimum required ratio o f 5 
observations to I independent variable, the target sample size o f  63 is still somewhat 
small. A small sample size lowers statistical power and increases type II error which is 
the probability o f  failing to reject the false null hypothesis (Hair et ah, 1998).
This study analyzes the cumulative abnormal returns for a 2 day window (-1 to 0). 
This type of study can be performed for a longer window period (-5 to 0, -5 to +5, -10 to 
0, or -30 to 0). The returns from a longer window can be compared to returns from the 
short window to examine the possibility o f information leakage. In addition, a longer 
window could give larger returns. This would make it easier for the researcher to analyze 
the impact o f method o f  paym ent and nature o f the acquisition.
There are many reasons for firms to be involved in M&As. One is the potential 
synergy from M&As; the benefit from a new technology, a new product, and the 
expansion o f market share. M erging companies hope to bring something unique to better 
their operation, eliminate redundancies, and become a more efficient, capable, and
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profitable company. Halibozek & Kovacich (2005) claim that more than half o f M&As 
fail to accomplish the anticipated or planned results. Are hospitality industry M&As 
different from other industries? To examine whether M&As are successful in the long 
term, the post acquisition performance needs to be studied. There are many reasons for 
failing M&As including hubris, overpayment, overconfidence o f management, agency 
problems, cultural differences, technology problems and so on. A post acquisition study 
could identify the reasons why some M&As are successful and others are not.
Target returns are generally higher than bidder returns. Some researchers claim it is 
due to the typically disparate size between targets and bidders. Target firms are generally 
smaller than bidding firms. Pem steiner (2000) finds the larger the bidder relative to the 
target, the higher the premium paid in hotel mergers and acquisitions. A future study 
could control the size o f  the firms to test the size effect on target and bidder cumulative 
abnormal returns.
Summary
This chapter presented the findings, implications, contributions and limitations o f the 
study. A positive return for both target and bidder indicates there m ay be a synergistic 
gain from M&As. Findings o f bidder returns by method o f  payment support information 
asymmetry and signaling theory. This study contributes as the first comprehensive 
merger and acquisition study in the hospitality industry including industry types, nature 
of acquisition and method o f  payment. Due to the limitation o f  small sample size for 
tender offers and REIT status firms, the findings might not be generalizable. 
Recommended avenues for future study include increasing the sample size, and including
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additional relevant variables to improve the multiple regression models.
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